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Preface
In the past, intensive interest in Soviet research and development has been
sporadic both in the West and in the USSR. The end of the 1980s coincided
with the demise of the Soviet model of economic development. As a result,
a surge of attention has been given to the factors driving the motor of Soviet
growth and development, as well as R&D. The opening, first, of the Soviet
and, subsequently, of the Russian economy, finally exposed it to global stan-
dards. The long period of international isolation with respect to scientific
and technological exchanges made it difficult for scholars and policy makers
at home and abroad to measure the status of Soviet advances. Consequently,
some overrated the levels, while others underestimated them. Now it comes
to light that, although the Soviets put the first satellite in space (Sputnik)
and developed their own hydrogen bomb, these were more the exceptions
of innovation from research results rather than the rule. Therefore, as the
management of the entire economy increasingly malfunctioned, so did the
management of R&D in contributing to economic growth and development.
There is no denying the incredible investment of the former Soviet state
in domestic science and research. The R&D community was one of the
largest, if not the largest, in the world during the second half of the twentieth
century. Now, Russia has inherited not only this enormous resource, but also
the inadequate organization, management, and structure. There is a fear of
losing some of the valuable potential but a need to rationalize, increase
productivity and efficiency, and reorient according to market signals. Russia
is in a unique position. The transition to a market economy at a time when
research and technological processes are becoming more international than
ever provides great opportunities for reorganizing and restructuring the R&D
sector to be representative of and conducive to such a transformation. The
impact on economic benefits for the domestic and world economies could be
substantial, and should not be underestimated.
The purpose of this study is to provide a clear picture of the R&D
resources and management that were created under the former Soviet-style
system and of the roots and prospects of the present reform movement.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
An excerpt from a book on the logic of a planned economy illustrates how
the author, Pawel Dembinski, interestingly formulates the perception of the
average man in the street in a centrally planned economy:
There's no unemployment, and yet nobody works.
Nobody works, and yet the plan gets fulfilled.
The plan gets fulfilled, and yet there's never anything in the shops.
There's never anything in the shops, and yet every fridge is full.
Every fridge is full, and yet everyone complains.
Everyone complains, and yet the same people keep getting elected.
[Dembinski, 1991, p. xiii]
This statement has become more than just an anecdote; particularly
toward the end of the Soviet-style of government, it became indicative of
the system's functioning and finally synonymous with the definition of the
system. The problems described in this quote became systematic, actually
rooted in the politico-economic structure of the Soviet system. No sector of
the economy was spared, including research and development (R&D). The
management, organization, and motivations of the R&D sector led to a con-
fusing situation with its very own logic. The same quality scientific resources
that launched Sputnik satellites into space were simultaneously incapable of
incorporating sufficient technological potential into the production process
in order to progressively improve consumer welfare.
Such paradoxes combined with other more basic issues such as linguis-
tic problems inhibiting personal contacts and knowledge of foreign scientific
literature have led Western experts to perceive certain gaps in the Soviet
R&D or the more general scientific and technological system. Despite these
gaps, Westerners often underestimated Soviet scientific performance in spe-
cific fields.
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Indeed, today little doubt remains that the size of the scientific com-
munity in the former Soviet Union was enormous. The size was a function
of the resources devoted to its development based on the status of science
perceived by members of society and politicians. The incredible and consis-
tent ideological commitment over the decades, since the birth of the Soviet
Union, gave the region potential beyond that recognized by foreign ana-
lysts. Although this sector has been inbred with the customary problems
associated with Soviet Communist economics, and the resolution of some of
these problems may prove painful, the R&D sector is much more a blessing
than a burden in the transition to a future market economy in the successor
republics of the former USSR.
Reforms introduced to realize the transition to a market economy have
opened the door to bring the largest successor republic, the Russian Federa-
tion, back onto the world stage as a major player in science and technology.
In order to be in a position to best consider the alternatives, a thorough
analysis of the Soviet R&D sector is required. This book undertakes to show
how the Soviet model of scientific and technological development serves as
a case study of the influence of the management of R&D on past and future
economic and social factors of the region.
1.1 The Topic
1.1.1 Research and development
Over time, research and development has become an almost superficial de-
scription that appears to indicate a single activity. It is, of course, much
more. In fact, these words represent complex processes that are the basis of
technological change, which is, in turn, essential for an improvement in our
well-being. Investment in and management of research and development are
crucial factors in determining the style of economic growth and development
a nation will follow.
Although the elements of research and development support one another,
some fundamental characteristics are different between them: namely, the
objectives, the relationship to the needs of society, and the viewpoint and in-
tellectual characteristics of the practitioners (O'Brien, 1964, p. 659). Even in
a planned economy, where the policies concerning the R&D sector originate
almost solely in state priorities, the distinctions are upheld.
In this study, the often imprecise terms of science, research, engineering,
development, and technology conform to the following generally accepted
definitions:
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• Science: The accumulated knowledge of the physical world and the pro-
cess of extending this knowledge.
• Research: The process of investigation and experimentation aimed at the
discovery and interpretation of new facts and relationships for practical
and theoretical application.
• Engineering: The process of utilizing the results of science and research
to design, develop, and build specific equipment and systems.
• Development: The phase in which the objective sought is beyond the
current state of the art and in which new design concepts are evalu-
ated and improved by experimentation, usually guided and evaluated
by analysis.
• Technology: The product of the cumulative means employed to provide
objects necessary for human sustenance and comfort.
Essentially, each factor contributing to technological advance has direct
or indirect links with all of the others. Technological advance is the key
catalytic factor to raise productivity and spur the economic growth process.
Implicitly or explicitly it is assumed that there is a production function relat-
ing the input of the resources applied to R&D to the output of technological
advance (Nelson et al., 1967, p. 23). The production function for technology
is actually a combined product curve, incorporating numerous factors in-
cluding those listed above.[l] It was, after all, Friedrich Engels, close friend
and colleague of Karl Marx, who pointed out that: "Technology depends to
a considerable extent on the state of science, science depends to a far greater
degree on the state and requirements of technology" (cited by Lane, 1985,
p. 298).
The management of R&D refers to the style in which R&D is structured,
organized, operated, and governed in the science and technology (S&T) com-
munity. Any particular method of R&D management attempts, in some
manner, to find a balance between two main objectives:
1. The risks associated with investing human and capital resources for the
production of innovations and technological change.
2. The benefits that accrue to individuals and to the system as a whole
depending on the effectiveness of the R&D investment (referred to as
commercialability).
The system of R&D management in the former Soviet Union is the focus
of this study. It was one in which the management, like in other sectors of
the economy, was centrally organized on a planning basis influenced in part
by various, often unclear, bargaining procedures between components of the
hierarchy. The basic environment was not a market economy; there was no
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consumer-originating demand and no democratic decision-making process
like that which occurs in many Western countries.
In a general sense, economists have long neglected the crucial relation-
ship between technological advance and economic growth and development.
Nor have the components of technological change, such as science and re-
search and development, been accorded their actual importance for the ex-
pansion of output and the improvement in universal social well-being. Of
course, since Robert Solow's influential 1957 article calling attention to the
importance of technological change in American economic growth, attitudes
and emphases have been modified. Today the topic continues to be of lead-
ing interest, and many issues remain controversial. Nevertheless, there is
agreement that economic analysis of this source of growth can provide an
indication of the implications and effects of the public policy toward R&D
in a particular economic system.
1.1.2 R&D and growth in the Soviet/Russian context
The analysis in this paper provides evidence of the critical need for modifying
Soviet-style science and technology management in order to foster modern
economic growth. This study depicts the mismatch between new technology
and the old institutions in the USSR (and now the Russian Federation) as
one of the main reasons for the productivity slowdown and one of the key
impediments to economic growth and development in the second half of the
twentieth century.
The USSR possessed many of the requirements to facilitate a move away
from the stubbornly adhered to paradigm of old-style growth. The country
has vast amounts of natural resources, generous stocks of human capital, a
highly developed educational system, an enormous market size, and many
other beneficial attributes.[2] Thus, it is to some extent incomprehensible
(other than due to the obviously different political denomination) why the
Soviet Union did not achieve over the past few decades a level of development
or modern-style growth that would more adequately resemble its potential.
The problems lie in the Marxist legacy persevered in the USSR and
modified to fit the Stalinist approach to extensive economic development;
this legacy resulted in an emphasis of scientific rather than technological
advancement in all sectors except the military sector. Under the shrouds
of strict socialism that ensured the forced continuation of a planned mar-
ket economy, the system led to a complete distortion of incentives, focused
production on specific industries (many of which have become unimportant
for modern development and reduced the requirements for more advanced
research and technological standards), gave quantity priority over quality,
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and made productivity a secondary goal. The accompanying isolation re-
moved the influence of foreign competition, restricted technology transfer,
and led to a policy of importing capital with embodied technology rather
than knowledge upon which future economic progress could be based. The
imported technology was used until it became obsolete; further domestic
development to improve the national technology base and its international
status was not encouraged. The whole system lacked proper management of
research and technology (R&T) at the foundation; it was inefficient, some-
times even unproductive, and generally far from being market determined,
particularly with respect to consumer products.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia inherited both
the great resources invested in R&D during the Soviet Communists' rule
and the problematic organizational structure that did not fit into a country
attempting to undergo the transition to a market economy. In the future,
change to modern-style economic growth could lead to rapid development
and great growth in the Russian Federation. Bridging the technology gap
by beginning an energetic catch-up that effectively uses inherited resources
could be one of the paths to economic growth and development. If this
should take place, it may influence the overall situation in world markets.
The growth and development characteristic of the Japanese economy
since World War II is an example of the realization of economic potential
given certain prerequisites. Japan had been devastated by World War II.
In 1950, agricultural production and industrial production were still below
the levels of the early 1930s - a perilous situation in light of the rapidly
expanding Japanese population at the time (Denison and Chung, 1976).
Credit was being freely extended by the government in hopes of expanding
production, and inflation was a high three-digit number. The introduction of
a well-defined market system facilitating competition (not just allowing but
simultaneously encouraging participation in the world market), emphasis on
technology and knowledge versus capital equipment, and application of R&D
to a strong domestic base led the way to social prosperity and economic and
technological leadership.
Whether a similar potential destiny might take place in the former USSR
remains to be seen. The history, developments, and issues concerned with
R&D management within the science and technology sector and how these
affected the Soviet past and how they may influence the Russian future is
the topic of this study. The more precise objectives are reviewed in detail in
Section 1.2.
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1.2 The Study
1.2.1 Major objectives
The objectives of this study treat the practical issues that have arisen during
the discussions on the reorganization of the science and technology establish-
ment, or more narrowly the research and development sector, as it existed
in the former Soviet Union. This sector, now essentially existing within the
Russian Federation, must be reformed to accommodate the changes through-
out the country in its effort to develop a market economy. Due to its impact
on technological advances and consequent influences on economic growth and
development, research and development has an important role in securing
the potential of the emerging market economy at home and internationally.
In the Soviet/Russian case this role may prove to be even more pivotal due to
the fundamental position these factors had in the former centrally planned
economic system. So, as often happens in history, the past has become
consequential for the future.
Discussions with previously Soviet and presently Russian scholars and
policy makers reveal the extent of the problems caused by decades of intel-
lectual isolation and adherence to the Soviet way of doing things. Namely,
substantial deficiencies seem to exist with respect to the knowledge of the
Soviet scientific community's true standing in relation to those of the leading
Western industrialized nations that Soviet politics professed to be superior
to. In addition, already in the final ye9-rs of the Brezhnev era and more vig-
orously during Gorbachev's perestroika period, issues arose questioning the
productivity and efficiency of the enormous investment in basic and applied
R&D. Indeed, some experts queried whether the rate of return had not fallen
too low (or even became negative) to warrant continuing in the existing fash-
ion. Thus, the need for reorganizing and restructuring the management of
R&D is obvious. But how, if one knows not one's position with respect to
the rest of the world, and especially to those nations one thought one was
competing with?
While these questions provide sufficient reasons for a detailed review of
Soviet research and development, the treatment of the topic in Western liter-
ature, which has been politely described as less than exhaustive, emphasizes
this need. Whether the problems lie in the inaccessibility and/or lack of
consistent, reliable data or, perhaps, simply in a lack of researchers in the
field, there is still much that can be done.[3] It is difficult to make good
judgments about the depth and potential of Soviet/Russian R&D from a
Western (and, for that matter, from an Eastern) perspective. Many of the
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predictions and reviews of the past have been revealed as not completely
reflecting reality.
Today, in light of the dramatic political and economic transition to a
market economy, an up-to-date, comprehensive, and comparative account of
the R&D sector is more important than ever and can be a valuable contri-
bution to decision-making materials. Even in an established market system,
the precise contribution of R&D to economic growth remains an unresolved
issue; during the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market
economy one can imagine how contentious the arguments for and against
R&D may become. The situation in Russia and other Central and Eastern
European countries is more crucial as they have begun to feel the budget
crunch and are searching for places to cut government spending - in many
cases, R&D is high on the budget-cutting list. Consequently, the future
looks precarious.
These immediate needs are addressed in this work. This study provides
important material, much of which has not yet been published in Western
sources, to interested parties in Russia, other formerly planned economies in
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and the West, where experts aspiring
to assist frequently lack adequate background information. Of course, due
to the organizational and structural similarities inherent in sharing the same
Soviet-style central planning system, policy makers from the smaller CEE
nations could gain valuable insights from this study. Although it is impossi-
ble to cover all aspects, the goal here is to fill in as many pieces of the puzzle
as possible and advance the work on this topic.
Therefore, it is in this spirit that a great effort is made in this book to
describe and compare the Soviet R&D sector. Much is made of the compara-
tive aspect throughout the work. The relative perspective is often presented
in a thorough manner in which it has not been done before. In summary,
the main objectives of this study can be stated as follows:
• To offer an up-to-date review of the status of Soviet research and de-
velopment and its position in the Soviet-style economic system, using
previously unpublished Soviet sources (including interviews) and exist-
ing Western literature concerned with Soviet science and technology.
• To provide a historical and international comparison of the resources
available to the Soviet R&D community and of its output with those
available to other developed nations and newly industrialized nations.
• To emphasize the valuable elements of the R&D establishment and ac-
companying components created under the former Communist regime
in Russia's bid to rejoin the world scientific and economic communities.
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• To discuss the requirements for a new style of R&D management to
complement such a formidable goal.
1.2.2 Organization of the book
The analysis is carried out using a descriptive and international comparative
approach. Most of the book is devoted to a historical analysis, but efforts
are made to link this historical analysis with potential implications for the
future.
Chapter 2 deals with theoretical considerations related to research and
development. Emphasis is given to the catalytic character of R&D for eco-
nomic growth, development, and improvement of social welfare. There are
two parts to the chapter; the first part reviews the relevant theory, and the
second part covers the empirical evidence - that is, the studies that have
already been conducted in the West to provide numerical evidence of the
R&D contribution to the level and style of growth.
Chapter 3 treats technological development, growth, and R&D man-
agement and is also divided into two parts. The first part discusses how
R&D management can make a difference and ties this impact to techno-
logical progress and subsequently growth prospects. The second part is
concerned specifically with these factors within the setting of the former
Soviet Union. It begins with a general introduction to the economic and
technological standing of the Soviet Union and then turns to the specifics
of the R&D sector including the actors, organization, and background ide-
ology. The chapter concludes with a two-phase review of science, research,
development, and technology in the Soviet Union before 1985 and in the
turbulent period after 1985 until the dissolution of the USSR in 1991.
Chapter 4 focuses on the inputs to the Soviet R&D sector. The three
essential components crucial to any R&D community are education, R&D
personnel, and R&D financing. The chapter reveals the enormity of the
Soviet R&D sector and the special emphasis accorded it by central policies
that resulted in the dependence on the generous state resources. The three
factors described at length and in the international perspective reveal the in-
terdependence upon one another and simultaneously the inherent difficulties
arising in the attempts at total central management.
Chapter 5 concentrates on the internationalization of Soviet research
and technology. The chapter looks at foreign direct investment, transna-
tional corporations and joint ventures, involvement in international scientific
activities, technology gaps and trade, domestic and foreign government bar-
riers, and several other points. Comparisons are drawn whenever possible
Research and Development Management 9
to the Soviet system, where the presence or lack of particular international
aspects directly influences the techno-economic growth and development.
Chapter 6 is not exactly specific to the R&D issue, but a somewhat more
general problem is discussed that has in no small part affected the style of
management of Soviet research and development. It addresses the influence
of the central planning system and the bargaining, which was characteristic
of the Soviet-style system, on R&D. Basically, the chapter attempts to re-
veal the extent of the ample supply of natural and human resources at the
disposal of Soviet planners and how these may have actually been burdens
of abundance to a more productive R&D sector.
Finally, Chapter 7 discusses R&D management in transition, implying
the conversion of the R&D sector governed by the rules of the former Soviet-
style system to an integrated component of the emerging market economy in
the Russian Federation. This chapter reviews potentially valuable elements
of the R&D sector created under the former regime that, under new circum-
stances, could contribute to growth and development. The chapter closes by
discussing the requirements of a good R&D organization and how it could
contribute to economic growth.
The study ends with a summary of the main findings of each chapter
and some final conclusions.
Notes
[1] For example, the rate of advance of technical understanding has probably been
related to the number of educated employees engaged in R&D (Nelson et al.,
1967, p. 17). In a more specific example of the manufacturing industry, Nelson
(1980, p. 146) found that the differences in the pace of technological change
responsible for productivity growth reflected disparities in R&D spending and
R&D effectiveness. This subject is discussed further in Section 2.1.
[2] These resources, however, could have been a critical part of the reason why
the old path was so fondly maintained; see discussion in Chapter 4. They may
remain obstacles to rapid change in the future.
[3] Stephen Fortescue has just made a recent bibliographical review of pertinent
material covering science and technology in the Soviet Union. His essay and
lists, which are divided according to topics such as history, ideology, structure,
behavior, and the future, are presented as an article in the Soviet Studies Guide
(1992).

Chapter 2
Research and Development
and Economic Theory
The optimal organization of research and development (R&D) in a market
economy is one of the unsettled questions of economics. R&D has great ex-
ternalities that make its support more complicated than the support needed
for most goods. In a market system the private benefits and private costs
are contrasted to approximate the social welfare. Thus, the organization of
R&D has become a key issue in the transition to a market system of the
former centrally planned economies. This is particularly true for the former
USSR, which has been a major source of science and technology.
The phenomenon of technological change and the need to keep up with
that change are not new. The impact of improved production and new in-
vention and thus increased productivity, efficiency, quality, comfort, and real
output per capita have, in the past, had important economic (in industry and
commerce), social, and political consequences. Technology has facilitated the
inception of solutions to pressing economic problems (Le., hunger, disease,
working conditions), and is paving the way to answers that are required to
deal with the continual flow of today's urgent issues such as sustainability
of development, economic reform, conservation of resources, environmental
issues, and the "quality of life" (which includes value of leisure time and
time allocation). In addition, technological change transforms the structure
of firms and industries and the basic nature of competition in an economy
(Rosegger, 1980, p. 3). Thus, it is the technological change that causes
changes in productivity that influence the progress and style of economic
growth.
In general, technology consists of research, development, and related in-
vestments in new technology. Technological change is described as being
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either disembodied or embodied.[l] Disembodied change happens automat-
ically; that is, it requires no investment in plants and equipment. The iso-
quant curves of the production function shift toward the origin with time,
independent of changes in the factor inputs (Stoneman, 1983, p. 4). On the
other hand, embodied change is introduced into the productive process by
being inherent in new investments of either capital or labor (i.e., as machin-
ery, equipment, or personnel with new skills). The rate and direction of,
and inevitably the influence on, related economic factors (such as growth
and standard of living) of embodied technological advance are functions of
the economic environment in which the change occurs.
The results of numerous studies on the private and social rates of return
on agricultural and industrial research and development (in some cases this
included extension or diffusion assistance) in a market-oriented economy
show that the rates are not only positive, but also quite high. Therefore,
based on the consensus that productivity growth is largely determined by
the pace of technological progress, it is actually the underlying spending
on and effectiveness of research and development activity, which is at the
heart of technological change, that directly influence the progress and style
of economic growth.[2] Overall, technological progress is inhibited via social,
institutional, and economic difficulties.
Economic and technological advantages depend on changes in manage-
ment organization and behavior. These exist most beneficially as dynamic
processes and not in static states. According to most of the studies to date,
the rate of technological change is by no means constant. It occurs in what
Joseph Schumpeter referred to as creative gales of destruction. Schumpeter
also emphasized that this process of change is characterized by both or-
ganizational innovations and technical innovations (originating in applied
R&D) and their interdependence. Therefore, modern-style growth and, con-
sequently, development of a national economy result in part when individuals
and firms (in particular, private ones) commit resources to search for ways
of doing things better, usually in the form of new institutional or technical
technology. The critical point is that these economic agents primarily act in
this manner because they expect future economic gains.
2.1 Characteristics of R&D: The Theory
More than two centuries ago, Adam Smith, the father of economics, identi-
fied the division of labor, free markets, and technical change in the form of
new machines as the three important causes of increasing incomes (Coombs
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et al., 1987, p. 138). Until the 1950s, there appeared to be a relative ne-
glect of the issues associated with technological change. Since then there has
been a surge of interest in this topic, and, today, technological progress has
been generally recognized and subsequently verified as a key driving force
of long-term economic growth and development. Economic growth indicates
simply more output, while economic development implies the alterations
of the technological and institutional establishments that make more out-
put possible. Technical innovation, namely, research and development, is a
crucial source of dynamism in capitalist economies. However, science and
technology alone confer no economic benefits. Achieving economic benefits
requires commercialization, which takes production and marketing skills.
Numerous theoretical and quantitative studies by scholars, such as
Joseph Schumpeter early on and later Robert Solow, Edward Denison, Ed-
win Mansfield, and Zvi Griliches, have on the whole, supported this thesis.[3]
Technological progress is an essential element that facilitates development
simultaneously with growth and not just growth in an economy. This means
that growth and development are to a certain extent dependent on science
and technology policy and, more specifically, on the management of research
and technology. The effects of reasonably successful management influence
the incentive structure and motivation as well as the welfare of society, and
inherently also influence national and international competition.
The organization of science and technology often reflects the organiza-
tion of the economy. Changes attributed to a modernizing world require
nations to appropriately and rapidly adjust their efforts in science and engi-
neering research and development to secure a basis for improving the stan-
dard of living.
A thorough investigation of the management of the factors of techno-
logical change and the inevitable importance of and need for an optimal
organization of research and development to achieve modern-style economic
growth reveals that pure economic analysis, by itself, is inadequate. As a
result of the nature of R&D activities, which are variable, disorderly, uncer-
tain, often unpredictable, and nonuniform, scholars agree that conventional,
or orthodox, economic theory cannot clearly explain the reality of R&D
processes. [4] Nevertheless, a review of the literature covering the relevant
theory is essential to obtain an understanding of the influence of R&D on
the productive process and thus on the development of living standards.
In a market economy, fluctuations in the inventory of technical knowl-
edge are the result of changes in expenditures on R&D by private firms, by
the government, and by groups or individuals in universities and other non-
profit and nongovernmental research institutions. This inventory is cumula-
tive; therefore, what may often appear as an impressive new technological
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Figure 2.1. R&D-induced technological change shifts the supply curve.
advancement is usually the result of countless smaller advances of related
research and development.
Evidence indicates that the majority of the research undertaken results
in returns in excess of costs to the firm (profit) and that, in general, the
benefits to society are greater than the benefits to the firm (Braunstein et
ai., 1980, p. 19). Under conventional market conditions, R&D expenditures
are the main contribution that ensure the availability of technology as a
good that is introduced into the market because it appears profitable to
do so. Profit incentives are themselves affected by many aspects of the
economic climate. Thus, productivity and growth, as well as development,
may improve, become stagnant, or decline depending on the incentives to
invest in R&D.
Today, as never before, it is necessary for producers to find ways of
modifying their products or introducing new products, in each case reducing
the costs of and improving the methods of production to remain competitive.
Investments in research and development of technologies in any industry
- medical, electronics, chemical, automotive, aeronautics - facilitate lower
costs of production, higher quality, and new products. At a given price, a
change in technology that decreases production costs will increase profits.
This profit incentive tends to result in increased production, shifting the
entire supply curve(s) to the right (see Figure 2.1).
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This complete shift of the supply curve indicates a change in the quantity
supplied at each price (P) of that quantity (Q). Due to this shift, the area
under the demand (D) curve and above the new price P', known as the con-
sumers' surplus, has increased by the area PEE'P' (E equals equilibrium).
Thus, the difference between the total value consumers place on all units
consumed of a particular commodity (produced better, cheaper, or at all
due to the technological advance) and the actual payment for the purchase
of the same amount of the commodity has increased in their favor. In the
presence of competitive market conditions, economists have used the area
under a product's demand curve between the original curve and the shifted
supply curve 5' to measure the social benefits from an innovation (Braun-
stein et al., 1980, p. 29). Ceteris paribus, these benefits are a combination
of the social value of the additional quantity of the product available and
the social value of the resources saved as a result of the successful innova-
tion. Consequently, if the contribution of R&D and other inputs relating to
the innovation are compared with the related accruing social benefits mea-
sured in the way described here, it is possible to estimate the social rate of
return from the investment in the innovation for a selected time interval.
Economists like Griliches and Mansfield have made significant contributions
in this field. Some of their work is reviewed in Section 2.2.
Another method of demonstrating the influence of research and devel-
opment (via technological change) on the economy is with the production
function. It can be represented graphically as a series of isoquants called iso-
product curves. This function shows the relationship between the maximum
level of output that can be achieved by each and every combination of inputs.
For example, in the iso-product curve in Figure 2.2, Q indicates a given level
of output that is produced using various combinations of capital (K) and
labor (L) based on the existing state of knowledge in technology (Freeman
and Soete, 1987, p. 40). Under completely competitive market conditions,
the location of the curve depends on the particular production method and
the relative prices of the inputs. Generally, the curve is convex to the origin
and downward-sloping implying that both factor inputs are subject to the
law of diminishing returns and that each has a positive marginal product.
If capital becomes relatively more expensive, then more labor will be
utilized, indicating a movement along the curve down and to the right; an
increase in the relative cost of labor will force movement up and to the left
along the curve. Therefore, a change in the relative prices of the inputs
will cause movement along the curve Q. In contrast, a useful technological
innovation should shift the entire curve toward the origin to a new position
Ql. From Figure 2.2 it can be seen that the successful implementation of a
technological innovation resulting from R&D activities makes it possible to
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produce the given level of output with less inputs. This process can also be
represented by an upward shift of the conventional production function (the
Cobb-Douglas style) from pH to pt2, where pH is the level of production
at the original state of knowledge and pt2 is the level with the technological
innovation (see Figure 2.3).
The technological change illustrated by the parallel shift of the iso-
product curve, or production function, toward the origin in Figure 2.2 is
characteristic of the neutral type of technological change. Previously in this
chapter we have alluded to the term biased technological advance, which,
unlike the curve in Figure 2.2, is a non-neutral shift of the curve. If the new
technical change, considered to be disembodied and at constant prices, is
expected to require proportionately more capital than that which is needed
at the original level (Ql), the new relevant production function isoquant
moves to Q3; if proportionately more labor is required, a shift to Q4 will be
the result (see Figure 2.4).
Following Stoneman (1983, p. 4), Figure 2.4 can also be shown mathe-
matically. The traditional production function, where output is a function
of factor inputs, capital (K) and labor (L), for a given time period (t), is
written as
Q = F(K,L;t)
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Assuming that the function has positive first-order and negative second-
order derivatives with respect to the inputs and that it can be rewritten in per
capita form, it can be rearranged to explicitly account for factor-augmenting
technological advance:
Q = F(K, L; t) =G{b(t)K, a(t)L} .
Placing a dot C) above a particular variable to indicate the derivative
with respect to time, b(t) = iL(t), which is the shift Ql --+ Q2 in Figure
2.4, represents a neutral change also referred to as Hicks's neutral technical
change. In this case, the efficiencies of both inputs have increased so that
the capital-labor ratio remains unchanged - the marginal rate of substitution
between K and L does not change with a change in technology. In other
words, the new iso-product curve, Q2, uses the same optimal combination
of inputs as Ql:
Q2 : iL(t) = b(t) ,
Q3 : b(t) = 0 and iL(t) > 0 ,
Q4 : b(t) > 0 and iL(t) = 0
The shift from Ql --+ Q3 is an example of labor-augmenting or Harrod's
neutral technological change and occurs when b(t) = 0 and iL(t) > O. This
so-called labor-saving advance is a substitute for labor if, at a constant level
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of capital productivity, output will be raised at a given labor input (Free-
man and Soete, 1987, p. 36). The shift Q1 -+ Q\ referred to as capital-
augmenting (or Solow's neutral) technological change, occurs when b(t) > 0
and a(t) = O. This so-called capital-saving technical progress acts as a sub-
stitute for capital; in the presence of a constant level of labor productivity,
output can be increased at a given capital input. Only the Cobb-Douglas
type of production function is consistent with all three concepts of technical
change.
Thus far, the theory has concentrated primarily on how technological
change as a whole fits into the production picture. Technological progress
is traditionally divided into three activities: invention, innovation, and dif-
fusion. Investments in research and development are the basic inputs that
produce technological advance. In general, economic theory suggests that
R&D will be undertaken by a particular individual, group, or firm if the
expectation to generate profits with the investment in R&D exists. One
would assume that the level of R&D expenditure is somehow proportional
to the extent and speed of technological change, thus influencing economic
growth and development. The measure to which this is true depends on the
economic forces present.
At the firm level, the profits from R&D depend on the costs required
to facilitate the advance and on the revenues from the use or marketing of
the changes (Stoneman, 1983, p. 30). Of course, profits vary depending on
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the success of the technological change. A special characteristic of R&D
spending as an investment to generate a future flow of benefits is its uncer-
tainty. At the outset of a new R&D project, whether a stock of knowledge
exists in the field or not, it is extremely difficult to accurately predict the
costs required to achieve the objective. Consequently, a prediction about
the amount and timing of a future stream of benefits, especially under com-
petitive conditions, would appear to be even more uncertain.
Despite the fact that the conventional theory often seems insufficient to
thoroughly explain empirical results, no account of the influence of R&D
on economic processes would be complete without a review of the Arrow
model. [5] The incentives to engage in R&D in monopolistic, competitive, and
socially managed economies prove to be very revealing and have considerable
implications. In this book actual R&D situations in market economies are
compared with the situations in planned economies.
Figure 2.5 depicts an industry facing a demand curve, DD', and a
marginal revenue function, MR. Assuming profit maximization and initial
costs at co, the competitive market price would be at Co and the quantity
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at QOe, while the monopoly would produce at POrn and QOm, respectively.
Consequently, the monopoly profit (1r0) is PomABco.
On the presumption that R&D has resulted in a new technology facili-
tating a drop in unit costs of production to Cl, the monopoly figures for price
and output change to Plm and Qlm, respectively. Now monopoly profits are
PlmFGcl, an increase of (PlmFGcl - PomABco). In a competitive situation,
Arrow contends that the inventor controlling the new technology will sell it
in the market charging a royalty, the level of which will be between Co - Cl
and Plm - Cl' He further asserts that the competitive profits from a new
technology are greater than those in a monopolistic environment, conclud-
ing that a competitive market provides the greatest incentives for a firm to
invest in R&D. There are conflicting opinions among scholars of economics
of technological change with respect to this conclusion.
Nevertheless, reasonable consensus does exist with respect to a subse-
quent point made by Arrow. Namely, the incentives to both competitive and
monopoly industries are less than the potential social benefits (Stoneman,
1983, p. 32). The socially managed market would generate social profits
equivalent to the area coEHcl in Figure 2.5: larger than the potential profits
under either competitive conditions or monopolistic conditions. This would
indicate a tendency to underinvest in a purely market economy and that a
socially managed or planned economy should be most capable of achieving
the optimal (meaning most profitable and least wasteful to maximize social
benefits) level of returns for society using the optimal level of investment in
R&D. Base on this theoretical rationale, the planned societies should reach
far superior levels of economic growth, development, and living standards
than those nations with market-oriented economies.
The theory doesn't stop there. Much theorizing has been done to under-
stand the importance of the market structure to be conducive to high returns
from R&D. To procure such benefits, some experts have hypothesized that
certain structures are more encouraging for firms to undertake research than
others. For example, only large firms with large profit potential, high market
shares in large secure markets, and the possibility of achieving economies of
scale in their R&D departments will engage in the risky operation and fi-
nancing of R&D (Stoneman, 1983, p. 46).[6] Too many firms doing research
may generate unnecessary repetition and a low productivity research process
at the industry level. Of course, the market structure varies to some degree
depending on the industrial sector.
So, considering the theoretical perspective, a country like the former
Soviet Union possessed many prerequisites for economic success. It was a
completely managed economy on the basis of achieving the social optimum,
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there were the mega-enterprises that enjoyed monopoly power and exten-
sive vertical integration, and the economy was supposedly being spared the
wasteful competition characteristic of Western economies. In textbook terms,
these elements should have created an environment especially favorable for
investing in factors, such as R&D activity to facilitate technological advance
and, consequently, modern economic development and improved social wel-
fare. At least, this is the normative interpretation. But, where are they
now?
These theoretical suggestions have not been verified; the course of his-
tory, particularly recent decades, has actually proved the contrary. This
issue is addressed in the following chapters. The second part of this chapter
reviews the results of empirical work on the understanding of the role of
R&D in the development of the national economy.
2.2 Characteristics of R&D:
The Empirical Evidence
Sixty years ago, Schumpeter emphasized the importance of endogenous and
exogenous technological change as a key force behind economic growth. He
further suggested that investments in innovation will be made in expecta-
tion of earning existing monopoly benefits while being protected by propri-
etary knowledge and/or other advantages such as patent rights (Schumpeter,
1943). In the early 1900s, Schumpeter asserted that innovation requires re-
sources such as R&D and design, which themselves abide by basic economic
principles.
In the late 1950s, other economists began turning their attention more
intensively toward the previously neglected field of empirical investigations
concerning the actual influence of R&D on output and growth. The number
of studies has grown as quickly as the popularity and importance of this
subject. The earlier works, completed approximately a quarter century ago,
form the foundation of further study and continue to be the most frequently
cited.
The economic analyses of the effects of research and development in
a market economy have covered more than just an appraisal of the costs
and benefits of R&D activities; these analyses have gone so far as to make
estimates regarding the rates of return on investments in R&D to individual
firms, in selected economic sectors, and to society at large. In addition, the
practical application of econometric methodology to actual data has been
extended to estimate the share of technological change (the product of R&D
and other inputs) in the growth of per capita output over time.
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Early studies on technological change and GNP growth.a
Author
Solowb
Fabricant"
Denisond
Griliches'
Denison!
Approximate share of technological
progress in a 1% increase of GNP
0.875
0.90
0.345 (0.50)
0.20
0.226 (0.363)
Data period
1909-1949
1871-1951
1929-1969
1973
1929-1982
a All estimates are from studies based on the US economy. The estimates vary quite widely
due to the different industries, sectors, or number of firms; the alternative definitions of
technological change and GNP; the various time periods; and differing methods of cal-
culation. However, the important point to recognize is that each study, regardless of its
differences to the others, revealed a crucial role for technological change in output growth.
bSee Solow (1957). The study is restricted to private non-farm economic activity.
cSee Fabricant (1954). The figure is based on the standard output-per-unit-of-input cal-
culation.
dSee Denison (1974). The values account for the proportional share of Denison's measure
for technological change in a 1% increase in national income and not gross national prod-
uct, though both move in a very similar fashion. The value in parenthesis includes the
contribution of rising educational attainment.
'See Griliches (1973).
fS ee Denison (1985). The first value represents the portion that advances in knowledge,
Denison's measure for technological change, contributed to the 1929-1982 growth rate of
total actual national income. The value in parenthesis includes the contribution of in-
creased educational attainment. If the focus were only on the growth rate of total actual
national income in nonresidential business during the same period, then the values would
be significantly higher at 0.31 and 0.50, respectively.
The studies in this field have utilized alternative and related measures.
The list began with only the explanation of the residual in the Cobb-Douglas
production function as the component representing the contribution of tech-
nological change to economic growth (as in Solow, 1957). Since then, the
list of measures for technological change has expanded to include: public ex-
penditure on R&D, private investment in R&D, R&D expenditures to sales
ratio, number of scientists and engineers employed, number of patents, num-
ber of innovations, capital vintages employed, and new capital investments
to name a few. More recently, the work has primarily focused on the indus-
trial manufacturing sector ,[7] though the other sectors of the economy have
also been analyzed. In fact, the earliest studies were carried out concerning
the agricultural sector (Griliches, 1958 and 1964).
The figures from the studies presented in Table 2.1 seem to undoubt-
edly indicate that technological change not only has an influence, but is
the single most influential factor determining the total growth of the mar-
ket economy's output. Although the results of the investigations vary, they
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coincide with respect to the positive and substantial contribution of R&D-
based technological advance to increases in national product and/or income.
This conclusion gives support to the theory that technological change is one
of the key motors driving economic growth. Therefore, if this concept is
extrapolated to encompass the inputs generating technological progress, it
appears that the emphasis of the effort in R&D is a component which, to a
large extent, determines the style of economic development, the standard of
living, and, consequently, the level of welfare in an economy.
Solow's contribution to this theme in 1957 was a milestone in attempting
to generate empirical evidence for the theoretical concepts. Assuming that
factors of production (capital and labor) are paid their marginal products in
the presence of neutral technological change and constant returns to scale,
Solow developed an elementary way of segregating variations in output per
head due to technical change from those due to changes in the availability
of capital per head. The results show that, for the 40 years between 1909
and 1949, the average rate of technological change was about 1.5% per year,
and during this period that 87.5% of the increase in output per man-hour
could be credited to technical change and only 12.5% to increased capital
employed per man-hour. Solomon Fabricant (1954) has achieved a similar
result (though with a different method): he attributed 90% of the increase
in output over an 80-year period ending in 1951 to technical progress.
While subsequent studies have reinforced the clear positive trend of these
early findings, the influence of technological advance on the rate of output
growth was determined to be somewhat milder than previously estimated
(Table 2.1). Griliches began with the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function and used the rate of total factor productivity growth and
rough estimates for the rate of return to research expenditures and the net in-
vestment in R&D divided by total output. He concluded that approximately
20% of the growth rate of US output was caused by R&D expenditures.
Denison, an expert analyst of economic growth and its sources, postu-
lates that, as knowledge relative to production advances, the output that can
be obtained from a given quantity of resources rises (Denison, 1967, p. 267).
Thus, he identifies technological change as advances in knowledge (AIK),
which encompass knowledge of the technological and the managerial and
organizational types, so long as they permit reduction in unit costs (Deni-
son, 1974, p. 112). Denison has made repeated studies using different time
periods and concluded that advances in knowledge significantly contribute
to the growth of the whole economy; 35% in the 40 years from 1929 to 1969
and 23% in the 53 years between 1929 and 1982. As noted in note f to Table
2.1, these shares would prove to be substantially higher (between 10 and 15
percentage points more) if the influence of AIK on only the growth of the
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total actual national income in nonresidential business were considered. In
addition, moving the contribution of increased educational attainment from
the general labor category to the AIK category would further enhance the
share of the latter as a determinant of growth - in Denison's experiment by
about 15 percentage points to reach 50% for the 40-year period and 36% for
the 53-year period.[8]
The work of Denison and his colleagues demonstrates that advances
in knowledge, or technological change (primarily based on the investment
in R&D), have been the largest single source of long-term growth of total
output in the USA.[9] A 20% share in the rate of sector growth has been the
lowest estimate. To justify the enthusiasm surrounding the empirical results
that permit an endorsement of the importance of technological change and
consequently the appropriate management of R&D for economic growth, a
comparison is made between the US values (upon which the discussion has
been based until this point) and those for 10 other nations (see Table 2.2).
Other than two rather low, but not disturbing, values for Canada and the
former West Germany, the evidence shows that the contribution of AIK
to the rate of growth is consistently high for all the countries. Across the
ll-country sample, advances in knowledge singly account for an average of
almost one-quarter (between 23% and 24%) of the increase in the output
over the 20-year period. While Norway, Italy, Japan, and Denmark hovered
around the average, it was clearly exceeded in the UK, France, the USA, and
Belgium, and not quite attained in the Netherlands, former West Germany,
and Canada.
The reasons for these discrepancies are many. The authors of the rele-
vant studies have identified several weaknesses in the analysis. Aside from
the general difficulties associated with the accurate measurement of input
and output variables attributed to inconsistent and creative data collection,
management, and analysis, some factors remain unaccounted for. The most
significant of these are the improvements in the quality of goods and services
provided, which do not normally contribute to growth as conventionally mea-
sured; such improvements that offer the final user a wider range of choice and
may enable him to more cost-effectively or conveniently meet his needs are
an important result of research and development. In addition, the relation-
ships between output and inputs may be misspecified, variable definitions
and concepts of R&D expenditures may prevent meaningful comparability
over time or among firms and industries; and there is no unanimous con-
sensus with respect to the depreciation rate for R&D, the length of relevant
lags, the nature of interfirm or interindustry technology flows, and so on
(Mansfield, 1984, pp. 105-106).
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Table 2.2. Shares in the growth rate of national income (selected countries
over various periods, 1948-1971).a
Advances in knowledge
Country Laborb CapitalC and n.e.c.d
Belgium 0.25 0.14 0.28
Canada 0.37 0.23 0.13
Denmark 0.16 0.26 0.21
France 0.10 0.17 0.32
Italy 0.17 0.13 0.23
Japan 0.21 0.24 0.22
Netherlands 0.21 0.26 0.18
Norway 0.04 0.26 0.26
United Kingdom 0.25 0.21 0.33
United States 0.32 0.20 0.30
West Germany 0.22 0.23 0.14
QThis table is an adaptation and a summary from Denison's work on the sources of growth
in 11 countries. See Denison (1976, pp. 39). The rows do not add to one because of the
exclusion of factors other than the advances in knowledge from Denison's category of out-
put per unit of input, standardized.
bLabor includes employment, hours worked, age-sex composition, education, and unallo-
cated employment.
CCapital includes inventories, nonresidential structures and equipment, dwellings, and in-
ternational assets.
d n .e.c. indicates not elsewhere classified.
Nevertheless, all the values illustrating the contribution of advances in
knowledge to economic growth, shown in Table 2.2, are conclusively positive,
significant, and confined to a relatively narrow range. Although the contri-
butions to the growth rate appear rather evenly split between labor, capital,
and ArK at first glance, a close scrutiny of the notes to Table 2.2 reveals
that the first two categories are a conglomerate of sources. Therefore, even
in an international sample, advances in knowledge prove once again to be
the single most important source of growth for the whole economy.
Soon after economists began studying the general concept concerning
the influence of technological change on economic growth, their interest
turned toward a more intensive investigation of the components responsi-
ble for technological advance. T1;lis process has traditionally been defined
to include research, development, and diffusion. Schumpeter's words were
invention, innovation, and diffusion, while Scherer (1965, p. 165) split the
grouping into still more categories to include invention, entrepreneurship,
investment, development, and diffusion. Essentially, and throughout this
paper, R&D are considered the main inputs for technological production
and, consequently, any change therein.
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R&D is broken down into three main elements: basic research, applied
research, and development. In most market economic systems, basic research
is primarily financed by the government, usually localized in only a few in-
dustries of national interest, such as electronics, chemicals, and aerospace,
and is mainly conducted in higher educational institutions. In a market econ-
omy, resources for applied R&D are, in principal, allocated by the market
mechanism in a decentralized manner responding to market forces (Schnei-
der, 1991, p. 9). Thus, the private sector is chiefly responsible for funding
and conducting applied R&D. It is increasingly difficult to draw a clear
distinction between research and development. Nevertheless, development
typically refers to routine as well as not so routine changes or improvements
in existing technology or organization.
Depending on prevailing economic conditions, the organization and man-
agement of these three elements can play a crucial role in determining the
style, extent, and pace of growth in an economy. This management will influ-
ence not only the behavior of producers with respect to the manner in which
they operate their facilities to reduce costs, allocate resources, increase effi-
ciency and productivity, enhance quality, and offer new products, but also
the behavior of consumers. Inevitably, appropriate management of R&D
can render a substantial contribution to the rate of growth, the standard of
living, and a generally higher level of welfare.
After the initial interest in the field began in the 1950s, the main surge of
studies that attempted to show the relationship between R&D expenditures
and the rate of productivity change came in the late 1960s and continued
throughout the 1970s (refer to Table 2.3). The results were favorably per-
suasive for the industries, firms, innovations, and time periods selected. The
statistics in Table 2.3 illustrate that R&D expenditures are consistently re-
lated to a positive private rate of return, and a very high one at that. In
the cases where the social rates of return from investment in R&D were also
calculated, the results usually proved to be substantially above the private
levels. On the whole, the studies indicate the highest returns to R&D ex-
penditures were in agriculture and more variable (though generally lower)
in other sectors or groups of enterprises.
Griliches (1964) added expenditures on extension to those on research
and included the average level of education (among other inputs as land, la-
bor, fertilizer, and machinery) in his study on farm output. In his study he
found that the marginal rate of return from R&D expenditures to be 53%.
The results of other studies in the agricultural sector (Le., by Schultz, Even-
son, and Peterson) consistently revealed a rate of return to agricultural R&D
of close to or more than 50%. In manufacturing, scientists found the rates
of return to be lower, but the statistically significant effect of R&D on the
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Table 2.3. Studies on productivity increases and R&D expenditures.
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Author
Schultza
Grilichesa
Mansfieldb
Evensona
Minasianc
Petersond
Terleckyje
Griliches!
Mansfield et aU
Mansfieldh
Approximate marginal rate of return
from R&D expenditures (%)
42
53
40+/30
57
50
50
30
17
25/56
25/70
Year
published
1953
1964
1968
1968
1969
1971
1974
1975
1977
1989
a Agricultural sector.
bpetroleum/chemical industries.
cChemical industry (17 firms from 1948 to 1957).
dPoultry industry.
e33 manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries from 1948 to 1966.
fManufacturing industry (only the private rate of return from R&D expenditures of 900
manufacturing firms).
gThe private/social rate of return from 17 industrial innovations in a variety of industries
(refer to Mansfield et al., 1977, for further details).
"The private/social rates of return for 37 innovations in a variety of industries (see Mans-
field, 1989, pp. 133-136).
rate of productivity increase remained unquestionable. R&D expenditures
were related to the rate of productivity change (Mansfield, 1968) and value
added (Minasian, 1969) in the petroleum!chemical industry and chemical
industry, respectively, to discover a similarly high rate of return.
In the 1970s Griliches also turned his attention to the industrial sector,
but focused on the firm level. He conducted an econometric study to find
that in a sample of 900 firms, the amount spent by a firm on R&D was
directly related to its rate of productivity growth. The results also implied a
private rate of return from R&D expenditures of 17%. Terleckyj's study, also
based on economic production functions, revealed a 30% rate of return in
manufacturing from an industry's R&D. With the inclusion of interindustry
technology flows, Terleckyj demonstrated the presence of a substantial effect
of an industry's R&D on the productivity in other industries, which would
imply a social rate of return higher than 30% for the industry itself (see
Section 2.1). Mansfield et al. (1977) has gone a step further. This study
investigated the private and social rates of return from the investment in
17 industrial innovations, which are 25% and 56%, respectively. Again, the
social rate clearly exceeds the private. In his most recent work, Mansfield
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(1989) has increased his sample to include 37 innovations. While the private
rate of return has remained in the vicinity of 25%, the social rate has climed
as high as 70%. Such results have induced economists to warn policy makers
of a continuing underinvestment in civilian research and development.
The studies reviewed in this section have substantially contributed to
the understanding of the relationship between research and development, on
the one hand, and productivity changes and economic growth, on the other.
Although the work has often been based on different types of methodology
and data, the results are remarkably consistent. The various investigations
indicate that the level of R&D expenditures has a considerable effect on
the magnitude and style of economic growth. Investments in new technolo-
gies lead to changes in productivity that will influence both producers and
consumers in the market. The rates of return from investing in R&D have
been positive and impressively high, with the social rate always considerably
surpassing the private rate.
Notes
[1] Further distinctions are made with respect to the direction of the technological
advance; whether it is seen as neutral or biased with respect to the capital-labor
ratio. This phenomenon is explained in greater detail in Section 2.1.
[2] Economic growth can be either modern-style or old-style. The latter is charac-
terized by the traditional method of continually adding capital and labor to the
production cycle (also known as extensive growth strategy). This is contrary to
the modern-style economic system based on improved productivity, efficiency,
and quality of output (including diversity), in that strong biases in traditional
growth create an inflexibility with respect to changing resource requirements,
technologies, and demands. Modern-style economic growth is distinguished not
only by an increase in output (positive growth), but also by a change in the
composition of output. Numerous economic catalysts drive this process; R&D
expenditures are one important example. Refer to Section 2.1 for further dis-
CUSSIOn.
[3] The works of these noted economists are listed in the References.
[4] This term is used in the evolutionary approach to economic change described in
the work of Nelson and Winter (1982, p. vii.)
[5] An excellent overview of the concepts underlying the Arrow model can be found
in Stoneman (1983).
[6] This hypothesis was originally put forward by Schumpeter (1934) and Galbraith
(1952). However, since studies have begun to recognize the importance of R&D
in the market, the role of monopoly (and more prevalently firm size) in the
initiation of R&D has remained a contentious issue. For a complete review of
this topic (including alternative views) and related empirical studies, see Kamien
and Schwartz (1975).
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[7] These studies include Mansfield (1968 and 1989), Minasian (1969), Terleckyj
(1974), Griliches (1975), and Mansfield et at. (1977).
[8] This would seem to be an appropriate adjustment as a conceptual exercise, par-
ticularly, if one agrees that educational attainment could, de facto, be considered
knowledge relevant to production advances, therefore, yielding supplementary
interesting results. Clearly, all known advantages of a larger well-educated and
well-trained work force would warrant such a reclassification for experimental
purposes.
[9] Many of the studies have been conducted using very similar data sources. Over
the years, for example, much has been taken from the output and productivity
work of John Kendrick, which constitutes a large portion of the basic material
used for the studies. Often, the methods of analysis were also quite similar.

Chapter 3
Technological Development,
Growth, and R&D
Management in the USSR
Both policy makers and scholars from the East and West have expressed
a need for an up-to-date and comprehensive account of the actual state,
structure, and progress of research and development management and or-
ganization in, what was until recently, the Soviet Union. Certain aspects
of R&D in the USSR have been reviewed and analyzed in the literature,
but a thorough overview from Western sources supported by actual Soviet
data would be beneficial to gain an understanding of this complex system
during the time of economic transition. This study aims to provide this
understanding.
Many economists and additional experts from other fields are now in-
volved in attempts to provide alternative approaches to resolve the diffi-
culties and determine the origins associated with a rate of technological
development that has increasingly been unable to offset the effects of the
growing resource scarcity and increasing demand for consumer goods. The
dilemma is intensified by the desire to maintain the verified potential of
the largest scientific establishment in the world that is, at the same time,
plagued by enormous inefficiencies and has been relatively isolated from mar-
ket activities and production techniques, to say nothing of the international
community. In order to approach the existing problems in a suitable man-
ner, the research requires an analysis of the conditions or circumstances that
brought about the unique characteristics of the Soviet economy.
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3.1 Technological Development, Growth,
and R&D Management
3.1.1 Technological development
Technological progress has been generally accepted to be a major engine
powering economic growth and development; it has been acclaimed as one
of the most influential forces in the transformation not only of productive
relationships, but also of whole cultures (Rosegger, 1980, p. 1). Proof of this
has been evident since the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century.
In the past, changes in the management and development of technology
have by no means taken place in a smooth fashion. Although technological
advance appears to occur at a continuing rate, transitions in technological
development amplify or reorient the process of change. Schumpeter uses the
phrase "creative gales of destruction." Three such transitions have molded
modern technological development and influenced the importance and man-
agement of factors supporting R&D:
1. In the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, new produc-
tion techniques emerged and the need arose to rethink the organization
of labor and other factors of production to adequately fulfill the growing
significance of efficiency and utility as goals.
2. Late in the nineteenth century, rationalization occurred by integrat-
ing scientific advances and modification of techniques into what today
is termed technology with the development of comprehensive organi-
zational strategies for production and processes. Close ties between
production and R&D, as well as its benefit-oriented management, were
becoming necessary. The result was organized innovation: a process of
moving away from the inventor-entrepreneur. Those who were originally
individual inventors became employed as researchers, while managers,
systems engineers, and financial experts took over the entrepreneurial
role in innovation.
3. In the second half of the twentieth century, the third transition was
under way: the reorientation from energy toward information and com-
munication. More than the technological transitions before it, the third
is as yet the most demanding with respect to a need for strategic think-
ing, planning, and policy development (following Rip, 1989, p. 142). To
be successfully competitive in an open environment most favorable for
economic growth and development that will result in a higher standard
of living, production must be characterized by diffusion and utilization
of technologies based on R&D management that reflects changes in the
expectations of profits and alterations in demand.
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A distinguishing feature of technological progress is its classification as
one of the essential elements that facilitates development simultaneously
with growth and not just growth in an economy.[:L] Therefore, it is the
advantage that modern-style growth has over old-style economic growth.
3.1.2 Growth and development
For one reason or another, national economic policies emphasize either old-
style economic growth, in which the fundamental goal is to increase output
by simply increasing the level of the traditional inputs of capital, labor, and
raw materials, or modern-style economic growth, where the goal is to im-
prove productivity, efficiency, and the quality of output (including diversity),
though not at the expense of a simultaneous increase in output.
Therefore, basic economic growth is simply associated with an increase
in output, while its counterpart, economic development, also incorporates
a change in the composition of output that arises as a result of the diffu-
sion of technologies that influence the methods of production (productivity),
productive capacities (efficiency), and quality of output. Old-style growth
then, by definition, is equivalent to economic growth which encompasses the
growth of production as a whole or of manufacturing, in particular, special-
ization, allocation of resources, the extension of the division of labor, and
so on. Modern-style economic growth is consequently associated with the
tendency and motivation to transform production in the direction of greater
efficiency utilizing any number of potentially available means, of which many
have been related to changes in applied technology. These changes are driven
by, among other factors, ex ante expectations of monetary and nonmonetary
benefits and ex post alterations in demand.
Growth may be achieved with or without development, but development
will not occur without growth. The most successful economies in providing
a high standard of living for the population within their borders - basically
the industrialized, market economies - prove that both are prerequisites for
a robust and hardy economic environment. Growth is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for development.
In his time, Adam Smith already alluded to the characteristics indica-
tive of modern growth. The cornerstone of his theory was the belief that
economic agents will act rationally in order to attain the highest possible
benefit for themselves. This meant that the producers would use the means
personally available to them to specialize their efforts to maximize their
profit and productivity. Ideally, this forces other producers to follow simi-
lar paths depending on their respective talents, which directly leads to the
inherent need for a market where the fruits of the labor can be exchanged.
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The competition arising from the demand for inputs and the desire to attain
individual efficiency resultingly improves the efficiency of the economy as a
whole. In order to be successful in the race for individual and aggregate
economic gain, producers must continually seek to reduce expenditures by
further specialization, accumulation, and innovation. [2] Although this state-
ment does not describe a new phenomena, it does emphasize the need for an
appropriate economic environment in which the actors have both motivation
and opportunity to support the ongoing growth of an economy.
For the market mechanism to function well, the economy to grow, and
development to be sustained, the producers need to have certain freedoms
and incentives to allocate resources and implement innovations, to appropri-
ate the full returns of investments, to commoditize their output in response
to the possibility of trade, and not to have potential improvements in indi-
vidual productivity and efficiency explicitly prohibited or strictly controlled
by political institutions (Chirot, p. 17). It appears that not only trade,
but also technology, based on both dedication to domestic R&D and active
technology transfer, have jointly become the source of the wealth of nations.
The paradigm and policies of old-style growth have persisted to varying
degrees in more or less internationally prominent and/or seemingly economi-
cally successful nations. Until recently, the traditional method of continually
adding capital and labor to the production cycle in order to directly pro-
mote growth was a principal component of Soviet-style, centrally planned
economic policy. The obsession to increase output in existing industries was
most easily and directly achieved with increases in the basic inputs. As time,
resource requirements, technologies, and demands change, strictly adhering
to this procedure inevitably retards the necessary development needed by
an economy in order to maintain an appropriate standard of living for its
citizens. Thus, not only is the development in favor of greater productivity
and efficiency inhibited, but the sustainability of production, society, and
environment, and unavoidably political institutions consequently becomes
vulnerable to deterioration and finally to collapse. Such situations become
increasingly prone to a misallocation of resources and static inefficiencies
that unavoidably drive nations into socioeconomic and often political crises.
The majority of Eastern Europe is faced with such a predicament.[3]
In the former Soviet Union, for example, shortages of bare necessities, poor-
quality consumer goods, and an incompetence of dealing with disasters drew
attention to the dismal economic situation. The roots of these problems can
be traced to the socialist dedication in the USSR to policies that have, to
a considerable extent, preserved old-style economic growth based simply on
capital accumulation. Biased research, development, and diffusion of tech-
nological innovation stand out as factors that have led to economic decline
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in the long run - a predicament aggravated in certain political environments
such as that of an administrative command-type system. In Soviet ideology,
which for the most part spilled over to its immediate western neighbors (wel-
come or not), science was certainly the key to national prosperity, but actual
implementation was not. There is something fundamentally wrong with a
system in which the fairly high-quality innovations of many sciences gener-
ally do not diffuse or translate into satisfactory or marketable (particularly
consumer) products.
Considerations arise whether the problems can be traced back to the
Marxist theory or, probably more correctly, the Stalinist legacy at the foun-
dation of Soviet-style central planning, and if the transition to a new market
system will bring the opportunity for engaging in modern-style growth. If so,
policy makers and scholars are induced to ponder the potential implications
of a move from such a threshold level to economic takeoff - particularly, with
respect to the effects on the domestic sectors and (in a large country exam-
ple) on the regional or, more importantly, world market. Uncertainty will
continue to revolve around whether these countries could in any way achieve
the relative levels of prosperity of those typified by modern-style economic
growth if they would continue on their traditional policy trajectories and
were to remain in self-inflicted technological isolation.
How have countries that have emerged from difficult situations, such as
post-World War II Japan and Germany, established economies which gen-
erate development that leads to a genuine increase in the standard of living?
Many of these countries have been forced to artificially acquire advantages
because they do not have the good fortune to be blessed with abundant nat-
ural resource reserves. In fact, a significant number of industrial countries,
which have begun to exhibit distinctly different economic growth patterns in
the recent past, have originally exhibited relatively similar situations albeit
not at the same time in history.
If a nation possesses certain selected resources (such as a complete so-
cial infrastructure, human capital, cultural strength, and political stability)
that are just waiting to be efficiently harnessed, then there exists an in-
credible potential for growth and development. These properties, combined
with a deleterious lack of natural, material resources and very thoughtful
utilization of policy measures designed to circumvent such real physical dis-
advantages,[4] released forces into the market that ignited the spectacular
growth of Japan's economy for decades and laid the foundation for the cur-
rent global microchip revolution, which originated in Japan.
So, what might be some of the reasons that a nation as rich in natural
resources and cultures and traditions, and among the world leaders in liter-
acy rate and scientific achievement in various sectors as the Soviet Union,
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becomes such a deteriorating socioeconomic monolith? Was there a lack
of appropriate, market demand-and-supply-influenced, foresighted strategies
for the management of research and development? If so, can this lack be
made significantly responsible? Should a remedy be found and implemented,
how will domestic and foreign economies respond?
3.1.3 Research and development management:
Does it make a difference?
If technological advance influences the path of growth and development,
then it follows that these two latter factors are dependent on science and
technology policy and, more specifically, on the management of research and
development. The effects of reasonably successful management influences
the incentive structure and motivation as well as the welfare of society, and
inherently national and international competitive status.
Without question, economic and technical advantages depend on
changes in the management organization and technical innovativeness of
research and development. Appropriate management is the art of dealing in-
telligently with uncertainty. Successful management of innovations requires
an active commitment to R&D and often a long time horizon (Mansfield,
1989, p. 132).
In the field of economics and technological change, many studies have
been performed in an attempt to determine the percentage of successful R&D
projects from a certain level of investment in research and development of
products and processes. While the wide range of results do not warrant
the choice of any specific number in favor of another, various points have
generally been accepted:
• R&D activities can be an economically beneficial use of resources.
• The private rate of return on investment in R&D is not only positive, but
respectably high; the social rate has been estimated to be even higher.
• The production of innovations is closely related to the amount spent on
R&D.
• If there is early, competitive, and discriminatory evaluation of R&D
projects, the success rate will increase and resources will be utilized
more efficiently.
• Rewards from R&D investment may be fully realized only over the long
term; however, short-term fluctuations also occur.
• Productivity increase is related, though with a time lag, to the amount
spent on R&D.
• Investing in R&D is accompanied by variable degrees of economic risks.
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• Investment and the role of auxiliary activities that link production and
marketing are essential to achieving the potential benefits of R&D.
Given the premise that R&D is instrumental in generating long-term
profitability and success in the market place as well as a higher standard of
living, then the payoff from investing in innovation should not be inversely
correlated with the associated risks. In a market economy, R&D projects
aiming to make moderate advances are usually identified with low risk and
produce only moderate returns. Projects that are characterized as very risky
with respect to their technological and subsequent sales success are alluring
due to the great potential return on the innovation.
In the Soviet-style system, firm managers were averse to any kind of
innovation whether associated with low or high risks because their bonuses
were tied to fulfilling the plan determined by the center - any innovative
activity was perceived to thwart such goals at the factory level. Therefore,
the expectations were rather of losses than of gains, which are the standard
incentive to innovate. Risks were apparently interpreted solely as costs,
particularly within the managers prescribed planning horizon, and thus had
a negative relation to investments.
Paradoxically, scientists at the research institutes faced practically no
risks in terms of consequences of success or failure of research projects. They
often initiated enormous and expensive research activities with potentially
spectacular results as the lure for appropriate financing from the relevant
government agency. In this case, high risks were interpreted as a great asset
to obtain financing. Thus, inconsistencies arose where primarily research,
but also development, was often undertaken irrespective of true market de-
mand and supply impulses that influenced the national standard of living.
A void existed between users and producers. Scientists and engineers may
have been dealing in their own best interest, but were unaware of business
objectives. The lack of diffusion in the industrial and commercial sectors
was de facto a lack of managerial links and coordination. The outcome has
been some very novel results with ambiguous commercial value - a stock of
white elephants, interesting but unproductive.
Fittingly, a well-managed research and development portfolio should
consist of some equilibrium mixture of projects with either low risks and
moderate payoffs, or high risks accompanied by correspondingly high po-
tential profitability. The risks associated with R&D investment have been
classified as technical and commercial (Mansfield, 1989, p. 128). The former
constitutes the probability of whether or not a project will meet its objec-
tive in producing a new and/or improved product or process. An increase
in the share of development relative to the share of research indicates less
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~ R&D interface:
management links
and coordination
Figure 3.1. Integration of R&D with production and marketing.
risk. The commercial risk reflects the possibility that a technological innova-
tion will permit commercial diffusion (introduction and application). Under
conditions in which R&D projects are regularly reviewed and economically
evaluated from the proposal through to the application, the probability of
technical and economic success will certainly increase.
In addition to the need for an effective organization and management
devoted to techno-economic analysis, success is further enhanced if man-
agement of R&D includes a systematic search for ideas with technical and
commercial potential. Mansfield (1989) names three factors that together
determine the economic success of an R&D project:
1. The probability of technical success.
2. The probability of commercialization (given technical success).
3. The probability of economic success (given commercialization).
These factors imply a need for close integration of R&D with produc-
tion and marketing in order to optimally exploit the potential of resources
allocated to R&D (as demonstrated in Figure 3.1). Actual integration is
more efficient, less time dependent, and managerially more effective than
the standard feedback mechanism. Proper management of R&D promotes
and accomplishes this integration and reduces the associated risks.
An active commitment to R&D pertaining to economic goals results in
new products and processes that lead to technological progress and social
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development. Optimal organization of research and development activities
can facilitate substantial collective benefits for society from investment in
R&D (far in excess of those for the private entrepreneur); it is essential to
laying the foundations for securing a comparative advantage that can fuel
gains in the present and future standard of living. In pedestrian terms it
means jobs, salaries, and tax revenues.
3.2 R&D in the Soviet Centrally Planned
Economy
3.2.1 An introduction to the Soviet Union
The former Soviet Union was unique in many ways. Its enormous size (16%
to 17% of the world's land area) dwarfed that of all other countries; Canada,
the world's second largest nation, has only 45% of the area within former
Soviet borders. This vast expanse accounts for a wide variety of geographic
and climatic environments. The nation stretched from the tundra north of
the Arctic Circle to the arid areas 40° north latitude, spanned more than
8,000 kilometers from west to east, bordered 11 nations, and had access to
the waterways of the Arctic and Pacific Oceans, the Atlantic Ocean through
the Baltic and North Seas, and the Mediterranean Sea through the Black
Sea (see Figure 3.2).
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The vast territory and the tremendous supply of resources produced
both advantages and disadvantages for the country. An urbanization ratio
of 65.8% and a population density of 13 persons per square kilometer would
indicate that most of the almost 290 million inhabitants were concentrated in
the cities. Approximately only 16% of the population lived east of the Ural
mountains in the Siberian region where most of the natural resource reserves
are to be found. The area sown for agricultural production was over 2 million
square kilometers; that is, an area the size of Greenland, or four times the
area of France. Although the size is again incredible, the arable land is
dispersed and, apart from some exceptions, usually far from the population
centers. The population comprised more than 12 ethnic groups, and over 15
different languages were spoken within the former Soviet borders.
In order to link people, energy, and food in this unusually large and di-
verse natural environment, the Communist Party stressed the importance of
science, technology, and capital. These elements were major aspects of eco-
nomic strategy starting already shortly after the 1917 Russian Revolution.
The weight of their importance varied, but the emphasis on these fundamen-
tals provided the grounds for building a superpower from a feudal empire in
less than a century. After making impressive advances in industrial produc-
tion, expansion of the transportation network, and growth of agricultural
production and energy generation based on simple technology, relatively lit-
tle progress had been made with respect to high technology other than in
a few specialized sectors such as the military and aerospace sectors. The
management had not successfully oriented or integrated dynamic advances
in R&D into the production processes, resulting in a lack of high technology
relative to the leading industrialized nations and a technological gap between
the Soviet Union and other world powers.
Part of the problem was that, beginning in the early 1900s, the USSR
started investing heavily in nonsustainable old-style growth by spending
large amounts to purchase physical capital (usually turnkey factories, as-
sembly lines, manufacturing systems, and so on). As a consequence of this,
combined with the policies of isolation and self-sufficiency in practically all
sectors, there arose a general neglect for the acquisition of knowledge (by
way of exchange between individuals, purchases of licenses, and so on) that
could be built up and molded to accommodate demand as time passed and
preferences changed. This approach did, however, provide some immedi-
ate benefits and proved to be reasonably successful in the first half of the
twentieth century.
As long as the economy continued to grow at a respectable rate (albeit
according to Soviet economic indicators, namely, those based on material
product), there was no need to worry unduly about Soviet economic growth
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and development. Serious problems associated with such policies only began
to surface in the second half of the twentieth century and most obviously in
the beginning of the 1980s when insufficient adjustments were undertaken
to keep up with the technological progress occurring in other industrialized
nations of the world. During this time, toward the end of the Brezhnev
years and beginning of the Gorbachev era, technology started changing more
rapidly than ever.
As a result of these factors many questions arise. How have the alterna-
tive paths of development shaped the state of the various economies relative
to those in the industrialized West? To what extent did the devotion to
the ideology discussed above actually cost the now young emerging market
economies (EMEs)? What have been the benefits and costs? If the need
arises, can an EME generate modern-style economic growth where success
lies in the dominance of dynamic efficiency? These are the critical issues
facing many of the EMEs today. It would be too ambitious to attempt to
answer all these questions. The aim of this study is to generate an under-
standing of the predicament in which a country such as the Soviet Union
finds itself with respect to its economic development and the potential do-
mestic and international impacts of bridging the gap to modern-style growth
based on advances in technological change by modifying the organization of
research and development.
A glance at selected socioeconomic indicators can provide a better pic-
ture of the Soviet Union in the twentieth century and an understanding of
how the process of change has proceeded and resulted in the state of affairs
before 1991. If the data are observed in a comparative way, the interpreta-
tions are more meaningful.
Due to the difficulty in obtaining reasonably accurate and consistent his-
torical data for a wide variety of socioeconomic indicators in a large sample
of nations, the distribution of employment by sector and the gross domes-
tic product (GDP) were selected. These two factors shed light on both the
growth and development aspects of economic activity.
The economy of the USSR grew at an impressive annual rate of 2.34%
over the nearly 90-year period. In a five-country sample, this is second only
to Japan's yearly growth of GDP of 3.11 % per capita, while Germany held at
2.16%, the United States at 1.78%, and the United Kingdom at only 1.37%.
However, these numbers do not tell the whole story.
In 1900 the level of GDP for both Japan and the Soviet Union was far
behind the British and American GDP level, and at barely half the German
level (see Figure 3.3). By 1987, Japan had surpassed the British in GDP per
capita, was on the heels of Germany, and was closing fast on the USA. On
the other hand, the Soviets succeeded in achieving a mere 65% of the British,
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Figure 3.3. Growth of GDP per capita in selected countries, 1900-1987.
45% of the American,[5] and only 61% of the Japanese level; yet, back in
1900, the Soviets were at 118% of the Japanese level. The gap between GDP
per capita levels was large 90 years ago and had remained so for the USSR,
distancing it further from the old economic powerhouses and from the new
world economic leaders.
The distribution of employment by sector allows some conclusions to
be made with regard to the development of the economy. The figure for
the United Kingdom, the first country to enter the Industrial Revolution
in the late eighteenth century, not only show a very clear migration out
of the agricultural sector to industry, but already indicate the coming of a
new era - the transition to a heavy reliance on and substantial migration
of employment from the industrial sector to the service sector in the 1900s.
This phenomenon is exemplified by the changes in the shares of employment
from 8%, 42%, and 45% in agriculture, industry, and services, respectively, in
1900, to 2%, 27%, and 60% in 1988. The advanced state of British economic
development is already visible in 1900 when employment in agriculture was
less than 2 percentage points over the current OEeD average, and in services
it was greater than in industry. The other nations followed in Britain's wake
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with a time lag and at variable speeds. In fact, British agriculture is credited
with contributing as little as 1% to total GDP today.
Since 1900, industrialization has swept more or less strongly throughout
various parts of the world. The movement of capital and human resources
out of agriculture and into this growing sector was characteristic of this
phase of economic development. With the advent of more sophisticated in-
formation, technology, and communication, the latter half of the century,
particularly recent decades, has seen still another transformation - a type
of de-industrialization in the most advanced nations of the world. Ninety
years ago, both the USA and Germany had approximately 40% of the total
employment concentrated in the agricultural sector and only a quarter in
services. Today agricultural employment is below 5% of the working popu-
lation and employment in services is nearing 60% (this is also true for the
UK); in the USA it is well above that, at 68%. The share of employees
working in industry rose early in the century, and is now declining. Agricul-
ture contributes 2% to GDP in both nations, industry's contribution is only
25% in the USA and 40% in Germany, and services generate 72% and 59%,
respectively.
At the turn of the century, Japan and the USSR were characterized by
very similar situations. Both had relatively very low GDP per capita (the
Japanese at only 23% and the Soviets at 27% of the US level[6]) and had
not yet wholeheartedly entered the industrialization phase as demonstrated
by the domination of the agricultural sector with respect to employment
- 70% in Japan and 61% in the USSR (Table 3.1) . Industry and services
did not playa major role in the labor market or in output for either of
the two countries early in the century. The key point of interest lies in the
fact that, from such similar economic origins, the development and growth
paths of these two countries have differed substantially. Japan has not only
been able to catch-up, but has taken a leading role in the world economy.
Employment in agriculture is close to the OECD average, in industry it is
at 33%, and in services at 56%.
The Soviet Union did experience growth, but with much less develop-
ment. In the late 1980s, agricultural employment was still just above 20%,
far off the average of the world economic leaders and more in the range of
countries like Angola, Kenya, Brazil, and Chile, and above that in nations
like China, India, and Cuba. The percentage of the Soviet work force in
industry was higher than that in advanced market economies, and the 41 %
in services was on average about one-third lower. In the USSR, agriculture
still contributed over 20% to the gross national product (GNP), industry an
imposing 56%, and services only 23% (57% in Japan). These figures verify
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Table 3.l. Change in socioeconomic measures, 1900-1988 (in %).
Employment
Agriculture Industry Services GDP/capitaa
Germany
1900 38 b 36 b 25b 1,558
1988 5 39 55 9,964
Japan
1900 70 12 18 677
1988 8 33 56 9,756
UK
1900 8c 42 c 45 c 2,798
1988 2 27 60 9,178
USA
1900 41 20 25 2,911
1988 3 27 68 13,550
USSR
1900 61 d 14d 25d 797
1988 20 39 41 5,948
"1987, in international dollars (1980 prices). b1895. C1901. d 1897.
Sources: Compiled from The Economist (1985, p. 12; 1990, p. 214), Flora et al. (1987,
p. 443), ILO (1989, p. 7), Maddison (1987, p. 686; 1989, p. 19), Mitchell (1980, p. 159),
and UN (1990, p. 76).
what numerous authors have hypothesized about the growth and develop-
ment in the USSR during the twentieth century: namely, that the relatively
substantial growth was the result of a concerted effort to promote heavy
industry and the mass production of technologically less-advanced products.
This, as well as the need for a large agricultural sector, was in part the
result of the self-inflicted isolation that impeded trade, technology transfer,
and participation in the international R&D industry.
In fact, in a sample of both established and newcomer nations in the
world market, the path of the former Soviet Union stands out due to its
divergence from the common trajectory based on the relationship between
labor productivity and GDP per capita (see Figure 3.4). Soviet policy was
unable to generate the levels of GDP per capita as those achieved in Canada,
the UK, and the USA. If a comparison with these nations appears unjust, as
they already enjoyed a substantial head start in 1950, then the comparison of
the inability to match the 1987 GDP per capita levels of nations of reasonably
equal rank in 1950 (such as Japan, Austria, and Germany) is not only fair
but very revealing.
In addition, the central planning system could not combine increased
GDP per capita with improved labor productivity as other nations had that
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Figure 3.4. Economic growth and development in selected countries,
1950-1987 (in international dollars). Based on data in Appendix 3A.
have already been studied. The Soviets were even ineffectual in realizing the
positive development achievements relatively similar to those in nations that
were substantially below the Soviet labor productivity to GDP per capita
ratio in 1950. These countries (Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, and Taiwan)
were close to Soviet GDP per capita levels in 1987, but experience improved
labor productivities. The Soviet economy was falling behind in both these
factors - a signal of a relative decline in the standard of living on the output
side and of a possibly inappropriate policy orientation for R&D management
over the years on the input side.
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On the surface, current general economic data primarily based on pro-
duction statistics indicate that the performance of the Soviet Union was
excellent well into the late 1980s (Table 3.2). It was the world's leading
producer of barley, milk, oats, potatoes, sugar, and cotton, and a very close
second just behind China in eggs, meat, and wheat. Due in part to rich
reserves, the Soviet Union's mining and quarrying sector was one of the
top four extractors in the world of dozens of mineral products ranging in
diversity from salt to iron ore to gold and diamonds.
The Soviet manufacturing sector ranked among the front-runners in
turning out simple products ranging from cigarettes to cement. The first
indication of a lack of technological advance based on appropriate integra-
tion and management of research and development for the benefit of society
can be detected when the Soviet Union dropped out of the list of world's
top five in the manufacture of technologically more advanced goods such as
radios, televisions, and passenger cars. In fact, the giant passenger car fac-
tories in the USSR were at a cumulative fifth position in the world in 1981.
By 1989, Italian, Spanish, and British carmakers had surpassed Soviet pro-
duction levels, and new vehicle producers like South Korea and Brazil were
closing rapidly.
Because of the large reservoirs of energy resources, the USSR was a
leader in energy production, whether it was from coal, natural gas, or oil, as
well as one of the top three consumers of each. On an aggregate scale, the
largest nation in the world was complementing its geographic and population
size with high output levels.
If the production data are converted from the aggregate to a per capita
basis (Appendix 3B), then the Soviet Union drops out of the top five in
several categories but the output per person is usually still impressively
high with respect to the other nations ranking among the top five in each
category. The results indicate that annual yields of basic agricultural crops
reached 154 kilograms (kg) of barley, 56 kg of corn, 349 kg of milk (almost
one kg per day), 53 kg of oats, and 217 kg of potatoes, and 293 kg of wheat
per person. For less basic products the yields are 15 kg of eggs, 67 kg of
meat (that is 5.5 kg per capita per month), and 30 kg of sugar per person
per year in the late 1980s.
The manufacturing industry also appeared rather diligent with respect
to processing food products which resulted in an annual per capita con-
tribution of 6 kg of both butter and cheese, 0.177 hectoliters of beer, and
0.104 hectoliters of wine. In one of the most successful nonfood products
achievements, the USSR produced an impressive 1321 cigarettes for every
man, woman, and child (smokers and nonsmokers) per year. Although these
figures present an impression of plenty and abundance, Soviet consumers
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Table 3.2. The former Soviet Union in the world economy.
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Item
Agricultural productsa
Barley
Corn
Cotton
Eggs
Meat
Milk1986
Oats
Potatoes
Sugar
Tea
Tobacco
Wheat
Mining and quarrying a
Aluminum
Bauxite
Copper
Diamonds
Gold
Iron ore
Lead
Magnesium
Phosphate
Salt
Silver
Zinc
USSR
rank
in the
world
1
5
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
6
3
2
2
4
3
3
2
1
1
2
2
2
4
2
Item
Manufactured goods b
Beer1986
Butter1986
Cement
Cheese1986
Cigarettes1985
Newsprint
Paper & paperboard
Passenger cars1989
Radios1986
Televisions1986
Wine1987
WooP986
EnergyC
Electricity capacity
Electricity production
Coal reserves
Coal production
Natural gas reserves1989
Natural gas prod. 1988
Crude petroleum reserves1989
Crude petroleum prod.1988
Miscellaneous d
Population
Area
GNP
USSR
rank
in the
world
4
1
2
2
2
6
5
8
6
6
4
2
2
2
2
3
1
1
5
1
3
1
3
QIn 1988, unless otherwise specified.
bIn 1988, unless otherwise specified.
c1987 data, unless otherwise specified.
d1990 data.
Source: Calculations based on data from The Economist Book of World Vital Statistics
(1990), Motor Vehicle Data (1991), and PCGlobe (1990).
were confronted with shortages of basic necessities throughout a period of
apparent ample production.
Manufactured goods were generally produced both for export purposes
(to procure foreign exchange) and for the domestic market. As a result, low
per capita output relative to other products was a cause for concern.
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Table 3.3. Soviet productivity in the late 1980s (as a percentage of the
average of the top five producers in the world).
Agricultural goods
Barley
Corn
Cotton
Eggs
Meat
Milk
Oats
Potatoes
Sugar
Tea
Tobacco
Wheat
Labor
19.2
5.9
48.1
28.6
25.6
24.5
33.5
40.1
8.1
0.2
11.6
20.3
Land
40.8
9.8
103.3
13.8
40.0
39.8
69.3
30.8
7.1
1.4
28.4
43.3
Manufactured goods
Beer
Butter
Cement
Cheese
Cigarettes
Newsprint
Paper & paperboard
Passenger cars
Radios
Televisions
Wine
Wool
Labor
18.4
54.7
68.3
33.2
52.4
2.0
13.0
6.3
1.2
20.8
5.7
2.9
With regard to Soviet consumer goods, the paradox of seemingly plenti-
ful production and short supply cannot be found as in the agricultural sector.
Scarcity of consumer goods can, in part, be traced to the lack of emphasis on
their production (though this is not the root of the problem). Although the
Soviet Union was rated among the top five manufactures for most products
listed in Table 3.2, and among the top ten for the rest, the nation's man-
ufacturing sector fell far behind on a per capita basis. Only China, when
also in the top five, occasionally had a lower output per individual (largely
due to its enormous population). Soviet manufacturing produced only 5.5
kg of newsprint, 22 kg of paper and paperboard, 0.0042 passenger cars (238
persons per car), 0.0278 radios (36 persons per radio), and 0.0334 televi-
sions (30 persons per TV) per person in the late 1980s. This was only 2.9%,
12.9%,8.1%,1.1%, and 23.1% respectively of the averages of the other top
five nations in each category.
An analysis of the productivities associated with these products sheds
more light on the matter (for data and calculations refer to Appendix 3B). In
none of the two dozen products listed in Table 3.3 does Soviet labor produc-
tivity even come close to the average of the other top five world producers.
On a per agricultural worker basis, Soviets produced less than 2 metric tons
of wheat compared with 25 metric tons in Canada; 643 kg of corn compared
with almost 37 metric tons in the USA; just over half a metric ton of oats
compared with over 5 metric tons in Canada; 3.4 metric tons of wheat com-
pared with close to 35 metric tons in India; only 2.5 metric tons of potatoes
compared with as much as 12.7 metric tons in Germany; 345 kg of sugar
compared with well over 13 metric tons in Cuba; 775 kg of meat compared
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with 5.24 metric tons in the USA; and as little as 4 metric tons of milk
compared with 22.6 metric tons in France.
The productivity of land was also calculated to study the situation with
respect to agricultural production. With the exception of a few products, the
productivity of land in the USSR was often appalling below that of the other
leading producers. The reason for such paltry levels of output per hectare
of arable land could lie in the widespread use of agricultural land that is
of only marginal quality; although, inappropriate management, underuti-
lization, and poor levels of organizational, motivational, and technological
development are more likely responsible for the particularly poor perfor-
mance. As a result France produces six times as much wheat per hectare as
the USSR, Germany six times as much barley and four times as much meat,
China ten times as much corn, Poland almost ten times as many potatoes,
and so on.
When studying the Soviet Union, an additional factor cannot be omitted.
For many decades, the political orientation led to isolation and a comple-
mentary desire, or rather need, for self-sufficiency in the yield of numerous
crops that were not especially suitable for Soviet weather and soil condi-
tions or for general farming practices. Consequently, the land productivity
of crops like sugar, tea, and tobacco was extremely low. Cuban sugar yields
per hectare were 64 times those in the USSR in the late 1980s, Sri Lanka's
land productivity in tea production was almost 200 times higher, and China
was turning out 12 times as much tobacco per hectare of arable land. This
final point on isolation and self-sufficiency had an important and lasting ef-
fect on all sectors of the economy from research and development through
the producing sectors to services.
The Soviet Union also lagged seriously behind its top five counterparts
with respect to the labor productivity of manufactured goods (see Appendix
3B). The figures in Table 3.3 indicate that, without exception, Soviet labor
productivity for the 12 manufactured goods listed was again clearly below
the average of the five leading producers in the world. Only in butter,
cement, and cigarette production was labor productivity above 50% of the
average. Otherwise Soviet output per manufacturing worker was far below
that of others: the labor productivity in British beer production was over
8 times as high; South Korea was 13 times higher in television production;
Canada's was more than 116 times higher in newsprint and 22 times in paper
and paperboard; France was 23 times higher in passenger car production
(Japan and USA were 19 and 10 times, respectively); Argentinean wine was
produced with a labor productivity 27 times that in the USSR; New Zealand
wool was 216 times as high; and Hong Kong labor productivity in making
radios was a spectacular 225 times higher.
50 Christoph M. Schneider
3.2.2 An introduction to Soviet science and technology
In a setting where events appear to overtake themselves, science and tech-
nology in the former Soviet Union is experiencing a revival, or so we are led
to believe. Alongside the headlines that publicize economic woes are those
that inform readers of a renewed interest in policies oriented toward edu-
cation, science, and technology. Savior-like characteristics were implied for
such a political route in the USSR by countless media endorsements such as:
"Soviet Congress Wants Science to be the Savior," "Soviets Pin Economic
Hopes on Technology," "Science and the Spark of Perestroika," "Rockets
into Ploughshares," and "Science and Social Renewal." [7] Political scrutiny
has forced the academic community also to review the requirements, impor-
tance, and effects of the research and technology sector during the transition
to a market economy. The existence, organization, and integration of this
sector has implications not only for the future of the nation as a whole, but
also specifically for the personal livelihood of academia.
Today, in order for a country to strive for economic leadership, it must
also be at the forefront of the high-technology race. An important cause
of difficulties for nations trying to stay abreast of what others are doing is
simultaneously one of the most distinguishing features of high technology -
the rapidity with which it changes.
The example of Soviet-style socialism has proved to be incompatible
with rapid technological innovation. At least five characteristics specific to
the Eastern European economies warrant such a generalization.[8] These
include:
1. The considerable effort and motivation of firms to overcome supply diffi-
culties. In the shortage economy, constraints faced by the enterprise were
more significant on the supply side than on the demand side. Enterprises
did not create new demand because they were too busy securing input
supplies in the mighty vertically integrated industries. Once inventories
had been built up, they were a disincentive to innovation because they
must be consumed and were used as a bargaining tool by the central
planning agency to continue production along established lines. If tech-
nological change was implemented, it was primarily to accommodate
changes in the demand requirements as designated by the central plan.
2. Process innovations have dominated over product innovations. If prob-
lems arose during the production process and there was a possibility that
the planned requirements would not be met, then adaptations would be
made but no genuine alteration would be done to influence the con-
sumer market. In industrial research institutes, the majority of time
was utilized to improve existing technologies rather than to develop ideas
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that could lead to fundamental innovations. Due to the lure of extra,
unplanned income from pseudo-commercial contracts (primarily from
state ministries or other state organs), the institutes become flooded
with minor projects. Consequently, the proportion of genuine research
work done in engineering-oriented institutes had decreased over the past
decade by a factor of three (Rich, 1983, p. 464).
3. Financial incentives for research, development, and implementation have
been small, if not negative. Scientists realized almost no personal mone-
tary reward from developing innovations; the financing alternatives avail-
able to enterprises to invest in technological advancements were severely
limited (there was no such thing as venture capital or the like); and if
innovation resulted in not meeting planned production targets, bonuses
were lost.
4. Enterprises' priorities have been more inclined to emphasize the quantity
rather than the quality of output. The very large, vertically integrated,
and highly monopolistic enterprises enjoyed tremendous economies of
scale and did not have to compete on the basis of quality (particularly
due to the national incentive for self-sufficiency and the shortage aspects
faced by the economy).[9]
5. There has been a long time lag between invention and innovation; subse-
quent diffusion has also been slow. Studies have shown that implemen-
tation of innovations took three times longer in the Soviet Union than
in countries like West Germany and the USA during the same period.
Diffusion, even in the high-priority steel industry of the USSR, was a
fraction of the rate in other Western industrialized nations, although
capacity expansion may have been higher (Gomulka, 1986, p. 48).
The great paradox of the Soviet Union is that some fields of pure science
were near the highest standard in a worldwide comparison,[10] but there still
appeared to be something fundamentally wrong with the application of sci-
ence and knowledge because the USSR did not experience an appropriate
increase in the productivity and efficiency specific to modern-style economic
growth. The diffusion and translation of technological progress into efficient
production techniques and products was quite faulty. As a result, the stan-
dard of living had not risen with respect to what would seem characteristic
of modern development and that which has been realized in many Western,
market-oriented nations.
In an environment that simply lacks a competitive and efficient economy,
resources are misallocated and static inefficiencies arise. In the absence of
dynamic progress, the resources for production are inefficiently allocated
because the advances in science are hindered through a much more basic
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resource misallocation and disincentive system at the research and devel-
opment level. Both scientific activity and its goal of discovery, which to-
gether embody the point of departure for technological change, were gener-
ally present in the Soviet Union. It is the next step in this dynamic process,
namely, the conversion of technological effort into productive results, that
was inadequately achieved.
It appears that science was, to a large extent, detached from the pro-
cess of technological progress, which itself suffered as a result, inevitably
causing deteriorating productivity and efficiency of the overall economic sys-
tem. The scientific community was an enormous, very hierarchical, and pre-
dominantly institutional apparatus that became considerably self-contained;
thus, it became remarkably immune to any potential impulses from the mar-
ket and did not interact with business in questions regarding applied re-
search. Essentially, the scientific community was separated from commercial
organizations.
Normally, the effects of skillful management influence the incentive struc-
ture and motivation, as well as the welfare, of society and inherently national
and international competitive status. The fact that scientific advance has
become inseparable from industrial technology in Western economies dur-
ing the twentieth century implies, to some extent, that Western science has
simply made a better organized attack on the secrets of nature and used
greater resources in the assault than science in other cultures (Rosenberg
and Birdzell, 1990, p. 19). Harnessing scientific activity successfully, which
infers rapid and functional conversion into applied technology, continues to
increase allocative efficiency that has and will improve human welfare. This
activity must be cultivated in the appropriate national environment.
Soviet science certainly presented itself as a unique cultural system. Due
to the crumbling and disappearing economic and political system that main-
tained it, the scientific community of the former USSR is now practically left
to fend for itself. Policy makers and scientists in the former Soviet Union
must encourage reform of the economy, while simultaneously preventing the
collapse of the R&D sector as a result of its own transformation to accli-
matize to the new socioeconomic environment. Currently, the growing dis-
proportions in the formerly, solely administrative economic system indicate
the urgency to reform the structure of the research and technology sector
and the policies that rule it. On the whole, these imbalances arise for the
following reasons:
• Concentration of resources in obsolete industries.
• The availability and distribution of financial resources for R&D.
• A large technology gap between military and civilian sectors.
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• The relatively small share of the private commercial sector in economic
activity.
• Distorted and conflicting incentive structures (Le., for enterprises,
branch ministries, and research institutes)
• High levels of vertical integration in industry, lack of interindustry supply
relationships or other cooperation and coordination, and loose economic
ties between real technological demand and performed R&D.
• Absence of adequate intellectual property rights.
• Monopolization, barriers to entry, and a lack of participation III the
international market with outputs and inputs (Le., technology).
• Interbranch and interorganizational barriers between research institutes
and staff in industry, higher education, and the Academy of Sciences.
• An inappropriate tax system and collapse of the state budget and state
promotion of R&D.
Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of problems, but it does indi-
cate some of the immense reconstruction required to promote sustainabil-
ity of market-oriented technology development and science policy. Existing
evidence would seem to indicate that science and technology management
inherited from the former USSR will have to change by becoming more re-
sponsive to market demand, more flexible and inviting for entry, and profit
oriented as reform policies are implemented.
In the past, research and technology has been part of the large nonmar-
ket sector. Due to the alienation from the market process, Soviet R&D was
primarily financed by the state in one way or another, while in the United
States it is financed, to a large extent (approximately 50%), by the revenue
generated from the sale of the product at the market price. Unless the entire
system of funding research in the successor republics of the former Soviet
Union is changed, constructive reorganization of R&D is practically point-
less. Because competition for funding in the former USSR had hardly been
based on the research value and the quality of proposals, narrow political
interest groups with biased and often inadequately informed ideas on what
is useful dominated science policy. Proposals for change are many, but one
of the most reasonable seems to involve a peer review similar to that in the
West. This would entail research institutes applying for funding of specific
proposals, the merits of which should be judged by international referees.
Soviet, now Russian, science must become readily convertible into tech-
nology in order to be economically productive. Proper organization and
management are crucial. In effect, a new, much more flexible, techno-
institutional market structure is required. This structure must introduce
competition, stimulate the supply of innovations and their diffusion (while
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simultaneously allowing demand stimuli from the economy to influence the
innovators themselves), allow a blending of domestic and global R&D pri-
orities, and facilitate a longer-term perspective for R&D investors. Russian
policy makers and scientists are looking toward Western industrialized coun-
tries to gain an understanding of how to deal with research and technology
in a modern-style market environment and, still more fundamentally, how
to prepare the research and technology sectors in formally command-type
administrative economies for the ascent to market responsiveness.
3.2.3 The R&D sector in the Soviet Union:
Science and Soviet-style socialism
The problems that plagued the organization and management of the Soviet
R&D sector reflect the policies that have directed the whole economy for
many decades: R&D was not market oriented. The state determined a set
of priority areas within which scientists made proposals that met the planned
requirements to ensure funding rather than to break new frontiers in pro-
ducing "commercializable" research and development results. Scholars were
reacting to distorted incentives that were sent not from the market but from
the central governing body. The government was the market. Consequently,
R&D activities and financing were separated from production, other than in
cases where such services were requisitioned to fulfill particular orders from
supervisory levels of the administrative hierarchy. Universities, generally
the centers where scientific interests, business needs, and government poli-
cies are often blended to produce useful results in the West, did not have an
important role in Soviet R&D. Basic research was conducted in institutes of
the Academy of Sciences, and applied research was performed by institutes
of the various ministries. In addition, a large percentage of some of the best
R& D was done within the secretive enclaves ofthe military industrial sector,
where it often stayed.
As a result, the Soviet Union and its neighbors came to lag behind their
Western counterparts. Although Eastern European countries, particularly
the former Soviet Union, have been substantial contributors to the world's
stock of scientific knowledge in the past, they have been unable to achieve
satisfactory conversion into economic productivity; this inability has been
a major reason for this gap. Thus, it has become more and more evident
that appropriate organization and management of R&D that is inherent to
generally implementable technological advance is a true source of the wealth
of nations.
Research and Development Management 55
From its inception until its dissolution, the Soviet Union viewed science
as an essential element in promoting growth to attain economic and polit-
ical supremacy in the world. To achieve these goals, the USSR promoted
general and technical education, research and development, and industrial
technological advance in an impressive manner during the twentieth century.
Therefore, the intellectual potential of this region has dramatically changed
since the turn of the last century.
Marxist Theory
The great value attributed to scientific substance goes back to the original
ideas of Marxist theory. This concept for economic development and social
change conveyed a distinct emphasis on economic efficiency and productivity
as fundamental determinants in deciding the outcome of the competition
between different forms of organization of economic activity over time. The
need to confirm the international superiority of the Soviet economic system,
combined with its technological inferiority to Western industrializing nations
after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, forced science and technology to the
top of the party-state central agenda to procure the necessary innovation to
catch-up.
The pivotal role of science and technology is an intricate part of clas-
sical socialism. It is the instrument for social development and fulfillment.
The classics of Marxism-Leninism elaborate an integrated concept of the
development of science. These fundamentals present an adequate concept of
the nature of science as a cognitive system and a component of society and
its position and role in societal life and the basic laws of its development
(Mikulinski and Richta, 1983, p. 8). This theoretical approach emphasizes
the intricate role of science in socialism and the corresponding scientific ad-
vances facilitated by a socialist environment. A socialist system was seen to
be a superior basis for scientific activity compared with a capitalist economic
system, which had no central planning, promoted wasteful competition, and
did not provide sufficient security for the structure and individuals involved
in intellectual work such as research and development, where the return on
often high investment was risky and gradual.
Under socialism, scientific knowledge mastered by society becomes an
integral part of human culture. Some excerpts from Mikulinski and Richta
(1983, Chapter 1) reveal what Marx and his colleagues have said about sci-
ence, research, development, and technology that was consistent with their
belief that labor is the most crucial element of the socioeconomic system.
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Marx said, "The implements of labor, in the form of machinery, necessi-
tate the substitution of natural forces for human force, and the conscious
application of science, instead of the rule of thumb."
Marx believed science (which appears to include both accumulated
knowledge and current advances from research and development) to be a
universal productive force. In his opinion, socialism unites science and labor,
while capitalism makes the worker subordinate to the machine, a product
of science. Even the emancipation of labor at the hands of technological
advance can be seen positively in Marxist terms, as the increase in free time
is to the benefit of the full development of the individual. The feedback
of this on the productive power of labor becomes the greatest productive
power. Essentially, man, through science, is the wealth of society and fuels
its development.
In his extensive works, Marx also made predictions about the future.
He wrote that the transformation of science, R&D, and technology into
an immediate productive force would shape the development of society. [11]
Friedrich Engels, close friend and colleague of Karl Marx, is quoted as say-
ing, "If society has a technical need, this advances science [R&D, and sub-
sequently technology] more than ten universities" (ibid, p. 45). This quote
is probably intended to demonstrate the strong influence of society's tech-
nological needs rather than to demean the educational institutions.
Lenin generally followed Marxist theories. At the time, these theories did
not appear to conflict with the introduction of his so-called New Economic
Policies (NEP). Of course, besides being a politician, Lenin was a scholar
and extended Marx's ideas by making statements such as, "each step in the
development of science adds new grains to the sum total of absolute truth,
but the limits of each scientific proposition are relative, now expanding, now
shrinking with the growth of knowledge."
Stalinist Legacy
Soviet-style socialism has come a long way from adhering to the fundamen-
tals of Marxist ideology. In fact, some experts contend (probably with good
reason) that no member of the politburo in the 1980s had the slightest in-
terest in what Marx actually said on any subject (Nove, 1986, p. 44). The
management of the economy took on many different characteristics over the
decades, but to its end it remained most troubled by the Stalinist legacy.
Joseph Stalin was a despotic ruler who developed a constitution that
carried his own name. He reoriented political and economic priorities, col-
lectivized and centralized the economy leaving no opportunity for any mar-
ket activity, and subordinated everything to the state, which was the party,
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which was himself. Terror and strict censorship was used to ensure con-
trol and enforce compliance with orders and official ideology. Intelligence,
knowledge, and all other traits characteristic of scholars and the scientific
community were suspicious. It is well known that an inquiring mind, cou-
pled with intellectual curiosity and an analytical approach, is not easy to
discipline. Stalin's great purges of intellectuals were less and less to isolate
dissidents or punish specific actions, but more and more for preventive and
anticipatory reasons (Nove, 1986, p. 15). For example, Nikolai Vavilov, a
great Soviet geneticist and former president of the Academy of Agricultural
Science, was persecuted and died in Stalin's Saratov prison in 1943 (Garret,
1989, p. 41).
In recognition of the limited scope of genuine scientific inquiry in fields
such as molecular biology and genetics, a whole generation of able young
Soviet scholars opted for other fields. The effects can still be observed today
in the severe shortage of specialists in the biosciences to help support the
present biotechnological program. The social sciences were also victims of
a similar history. In addition, the headquarters of the Academy of Sciences
was moved from its home of 150 years in St. Petersburg to Moscow in 1934
to allow for improved surveillance and control.
In economic policy, Stalin focused his regime's policies on the develop-
ment of heavy industry with an increase in physical output as the primary
target. A coercive central planning system was the tool implemented to
effectively move from a largely agriculturally based economy to one con-
centrated on expanding heavy and defense industries to promote growth of
the whole economy. The emphasis on heavy industrial production was also
characteristic of a stage of industrialization in present world leaders such as
Japan, Germany, and Britain. Some newly industrialized countries (NICs)
in Southeast Asia are now also following this path of development. For some
time it was quite successful in the former USSR; as the industrial infras-
tructure was being built up, leading growth rates for steel production were
being achieved. The difference between the former USSR experience and
the Japanese or Western European experiences lies in that the latter group
was integrated into the world market and responded to changing interna-
tional demands by moving to a subsequent phase of economic development
- often referred to as the new techno-economic paradigm. Interestingly, the
emphasis on the expansion on heavy industry continued until very recently
and is still continuing in some communist/socialist nations (former Soviet
Union, China, Cuba, etc.) as demonstrated by the extremely high shares
of investment (often close to 75%) in the energy production, raw material
recovery, and defense sectors.
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By selecting and overexploiting relatively unsophisticated technologies,
the Soviets took advantage of economies of scale (this was also partly due
to their dependent neighbors) beyond that normally achieved in Western
industry. The large economies of scale, as epitomized by the high degree of
monopolization in Soviet industry, and the isolation of the market following
Stalin's import substitution strategy reduced the real demand for innovations
because enterprises did not have to compete for a share of the market.[12]
There was no need to make a product more attractive to consumers - the
"no-frills theory." The market was divided, and production quotas allocated.
The Academy of Sciences had become little more than a rubber stamp for
huge prestigious projects drawn up by the industrial ministries and left many
scientists either researching items with little or no commercial prospects or
just plain idle.
After Stalin nationalized the means of production and property (com-
pleted by 1936), he adjusted the dictated goal for production to the gross
ruble value of output, the VAL system (Goldman, 1987, p. 20). Due to a
system of pricing on a cost plus basis, producers were actually encouraged to
use more and costly inputs to simply increase the value of output. The re-
sult was inefficiency, waste, and a strong reluctance to be innovative. As the
size, sophistication, and intricacies of control of the planned Soviet economy
increased, so did the previously mentioned problems. Furthermore, in the
absence of official economic penalties for poor or inadequate work in all sec-
tors, the system was destined to lose its self-correcting mechanisms (which
tie quantity and output to quality of work) after a long period of distortion
(Goldman, 1987, p. 45).
Post-Stalinist Developments: From Khrushchev to Gorbachev
Unfortunately, many of the characteristics described above continued to
hamper attempts to make the system more efficient long after the death
of Stalin.
Nikita Khrushchev had a vision that the Soviet Union would match and
then supersede American achievements in technology and industry in the
long term. He not only reemphasized the importance of research and devel-
opment, but also stressed the need to link these factors with exploitation of
the nation's rich natural resources. Aside from establishing the impressive
research center at the Siberian town of Novosibirsk, Khrushchev's attempts
to reorganize the management of the national economy and scientific com-
munity were primarily tied up by the bureaucrats, administrators, and state
planners.
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During the extended leadership of Leonid Brezhnev, the already enor-
mous administrative apparatus gained in size and influence. Pure and ap-
plied research continued to be generously funded by the state. Institutes
paid lip service to the scientific or economic value of their work. Scientists
enjoyed great prestige, yet their status has always been uncertain; their priv-
ileges made them part of the social elite with a real but strictly contained
autonomy (Matcheret, 1987, p. 83).
The Soviet government created new institutes and increased the em-
ployment in existing ones, leading to a very large population of institutes,
many with employees numbering in the thousands and frequently perform-
ing independently of activities elsewhere, consequently, often overlapping.
As the size of institutes took on such magnificent proportions, the emphasis
was often more on administration rather than on invention. Increasingly, re-
searchers had fewer customers interested in rapidly implementing their ideas,
often because this would have interrupted planned industrial or agricultural
output. The scientists were hindered rather than encouraged to discuss
their work with foreign (especially Western) professional colleagues. Thus,
the mammoth Soviet scientific community, already with approximately one-
quarter of the world's scientists, was simultaneously deprived of the stimu-
lus of multi-customer demand and of critical international review. Civilian
R&D suffered most under these strict conditions; some directed freedoms
and incentives made institutes of the military and aerospace sectors rela-
tively productive and successful.
Scientific and technological advances were also portrayed as fundamen-
tal to Gorbachev's reform strategies (see discussion in Section 3.2.5). Gor-
bachev's general economic reform called for cuts in staff in some central
ministries and state committees, reductions in state budget outlays, and
stricter financial discipline for enterprises. This reform made the survivabil-
ity of many research institutes as well as their customers difficult, if not
impossible, in their then existing form.
From 1985 (the beginning of Gorbachev's ascent to power) until 1991
(the year of his resignation), a number of Soviet politicians including the
president made bold statements that science and technology would bring a
new economic prosperity to the Soviet nation. Speeding up scientific and
technical progress was to be the basis for increasing economic growth. Re-
ports indicated that Soviet academics believed that without rapid scientific
advance and the practical application of research in production processes, the
government's ambitious program of economic reform was beyond realization.
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3.2.4 Actors in Soviet R&D policy
The Soviet Union was characterized by an administrative and hierarchial sys-
tem. This was also true for planning and managing R&D policy, which was
part of the development of science and technology in the national economy.
The entire management process of research, development, and diffusion
of innovation began at the top in the Supreme Soviet (see Figure 3.5). This,
the highest level of government, and the Council of Ministers were the execu-
tive bodies that made decisions regarding global questions such as: What are
the main priorities and directions of science and technology development?
What are the national goals in these fields? How soon should these be re-
alized? What financial and human resources are to be allocated to achieve
these goals?
Subsequently, it was the responsibility of GOSPLAN (the State Planning
Committee) to elaborate the corresponding short-term (1 year), medium-
term (5 years), and long-term (15 years) national plans, which were ulti-
mately adopted by government (the Council of Ministers). GOSP LAN then
cooperated with various state committees to set objectives for the manage-
ment bodies at ministerial, republican, and regional levels. These in turn
defined the goals and planning indices for associations of enterprises and
single enterprises. This sequence describes the direct, hierarchial planning
process which began after the adoption of the national priorities at the na-
tional level. During the preparation phase of the plan, there was intensive
interaction (negotiations, bargaining, etc.) between all the levels. For exam-
ple, the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) and the State
Standardization Commission were responsible for determining the necessary
technical level in a specific branch.
However, the new technological ideas were not simply generated by plan-
ning, but were rather results of the efforts of scientific-technological organi-
zations: namely, the research institutes and laboratories of the state com-
mittees, the Academy of Sciences, and the industrial ministries. Due to an
unclear division of duties between the agencies, conflicts consistently arose
between the various organizations with respect to their fields of influence
and areas where their activities would complement one another. Unfortu-
nately, the effects of this rivalry were more frequently compartmentalization
and isolation instead of healthy competition.
In addition to countless specific departments, most of the state com-
mittees had very large, specialized institutes to support their influence on
policy. The GKNT had institutes for gathering and analyzing information
and data (the VINITI, which employed 26,000 persons), for organization
and management, for advanced management education, and so on. The
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Figure 3.5. Soviet management process of research, development, and
diffusion of innovation.
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State Committee for Discovery and Inventions supported an institute for
patents, scientific examinations, and licenses. GOSSTANDART had a spe-
cial institute that described the technological conditions and standards, and
attempted to modify management systems to improve the quality of goods.
GOSPLAN had two scientific, economic institutes responsible for studying
economic and social processes in the Soviet Union.
Each institution of the state committees was required to investigate top-
ics relevant to its committee's interests irrespective of any overlap of research
being conducted elsewhere.
Academy of Sciences and State Committee for Science and Technology
Other than the specific interests of GOSPLAN ,[13] the Academy of Sciences
and the State Committee for Science and Technology conventionally had
the strongest influences on R&D policy making and were essentially respon-
sible for the organization and output of science, research, and technology, at
least in the civilian sector. GKNT played an important part in the formu-
lation of science and technology policy, having coordinating powers over all
R&D, though with emphasis on the applied, and therefore branch, sphere
(Fortescue, 1987, p. 98). The advisory and executive responsibilities of the
Academy of Sciences of the USSR were essentially concentrated on managing
and performing fundamental research activities.
Therefore, GKNT was responsible for establishing the principles for di-
recting scientific development, organizing intersectional or interbranch re-
search, economically and effectively applying the results of research (scien-
tific and technological advances), and managing the exchange of scientific
and technological data and cooperation with foreign countries (Semeria,
1987, p. 143). In this role, GKNT coordinated the scientific activities of
the central planning system, determined the diffusion of information and in-
novation, approved research budgets, regulated the procurement of scientific
and technical literature from abroad, planned S&T activities, and forecast
investment in S&T projects. Using its links to the Department of Foreign
Relations, to the Committee for State Security (KGB), and to the Defense
Ministry, GKNT also had the task of exploring foreign markets (in the West)
for leading-edge technology suitable for adoption and insertion in the Soviet
production process.
Until 1991, the State Committee for Science and Technology distributed
the state funds for research. This giant bureaucratic apparatus allocated its
budgets through the ministries, which in turn decided which work should
be financed based on recommendations from state committees. As a result,
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research became tied to the needs of a specific ministry, which may and often
did not correspond to the needs of scientific research or industrial technology.
The Academy of Sciences, founded in the early eighteenth century by Pe-
ter the Great in St. Petersburg, was the oldest and most prestigious scientific
organization in the Soviet Union. This elite scientific community comprised
nearly 300 R&D establishments, branches, institutes, laboratories, observa-
tories, stations, libraries, museums, botanical gardens, and the like with a
particular emphasis on the basic sciences (Matcheret, 1987, p. 86). Some of
the research centers have become quite famous, occasionally for their suc-
cessful research, but all too often for the size of their colossal staffs, which
has been estimated at approximately one-quarter of the world's total scien-
tific personnel. Almost all were located within the borders of the Russian
republic, which was the only republic with no Republican Academy to call
its own - at least not until late 1991 when the Soviet Academy reacquired
the name Russian Academy, its name until 1925.
The Academy of Sciences was governed by an elected Presidium that was
responsible for coordinating all basic research in the Soviet Union in accor-
dance with the guidelines adopted by the Council of Ministers. The internal
management of the academy proved that some remnants of democracy and
autonomy persisted to certain degrees in spite of central planning. Some
experts estimate that up to 85% of basic research in the Soviet Union was
carried out in academy institutes, leaving only a minor role for institutes of
higher education, which had almost solely a teaching function (Matcheret,
1987, p. 87).[14]
In a review of Soviet civil science, Matcheret (1987) gives a compre-
hensive listing of the tasks of the academy. In addition to those already
mentioned, these tasks included defining overall research policy for the sci-
entific disciplines and the social sciences; performing some applied research
in laboratories; acting as a key vehicle for technological penetration; training
scientific personnel; analyzing and disseminating world scientific and tech-
nological findings in relevant fields; publishing journals, reviews, and books;
maintaining international contacts; organizing international congresses; rep-
resenting the Soviet Union in more than 150 international, nongovernmental
scientific organizations; and presenting awards for outstanding achievements.
Due to the prestige and to some extent also influence, intellectuals who
were members of the academy enjoyed some of the highest salaries in the
country, far above those of enterprise managers - a very different picture
from that in the West. The general salary level for scientific personnel was
markedly higher than the national average for nonscientific workers.
For more than seven decades, science was at the center of Soviet govern-
ment policy, and the Academy of Sciences was one of the chief instruments
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1986
36.6
13.7
1986
0.8
7.3
Table 3.4. The age structure of the USSR Academy·of Sciences.
Percentage of scientific workers under age 40 in scientific establishments
Qualification 1973 1983
Doctors of Sciences 10.7 3.0
Candidates of Sciences 52.4 35.2
All scientific workers 61.6 45.9
Percentage of members of the academy under age 50
Status 1976
Academicians 5.8
Corresponding members 17.8
Percentage of members of the academy over age 75
Status 1976
Academicians 15.3
Corresponding members 8.1
Adapted from Kneen (1989, pp. 79-80).
thereof. The academy loyally reconciled its interests to accommodate the
interests of government, but usually ineffectually. Yet its mere existence
drained support, in the form of personnel and funds, from the universities,
leaving it to the Academies of the Republics to amend the balance with
respect to the universities in their own territory.
After 1985, the academy itself felt the scouring of reform. It was time
for some changes. This giant national think tank was riddled with increasing
and an aging bureaucracy and employment. The question where were fresh
ideas to come from looking at the age structure of the academy is a valid
one. In the categories of doctors of science, candidates of science, and all
scientific workers, the share of scientific workers under age 40 shrank from
10.7%,52.4%, and 61.6% respectively in 1973 to as little as 3.0%, 35.2%, and
45.9% in 1983 (see Table 3.4). The statistics for the general members of the
academy are even more shocking with over 50% over age 75 in 1986, up more
than 27 percentage points from 1976. These circumstances brought about
several changes. In academy establishments all managers were to retire at
65, or 70 in the case of a member of the academy, appointments to heads of
institutes and their deputies and to heads of laboratories were to be subject
to review every five years when an election was to be held, and a director
could only be reappointed one additional time by the same procedure, so
the maximum consecutive term was 10 years (Garrett, 1989, p. 42).
Unfortunately, some restructuring (perestroika) of the scientific commu-
nity has actually increased the bureaucratic barriers that have proved to be
obstacles to productive research. In efforts to democratize (glasnost) the
hierarchy within the research institutes more tiers were created, adding to
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the power struggles. The decision to implement a new method for electing
the heads of laboratories (subsections of the institutes) lessened the profes-
sional character of the research structure. It became more important to gain
the support of the relatively larger numbers of nonscientific staff, who were
ill-suited to judge the suitability of the candidates professionally.
Finally, some comments regarding the influence of the Supreme Soviet
Committee for Defense and State Security on R&D and science. This Com-
mittee not only controlled the defense budget (between 10% and 15% of the
national budget over the years, including its significant allocation for R&D),
but also siphoned some of the country's best scientific, technical, and ma-
terial resources from the civilian sector. In 1988, about 75% of the budget
for R&D went to the defense sector, the results of which hardly, if ever,
spilled over to the civilian production sector (Yakovets, 1991, p. 2). Military
research was traditionally carried out in closed institutes and laboratories.
This severely affected the creativity of Soviet S&T development. The secrecy
and isolation caused some scientists to inadvertently become victims of the
reinvent-the-wheel theory and drastically limited contacts with foreign S&T
communities. One of the reasons for the relative success of Soviet defense-
oriented R&D lies in the extraordinary privileges granted the scientists in
these special institutes and towns, and the almost boundless resources avail-
able to them.
The quality and potential of the military industrial complex (MIC) of the
former USSR is remarkable. Today, there is an urgent need for its conversion
to civilian uses before the resources are lost. The MIC is the sector with
the highest technological level because noneconomic priorities such as the
arms race and the desire for military supremacy have led to a concentration
of the most qualified personnel, state-of-the-art machinery and equipment,
and enormous investments. This was done at the expense of the nonmilitary
industry.[15] Times have changed. Global disarmament and the pressure
to restructure the domestic economy have forced decision makers to actively
undertake measures to begin conversion of the military industry to civilian
uses.
Conversion is a complicated process anywhere; more so, of course, for the
former Soviet Union where the defense sector was highly monopolized, iso-
lated from the market, shrouded in secrecy, dependent on generous budget
allocations and military orders, and had no independent marketing rela-
tions or functions. The transformation of the military orientation is partic-
ularly difficult in the case of large, specialized scientific organizations (with
a large proportion of fundamental R&D established on an expensive and
often unique experimental base), and closed zones or towns (where an entire
66 Christoph M. Schneider
locality and its population has been devoted to the research, design, and pro-
duction of specific military paraphernalia). Conversion of the military sector
is of interest to more than just the research community, bilt it is extremely
complicated and should be investigated in detail in a separate study.
3.2.5 Science, research, development, and technology
before 1985
The Soviet Union developed the largest scientific community in the world
(see Chapter 4). Funding as a percentage of national income was tradition-
ally planned to be relatively high, the facilities were often enormous, and
the number of research personnel was awesome. This investment in the So-
viet scientific community did not go unnoticed; Soviet scientists had been
awarded a respectable number of Nobel Prizes during the 1950s and 1960s.
The origin of the structure of science and technology policy was the
same as that of the state which it served. Political goals, which had priority
in such a system, caused the evolution of science to be frequently deter-
mined by factors of national prestige rather than by the true needs of the
economy and society at large. The result was the rise of a socioeconomic
phenomenon called branchdom: division of the economy into separate, rather
isolated, sectors. By the end of the 1930s when the centrally planned system
(CPS) was in full operation, all production decisions including R&D and
long-term development issues were taken from the authority of industrial
enterprises and transferred to higher management levels (Le., ministries and
state committees).
This practice made it difficult for the consumers of R&D products to in-
fluence the field, effort, and funding of research through typical channels of
a market economy. The scientific community was forever attempting to uti-
lize its bargaining power to influence these elements, though with distorted
results. Thus, branchdom cultivated scientific monopolies that distorted the
goals of technological progress. This led to a structure in which mainly
large-scale R&D institutions, often with many thousands of employees, were
most viable. A limited number of rather small-scale institutes, directly serv-
ing some ministerial directives, also operated. In the period between 1975
and 1985, while the government imposed strict restrictions on the process of
establishing new R&D institutions in fear of losing control, the average size
of an R&D institute grew by more than 25%. Furthermore, the centrally
planned system (CPS) was in itself a primary cause of strong interbranch
and interorganization barriers that prevented information exchange between
scientists in research institutes and employees in industry, higher education,
and the Academy of Sciences.
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Basic research and applied research were separated from one another
by the organizational autarky of industrial ministries and the Academy of
Sciences. R&D plans for different departments of the CPS were determined
by corresponding bodies in the Central Committee of the Communist Party,
the State Planning Committee, the Military Industrial Commission, and
the State Committee on Science and Technology. With the exception of
military industrial R&D, inadequate coordination led to mismanagement
and conflicting indicators and objectives.
There was a continual conflict between enterprises' and branch min-
istries' planning perspectives and the actual duration of technological de-
velopment from research and development to implementation and diffusion.
Additional barriers between the academy, educational institutions, and in-
dustry (as well as between industries) split the scientific community into dif-
ferent groups with weak communication and under strict regulation. There-
fore, the early 1980s saw the structure of the Soviet R&D sector as extremely
monopolized (with discretionary distribution of R&D resources depending on
quality) and exceptionally inflexible and unable to respond to new demands
of society and science itself.
In general then, the Soviet economy was characterized by profound struc-
tural and technological imbalances. Both the substantial discrepancy be-
tween administrative management methods (regulation) and the innovation
processes and the economic, ideological, and socio-cultural peculiarities re-
sulted in an economic and political system indifferent to innovation and
technological change. Excess bureaucracy and ineffective state regulation
have been identified as the main obstacles to innovation. The five main fac-
tors cited as those most inhibiting innovative ability of the centrally planned,
system are state control and militarization, waste and shortage economy
(including the so-called anti-innovation branch structure), monopoly and
monotonous organization of innovations, economic culture, and technologi-
cal incompatibility.[16]
The CPS signified total state control of economic life, including science
and technology. Success was measured by fulfilling plan assignments and not
by making scientific discoveries. The result was a prevalence for short-term
interests (to meet the directives) rather than adaptive, long-term commit-
ments that could secure a more certain future. The long-term orientation
that existed was one that remained inflexible and concentrated on old prob-
lems, thus becoming obsolete in the course of a modernizing world.
In addition, investment, research, and technological policy was essen-
tially dependent on the state budget. Any decisions with respect to these
issues had to clear numerous hierarchial levels. Management of R&D financ-
ing and selection of particular paths of scientific and technological progress
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were, until recently, largely beyond the authority of the individual enterprise
or association.
In addition, Soviet S&T progress consistently had a substantial mili-
tary jspace orientation.[17] This was accompanied by a lack of devotion to
economic development problems (including a disregard for creating national
competitiveness) and a severe neglect of the civil sector, which resulted in
more direct consequences such as a monopsony situation, distorted prices,
and secrecy. The militarization of R&D was a threat to future S&T progress
in the Soviet Union due to the significantly weakened channels of converting
advanced technology for use in civilian industry and to the rigid command
management of enterprises in the military industrial complex.
Paradoxically, the output orientation of the administrative system has,
in the long run, led to a shortage economy. In the CPS, science and techno-
logical policy was restricted to the framework of the acceleration principle
and had no real stabilizing role. Such acceleration was sporadically initiated
when central authorities became aware of a widening technological gap be-
tween the level in their country and the levels in those countries it was to
be competing with.
Of course, the huge shortages characteristic of the Soviet economy di-
rectly impeded S&T progress. Physical limitations imposed on the scope of
R&D, financial resources became more scarce as the need to generate and
implement innovations grew, and efforts to satisfy everyday needs diverted
crucial energy and creative potential. A product of such an economic system
is the so-called anti-innovation branch structure. Its awkward and archaic
character is primarily due to a lack of restructuring with respect to changing
demands (particularly in the 1970s and 1980s when efforts were made to be-
come more R&D intensive), the inadequate development of various related
services, and a high degree of obsolete capital stock.[18]
The artificial type of Soviet monopoly based on administrative principles
was clearly an obstacle to innovation and technological change. Insurmount-
able vertical economic barriers are a direct consequence of the departmental
monopoly (branchdom). Soviet monopolistic management led to degradation
of product quality, lack of competition (especially to spur S&T progress),
and a reduction in the choices available to the consumer. Both monopoly and
monopsony features bias technological change and impede modern economic
growth. Thus, there was little possibility for integration and interdisciplinary
activity.
Nevertheless, ministries were required to maintain the given technolog-
ical level of production according to predetermined state standards and to
demonstrate technological achievements to the state authorities. In order to
fulfill this purpose, the ministries had a pool that included not only plants
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and factories, but also research institutes, design bureaus, and laboratories,
all somehow linked to industry. These are referred to as science/production
agglomerations, which were ignorant of market impulses and processes due
to their monopoly positions. Unfortunately, lobbying of the individual el-
ements was strong, coordination between them was weak, and enterprises
were generally quite unreceptive to innovations in any case.
Certain features that normally motivate R&D and subsequent techno-
logical change and innovation in a market economy were not present in the
economic structure of the Soviet Union. These include a functional capital
market (as well as venture capital[19]), high labor mobility,[20] and interna-
tional cooperation in research and exchange of scientists. The closed nature
of the centrally planned system and the commitment to secrecy imposed
extensive limitations on mobility of skilled personnel and the transfer of
information and technology.
The prolonged domination of the CPS resulted in the formation of a spe-
cial Soviet economic culture. Among the main items influencing successful
technological change was the aversion to competition and entrepreneurship
and the ignorance of the value of individual innovative spirit. Entrepreneur-
ship was commensurate with exploitation, parasitism, and speculation. The
use of ideological regulators of economic development and the existing plan-
ning and evaluation system of the results of scientific and technological ac-
tivities led to an unprecedented paper entrepreneurship in the form of exag-
geration of quality and quantity of results, and a trend toward spectacular
projects with sensational results.
Decades of command control, largely insensitive to changing de-
mands, resulted in incompatibility with technological standards of market
economies, with the exception of few selected strategic areas. International
R&D cooperation is vital for domestic technological progress and scientific
competition that reflect the evolution of demand in a modern society. Re-
verse engineering was one of the few links that Soviet scientific and technical
experts had to the international S&T community. This peculiar research
method was most popular in the motor vehicle, aircraft, chemical, and micro-
electronics industries. It was simply engaged to organize production, not for
the long-term improvement or development of technology. Although there
has been some trade in licenses, much of Soviet technology imports have
been of the turnkey style that limited further domestic development and
expansion. The direct import of knowledge and exchange of established or
aspiring scientists was minimal.
Overall, the state strategy for S&T development was aimed at achieving
international leadership in certain spheres of human knowledge, often at the
expense of economic efficiency (Mikerin and Kozlova, 1991, p. 2). There was
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more emphasis on the support oflarge-scale technological programs than on
creating a favorable economic climate for innovations and technical change.
The assessment of the effectiveness of new technology in the Soviet Union
revealed contradictory results with respect to contemporary global trends.
The causes were the distorted, expenditure-based central pricing system,
central distribution of resources, artificially suppressed consumer prices, high
taxation of excess profits (practically negating reinvestment possibilities),
low wages, and comparatively high prices for new technology. Consequently,
it appears that the present and future cost of innovating is far higher than
the potential return and an enterprise is better off adhering to the traditional
technology. On this premise, enterprises will never be motivated to engage
in technologically progressive activities.
Despite periodic showings of scientific achievement, the 1980s were a
time of decline for Soviet R&D: stagnation and an ever-widening gap between
the rate of intellectual production and that in the industrialized countries had
become the distinguishing features.[21] Estimates predict that the gap has
grown from 10 to 15 years behind in the mid-1950s to 20 to 30 years in the
mid-1980s, and is still growing (Motorygin and Glaziev, 1991, p. 8).
3.2.6 Science, research, development, and technology
after 1985
Some Soviet experts began to feel that the backwardness in the R&D sector
that was characteristic of the technology gap to the Western industrialized
countries may acquire a qualitatively irreversible character.[22]
As already mentioned, the Soviet scientific community was faced by what
at first glace seemed to be a paradox: questionable performance despite a
long-standing scientific tradition, fairly consistent and certainly secure fund-
ing (see Chapter 4), a tremendous store of knowledge, and a large number of
scientists and engineers. The situation becomes less paradoxical if seen in a
different light: namely, the shortage of state-of-the-art scientific equipment
that prevented scientists from reproducing world scientific achievements and
severely hindered any true pioneering work and the absence of modern com-
munication technology, infrastructure, and ideology that could convey re-
sults of work being done in other parts of the world and inform others on
those occasions when Soviets did make a discovery. This backwardness in
Soviet science was primarily related to backwardness in Soviet industry as a
whole, whether in computers, electronics, instrumentation, communication,
or other crucial fields.
As a result, the Soviet Union adopted the Comprehensive Program of
Scientific and Technical Progress of the CMEA countries to the year 2000 in
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1985 (Kneen, 1989, p. 68). This program identified "electronization" of the
economy, comprehensive automation, atomic power engineering, biotechnol-
ogy, and the creation of new types of materials as five areas where accelerated
development was considered crucial for the future well-being of the USSR
and its socialist partners.
There had been attempts to integrate the research science sector with
that of industrial technology to improve interaction with industry. The goal
was twofold: to make research more demand responsive and to facilitate
technological development. Already late in 1985, a decision of the Supreme
Soviet and the Council of Ministers delegated the actual control of several
industrial enterprises to Intersectoral Scientific and Technical Complexes
(MNTKs). The research and production processes were to be integrated
with industry by putting enterprises under the authority of a single body or
official for each project. Each MNTK was to be made up of institutes of the
Academy of Sciences, branch institutes from the ministries, professorships at
institutes of higher education, a project office, and experimental production
capacities (Matcheret, 1987, p. 93).
In addition to the MNTKs, Scientific Production Associations (NPOs)
had been encouraged at the branch and enterprise levels to further meld
together research institutes and production enterprises from different min-
istries for the purpose of stimulating innovation (Goldman, 1987, p. 81).
The essential difference between MNTKs and NPOs is that the former com-
bine research, developmental, and production facilities from several different
branches of the economy, thus necessitating the cooperation of numerous
decision-making bodies. These newly developed establishments were sup-
ported by Gorbachev; the twelfth five-year plan was to substantially increase
central expenditure for these activities.
The widening technology and knowledge gap to the Western industrial-
ized countries, as well as the disappointing performance of the Soviet S&T
community, compelled authorities to introduce perestroika in the science es-
tablishment with the proclamation of a government decree, "The Transfor-
mation of Research Organizations on the Basis of Complete Self-Accounting
and Self-Finance," by USSR President Gorbachev in the fall of 1987. This
decree gave state research institutes some autonomy with respect to the for-
mulation of research plans and the access to alternative sources of finance.
The ministerial organizations and monopolies in the R&D sector were to be
abolished, and prices on R&D products liberalized.
If institutes could not procure financing through contracts or continued
inefficient or fruitless work they were destined to be closed. Applied research
institutes may be able to generate sufficient income on a contract basis, but
those concentrating on fundamental research would probably face severe
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Table 3.5.
Expenditures
Christoph M. Schneider
R&D expenditures of nonstate organizations (in billion rubles).
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 a
0.03 1.21 4.70 6.00 6.15Total
including
R&D cooperatives
Youth research centers
Permanent research teams of Union of
Science and Engineering Society
Permanent research teams of All-Union
Society of Inventors
aEstimated.
bInsignificant or unavailable.
Source: Motorygin and Glaziev (1991, p. 20).
0.01
0.02
0.17
0.85
0.12
0.07
3.15
1.10
0.35
0.10
3.90
1.45
0.50
0.15
4.00
1.50
0.50
0.15
difficulties. For this reason, the g08zakaz (state order) was introduced into
management to replace the traditional task plan (Fortescue, 1990, p. 227).
Nevertheless, a team consisting of the USSR People's Control Commission
and the GKNT began an inspection in 1986 of the performance of research
institutes to determine which were inefficient. Within a short period, 14
branch institutes had been examined and half of them had been closed down
(Kneen, 1989, p. 74).
Simultaneously, the State Enterprise Law (SEL) and subsequent self-
organization were advocated and implemented, the price-setting mechanism
for R&D products ceased to be the domain ofthe state, and limits to the size
of personal income from R&D activities were abandoned. These elements
facilitated the blossoming of a nonstate R&D sector dominated by an un-
precedented increase in R&D cooperatives that employed more than 320,000
persons and accounted for work and services worth more than 3 billion rubles
in 1989 (Table 3.5). Total R&D expenditures of nonstate organizations were
already more than 10% of total gross expenditure on R&D in the USSR at
this time. However, R&D activity seemed to become biased toward contract
work to improve the quality. Such an emphasis will not rejuvenate the R&D
sector as explained in Section 7.3.
Unfortunately, real shifts in the structure and quality of R&D activities
failed to keep pace with the scale of the financial revolution. Conditions
conducive to stimulating the demand for highly efficient and science-intensive
production had not been created; one of the most critical being the absence of
a well-defined intellectual property rights system, which inevitably impaired
the ability to capitalize on R&D achievements.
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Many private firms began to resort to a type of industrial piracy that
involved using and selling inventions and know-how developed by state or-
ganizations; its main form was the by-now legal, part-time employment of
specialists fully employed by the state. Estimates show that more than half
the scholars in the Soviet Union work in the nonstate R&D sector, while
many continue to be employed by the state (Motorygin and Glaziev, 1991,
p. 15). Many scientists were reluctant to move out of the safe framework of
state-sponsored research. Thus, these firms were no more than intermediate
service agents that did not carry the burden of maintaining the equipment,
infrastructure, and national obligations of a state research institute.
Essentially then, knowledge and technology were consequently trans-
ferred between research institutes and from these institutes to the produc-
tion sector, but did not stimulate R&D activities. Whether revenue from the
sale of these intellectual products was reinvested in R&D remains doubtful.
In fact, numerous nonstate R&D enterprises were consequently, indirectly
subsidized by the state and may, in fact, have not been economically viable
in a more competitive market without access to such resources.
The unavoidable weakening of central control over state enterprises (due
to the implementation of the SEL) was accompanied by the decline of
performance- and enterprise-promoted R&D. With the subsequent introduc-
tion of the new tax system, ministries lost the right to collect any portion of
state enterprise profits, cutting off an important source of industrial R&D
funding.
The situation worsened throughout 1990 and early 1991. Industrial R&D
was plagued by financial trouble due to the abolishment of special industrial
funds for science and technology development (distribution method of sub-
sidies for R&D when regulation required all profits to be transferred to the
state), the new 1991 tax system (including federal, republican, and local
taxes on state enterprises' profits), decreased profit leading to reduced de-
mand for state R&D products by industrial and agricultural enterprises,[23]
collapse of the state budget,[24] and the brain drain from the state research
institutes to the emerging private sector.[25] Even more simple aspects such
as the obsolescence of experimental equipment and scientific instruments ac-
companied by the general deterioration of research premises also took their
toll on R&D advances.[26]
The opening of the Soviet economy exposed previously protected areas of
Soviet science and technology to levels attained in the international commu-
nity, often revealing substantial gaps between the internationally publicized
and the actual domestic research achievements. This is particularly true for
the civilian sector. One benefit of Gorbachev's glasnost was the new freedom
of intellectuals to exchange opinions at home and abroad. It would appear
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that gone are the days of Stalin's iron-fisted control of the scientific commu-
nity and hassles of the Brezhnev era concerning politico-bureaucratic control
of passports, visas, publications, conference travel, and postal communica-
tion. Nevertheless permission to go abroad continues to require invitations
and is not as fast in coming as is deemed necessary for a flexible environ-
ment, and the formal process is still cumbersome. Today new barriers are
present that may be more insurmountable than those of the past: Western
attitudes and hard currency.
One aspect that has been labeled for change are the resources allocated
to the defense industry. A state program for defense industry conversion
until 1995 has been approved. The goal is to reorient a substantial amount of
R&D resources from the MIC toward civilian purposes. Under this program
46% of the R&D resources of the defense sector should be implemented for
civilian purposes by 1995, compared with only 29.6% in 1989 (Kulichkov,
1991, p. 1).
Today there is a need to change the entire R&D organization, which in
the past was based on the fulfillment of state directives and nonmarket crite-
ria for performance. Some proposals for restructuring include: integration of
the processes of reorganization of research institutes and the privatization of
state enterprises; dissolution of ministries and other administrative supervis-
ing bodies; restructuring of the state system of R&D finance and promotion;
introduction of appropriate intellectual property rights, legislation, and state
innovation policy; and reform of the education system (Glaziev, 1991, p. 3).
Sufficient demand for R&D products will be necessary for R&D restructuring
to be successful and to make the sector viable during and after the transi-
tion to market conditions. Thus, de-monopolization and the development of
competition is a key prerequisite. There is some fear that privatization is cur-
rently taking place without de-monopolization. The transformation of state
enterprises into self-managed, joint-stock companies can easily be followed
by the rebirth of new organizational monopolies in the form of associations,
conglomerates, and others.
Research institutes cannot be privatized like enterprises. The appropri-
ate form should depend on the character of the research activity, whether
basic, applied, developed, or any combination of the three. The reorganized
institute may remain in the hands of the state, be transformed into consor-
tiums owned by firms, firms' R&D departments (Le., previously scientific-
production unions), small high-tech firms, centers for contract R&D (mainly
applied R&D), self-managed organizations leased or owned by their em-
ployees, or be transferred to universities or colleges. The transformation
of research institutes must be accompanied by restructuring of the current
R&D financing system. Although foundation or other private funding may
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be established, there will probably be a need to subsidize some R&D (par-
ticularly fundamental) during the transition to preserve accumulated R&D
potential. The recipients, amount, and duration of the funding must be
carefully identified.
The obstacles that hinder the realization of radical attempts to restruc-
ture include a shortage of resources (due to the distortion caused by fixed
prices), lack of expertise and experience, inadequate structure of state bod-
ies, and insufficient international exchange. A new national industrial policy
is required to provide sufficient stimuli for enterprises with respect to long-
term investments, innovative activities, and foreign trade. Both price and
quality competition should play an essential role in determining the route
that research and development managers take in the future.
Notes
[1] Economic growth is an increase in a geographic or political region's capacity to
produce goods and services and the actual increase in their production. Tra-
ditionally, the accepted measure to monitor growth has been the annual rate
of increase in a particular area's gross national product (or the rate of expan-
sion of per capita national income). There is considerable awareness of the
shortcomings of this measure, especially because it does not appear to always
measure adequately nonmarket activities, transactions in the black economy,
value of leisure or free time, and disbenefits of industrialization such as en-
vironmental damage or destruction of aesthetics. The all-encompassing term
to more reliably describe actual changes in the standard of living is economic
development. Essentially, development (originally from biology but also ap-
plicable to economics) refers to the progressive changes in size, shape, and
function during the life of an organism (Goetz, 1988, p. 45). In this analysis,
the role of the organism is taken by economic man or a regional or political
economy.
[2] The original work on this topic is entitled An Inquiry into the Nature and
the Causes·ofthe Wealth of Nations, by Adam Smith, first published in 1776.
These comments are a synthesis of the summary of some of Smith's ideas given
by Chirot (1989, p. 16).
[3] In the past, the countries of Eastern Europe were classified using different
expressions ranging from Iron Curtain countries and socialist countries to cen-
trally planned economies (CPEs), administrative and command economies.
The countries in this group include: Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary, Poland, Romania, the former Soviet Union, and the former Yugoslavia.
Today, these nations are undergoing fundamental changes in their structure and
character, and are therefore often referred to as emerging market economies
(EMEs).
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[4] This is exemplified by the strong emphasis on importing knowledge (for long-
term benefits) to Japan rather than on simply capital (for immediate, short-
term benefits) during the early stages of the post-World War II buildup period.
[5] Particularly little in light of Khrushchev's vision of the USSR overtaking the
USA as the leading world economic power in the second half of the twentieth
century.
[6] In fact, this situation did not change much until the 1950s. At this time,
GNP per capita in Japan was 17% (relatively less than the comparative figure
in 1900) and in the USSR it was 34% of the corresponding US level. An
interesting point regarding this indicator over the next four decades is that
while the Soviet level was 118% of the Japanese in 1900, it grew to more than
twice the Japanese level by 1950. In 1987 the GDP per capita in Japan was
164% of the Soviet level - a complete turnaround (Figure 3.3).
[7] These titles are from New Scientist (13 March 1986), Science (Vol. 238), New
Scientist (11 March 1989), The Economist (24 March 1990), and Nature (5
April 1990) respectively.
[8] For further discussion of this material refer to Gomulka (1986, pp. 42-61). He
investigates R&D and innovative activities in centrally planned economies and
extracts various principles that appear to be incompatible with rapid inno-
vation from the results of numerous empirical studies conducted in Eastern
Europe.
[9] An example of this is described in a study of the machine tool industry in the
Soviet Union: "The Soviet machine tool industry, developing independently of
western assistance, has become the world's largest producer of machine tools.
However, emphasis has been on large-scale production of relatively simple-to-
produce, general-purpose machine tools at the expense of special-purpose and
complex types." (Grant, 1979, p. 555).
[10] Some examples are theoretical physics, applied mathematical methodologies
and other mathematics, metallurgy, advanced ceramics, nuclear fission and
fusion, and lasers.
[11] Marx's words for science, R&D, and technology are translated as "practice,
experimental science, and materially creative science" in Mikulinski and Richta
(1983, p. 42).
[12] In the Soviet Union, calculations based on newly available data have shown
that the median one-firm concentration ratio (that is, the share of total output
by an individual enterprise in a particular sector of the economy) is as high as
61 %. For comparison, the American figure for the top four firms is only 37%
(Kahn and Peck, 1991, p. 65).
[13] GOSPLAN's involvement in the R&D policy making was due to its function in
compiling production plans that would have been influenced by the realization
of new products or processes.
[14] In many Western countries (i.e., United States, Germany, United Kingdom,
and Canada), the universities perform the lion's share of basic research in the
economy in addition to the teaching function.
[15] Total state expenditures for R&D were 37.8 billion rubles in 1988. Of this 75%
was designated for use in the MIC (Yakovets, 1991, p. 2).
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[16] Collected from the paper by Ageev and Kuzin (1991). The authors also thor-
oughly cover the Western literature on technological change as it pertains to
the Soviet situation.
[17] In 1989, 15.3 billion rubles were spent on defense-oriented R&D in the USSR.
This amounted to 71 % of the state allocations for scientific activities.
[18] Estimates indicate that from 25% to 50% of machinery is obsolete and that
annual repairs cost over 40 billion rubles in the engineering industry and employ
the time of tens of millions of workers (Ageev and Kuzin, 1991, p. 9).
[19] Venture capital is an important source of R&D financing, particularly for
smaller enterprises or entrepreneurs, in market economies. High capital mo-
bility, competition between financing sources, and a sound credit and financial
system contribute to the opportunities for successful advances in science and
development for parties that might be excluded from the conventional type of
simple, traditional financial allocation of a command system.
[20] Soviet personnel policies in the R&D field, which were based on hierarchy,
secrecy, and autocracy, caused problems with respect to the stimulation of
creative work, the active participation rate of skilled personnel, scientific and
technological progress, and the democratization of the S&T sector.
[21] The rate of growth in the number of R&D personnel in the 1980s frequently
dropped below 1% per year, whereas it ranged between 3% and 5% in the USA
during the same period. The figures below indicate a much slower relative
increase of R&D specialists in the USSR than in the USA throughout the
1980s (Gokhberg and Mindely, 1991, p. 5).
Number of specialists engaged only in R&D, as of January 1, in thousands.
USAa
1981 1986
--------
USSR USAa USSR
1989
USSR USAa
Specialists 1434.2 1258.7 1599.4
a US figures do not include consulting personnel.
1725.5 1654.6 2026.9
[22] A statement by Gurii Marchuk in an article in the new science newspaper Poisk
in July 1989, while he was president of the Academy of Sciences (quoted in
Fortescue, 1990, p. 223).
[23] Already in 1988, the share of enterprises engaged in industrial R&D rose from
51.2% to 66.4% (Motorygin and Glaziev, 1991, p. 17). Again, the necessity to
do-it-yourself has arisen.
[24] In the case of basic research the academy and the military industrial complex
were largely dependent on state subsidies. In 1991, state budget revenues fell
by as much as 70% (partly accentuated by the war of laws between the different
levels of government). Expenditures on R&D in the MIC fell, in nominal terms,
from 15.3 billion rubles in 1989 to 13.2 in 1990. With a 19% inflation rate in
1990, the real decrease is approximately 33% (ibid, p. 11).
[25] 13.5% of R&D (by value) was carried out in the nonstate sector in 1990.
[26] For example, in early 1989 the library of the Academy of Sciences subscribed to
approximately 4,000 journals. The Harvard University library alone subscribes
to about 160,000.
78 Christoph M. Schneider
Appendix 3A
GOP per capitaa Labor productivity Total Gopa Employmentb
1950 1987 1950 1987 1950 1987 1950 1987
USSR 2265 5948 4784 11535 407840 1683764 85.246 145.972
France 2941 9475 6445 24806 123051 527602 19.092 21.269
Germany 2508 9964 5923 23594 125361 606404 21.164 25.702
Japan 1116 9756 2616 20484 93342 1198943 35.685 58.530
UK 4171 9178 9377 21199 210041 520270 22.400 24.542
USA 6697 13550 16540 29724 1019725 3308401 61.651 111.303
Finland 2610 9500 5342 19141 10464 47049 1.959 2.458
Sweden 3898 10328 8021 20240 27447 86403 3.422 4.269
Norway 3436 11653 7856 23351 11218 48711 1.428 2.086
Italy 2323 9023 5862 20757 108657 515158 18.536 24.819
Netherlands 3554 9197 9917 25229 35950 134420 3.625 5.328
Austria 2123 8792 4579 20610 14721 66488 3.215 3.226
Spain 10.793 11.369
Greece 2.839c 3.597
Portugal 3.289 4.403
Canada 4822 12702 13169 28138 66240 329525 5.030 11.711
Australia 4389 9533 10376 22007 35891 154398 3.459 7.016
Argentina 2324 3302 5844 9851 39865 104004 6.821 10.558
Brazil 1073 3417 3155 8817 55709 480752 17.657 54.524
S. Korea 564 4143 1817 11040 11584 176116 6.377 15.952
Indonesia 484 1200 1140 3286 35182 204928 30.863 62.373
Taiwan 526 4744 1443 10097 4144 92757 2.872 9.187
Thailand 653 2294 1255 4725 12704 122430 10.119 25.913
India 359 662 800 1715 129111 521772 161.386 304.227
China 338 1748 999 3697 184855 1869945 184.984 505.775
Bulgaria 4.183d 4.084
Czechoslovakia 5.853e 7.972
Hungary 4.1551 4.865
Poland 12.405 17.245
Romania 10.4659 10.586
Yugoslavia 7.411 h 6.703
aGOP in million international dollars at 1980 prices (Maddison, 1989).
bEmployment in millions (Maddison, 1989; UN, 1991; Mitchell, 1980).
c1951. d1946. e1947. 11949. 91956. h1953.
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Appendix 3B
Quantity Productivity
World Quan- Popul- Employ- Arable per Labor Land
Item Country rank tity ationa mentb landc capita (Q/emp.) (Q/ha)
Agricultural goods
Barley USSR 1 44.50 288.74 24918.0 232570 0.1541 1.7859 0.1913
(mmt, Germany 2 15.50 77.56 1645.2 12410 0.1998 9.4213 1.2490
1988) Canada 3 14.40 26.31 583.0 45990 0.5473 24.6998 0.3131
USA 4 13.30 248.23 3400.0 189915 0.0536 3.9118 0.0700
France 5 10.10 55.99 1488.7 19459 0.1804 6.7844 0.5190
Corn USA 1 125.00 248.23 3400.0 189915 0.5036 36.7647 0.6582
(mmt, China 2 73.82 1112.30 8009.0 96976 0.0664 9.2171 0.7612
1988) Brazil 3 24.70 150.75 14331.0 77500 0.1638 1.7235 0.3187
Romania 4 18.38 23.15 3060.0 10686 0.7940 6.0065 1.7200
USSR 5 16.03 288.74 24918.0 232570 0.0555 0.6433 0.0689
Cotton USSR 1 8.69 288.74 24918.0 232570 0.0301 0.3487 0.0374
(mmt, USA 2 5.49 248.23 3400.0 189915 0.0221 1.6147 0.0289
1988) China 3 4.54 1112.30 8009.0 96976 0.0041 0.5669 0.0468
India 4 1.36 833.42 1348.0 168990 0.0016 1.0089 0.0080
Pakistan 5 1.24 110.41 14054.0 20760 0.0112 0.0882 0.0597
Eggs China 1 4.53 1112.30 8009.0 96976 0.0041 0.5656 0.0467
(mmt, USSR 2 4.42 288.74 24918.0 232570 0.0153 0.1774 0.0190
1988) USA 3 4.06 248.23 3400.0 189915 0.0164 1.1941 0.0214
Japan 4 2.41 123.22 4890.0 4708 0.0196 0.4928 0.5119
Germany 5 1.11 77.56 1645.2 12410 0.0143 0.6747 0.0894
Meat China 1 19.54 1112.30 8009.0 96976 0.0176 2.4398 0.2015
(mmt, USSR 2 19.30 288.74 24918.0 232570 0.0668 0.7745 0.0830
1988) USA 3 17.83 248.23 3400.0 189915 0.0718 5.2441 0.0939
Germany 4 6.69 77.56 1645.2 19459 0.0863 4.0664 0.3438
France 5 3.91 55.99 1488.7 12410 0.0698 2.6265 0.3151
Milk USSR 1 100.65 288.74 24918.0 232570 0.3486 4.0392 0.4328
(mmt, USA 2 66.01 248.23 3400.0 189915 0.2659 19.4147 0.3476
1988) Germany 3 35.48 77.56 1645.2 19459 0.4575 21.5658 1.8233
France 4 33.70 55.99 1488.7 12410 0.6019 22.6372 2.7156
India 5 20.10 833.42 1348.0 168990 0.0241 14.9110 0.1189
Oats USSR 1 15.29 288.74 24918.0 232570 0.0530 0.6136 0.0657
(mmt, Germany 2 3.32 77.56 1645.2 19459 0.0428 2.0180 0.1706
1988) USA 3 3.18 248.23 3400.0 189915 0.0128 0.9353 0.0167
Canada 4 3.00 26.31 583.0 45990 0.1140 5.1458 0.0652
Poland 5 2.30 38.17 5006.9 14739 0.0603 0.4594 0.1560
Potatoes USSR 1 62.71 288.74 24918.0 232570 0.2172 2.5167 0.2696
(mmt, Poland 2 39.00 38.17 5006.9 14739 1.0217 7.7893 2.6460
1988) China 3 29.55 1112.30 8009.0 96976 0.0266 3.6896 0.3047
Germany 4 20.93 77.56 1645.2 19459 0.2699 12.7219 1.0756
USA 5 15.88 248.23 3400.0 189915 0.0640 4.6706 0.0836
Sugar USSR 1 8.60 288.74 24918.0 232570 0.0298 0.3451 0.0370
(mmt, Brazil 2 8.45 150.75 14331.0 77500 0.0561 0.5896 0.1090
1988) Cuba 3 7.89 10.45 579.0 3320 0.7550 13.6269 2.3765
India 4 7.02 833.42 1348.0 168990 0.0084 5.2077 0.0415
USA 5 5.42 248.23 3400.0 189915 0.0218 1.5941 0.0285
Tea Turkey 1 0.756 55.36 49.8 27927 0.0137 15.1807 0.0271
(mmt, India 2 0.625 833.42 1348.0 168990 0.0007 0.4636 0.0037
1988) China 3 0.566 1112.30 8009.0 96976 0.0005 0.0707 0.0058
Sri Lanka 4 0.225 16.88 363.7 1887 0.0133 0.6186 0.1192
Kenya 5 0.160 24.35 257.0 2420 0.0066 0.6226 0.0661
USSR 6 0.148 288.74 24918.0 232570 0.0005 0.0059 0.0006
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Quantity Productivity
World Quan- Popul- Employ- Arable per Labor Land
Item Country rank tity ation" mentb lande capita (Q/emp.) (Q/ha)
Tobacco China 1 2.350 1112.30 8009.0 96976 0.0021 0.2934 0.0242
(mrnt, USA 2 0.612 248.23 3400.0 189915 0.0025 0.1800 0.0032
1988) USSR 3 0.490 288.74 24918.0 232570 0.0017 0.0197 0.0021
India 4 0.439 833.42 1348.0 168990 0.0005 0.3257 0.0026
Brazil 5 0.386 150.75 14331.0 77500 0.0026 0.0269 0.0050
Wheat China 1 88 1112.30 8009.0 96976 0.0787 10.9265 0.9024
(mrnt, USSR 2 84 288.74 24918.0 232570 0.2925 3.3891 0.3631
1988) USA 3 49 248.23 3400.0 189915 0.1986 14.4971 0.2595
India 4 47 833.42 1348.0 168990 0.0563 34.7849 0.2775
France 5 30 55.99 1488.7 12410 0.5301 19.9369 2.3916
Manufactured Goods
Beer USA 1 228.96 248.23 20935.0 0.9224 10.9367
(mIn.hl, Germany 2 112.20 77.56 11654.9 1.4466 9.6269
1986) UK 3 60.10 57.03 5398.0 1.0538 11.1338
USSR 4 51.20 288.74 38225.0 0.1773 1.3394
Japan 5 48.50 123.22 14250.0 0.3936 3.4035
Butter USSR 1 1.670 288.74 38225.0 0.0058 0.0437
(mmt, Germany 2 0.890 77.56 11654.9 0.0115 0.0764
1986) India 3 0.720 833.42 6263.0 0.0009 0.1150
France 4 0.640 55.99 4636.8 0.0114 0.1380
USA 5 0.548 248.23 20935.0 0.0022 0.0262
Cement China 1 203.00 1112.30 32092.0 0.1825 6.3256
(mrnt, USSR 2 139.00 288.74 38225.0 0.4814 3.6364
1988) Japan 3 71.60 123.22 14250.0 0.5811 5.0246
USA 4 71.50 248.23 20935.0 0.2880 3.4153
Italy 5 38.20 57.56 4639.0 0.6637 8.2345
Cheese USA 1 2.51 248.23 20935.0 0.0101 0.1199
(mrnt, USSR 2 1.75 288.74 38225.0 0.0061 0.0458
1986) France 3 1.28 55.99 4636.8 0.0229 0.2761
Germany 4 1.20 77.56 11654.9 0.0155 0.1030
Italy 5 0.67 57.56 4639.0 0.0116 0.1444
Cigarettes USA 1 655300 248.23 20935.0 2639.89 31301.65
(mIn., USSR 2 381300 288.74 38225.0 1320.57 9975.15
1985) Japan 3 303000 123.22 14250.0 2459.02 21263.16
Germany 4 190200 77.56 11654.9 2452.29 16319.32
Brazil 5 146300 150.75 8986.0 970.48 16280.88
Newsprint Canada 1 9.97 26.31 2044.0 0.3789 4.8777
(mrnt, USA 2 5.43 248.23 20935.0 0.0219 0.2594
1988) Japan 3 2.64 123.22 14250.0 0.0214 0.1853
Sweden 4 1.73 8.40 960.0 0.2060 1.8021
Finland 5 1.65 4.96 534.0 0.3327 3.0899
USSR 6 1.60 288.74 38225.0 0.0055 0.0419
Paper & USA 1 76.40 248.23 20935.0 0.3078 3.6494
paper- Japan 2 18.40 123.22 14250.0 0.1493 1.2912
board China 3 12.10 1112.30 32092.0 0.0109 0.3770
(mrnt, Germany 4 9.86 77.56 11654.9 0.1271 0.8460
1988) USSR 5 6.30 288.74 38225.0 0.0218 0.1648
Canada 6 6.00 26.31 2044.0 0.2281 2.9354
Passenger Japan 1 9.05 123.22 14250.0 0.0734 0.6351
cars USA 2 6.82 248.23 20935.0 0.0275 0.3258
(mIn., Germany 3 4.79 77.56 11654.9 0.0618 0.4110
1989) France 4 3.41 55.99 4636.8 0.0609 0.7354
Italy 5 1.97 57.56 4639.0 0.0342 0.4247
USSR 8 1.22 288.74 38225.0 0.0042 0.0319
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Quantity Productivity
World Quan- Popul- Employ- Arable per Labor Land
Item Country rank tity ationB ment b landc capita (Q/emp.) (Q/ha)
Radios Hong Kong 1 43.40 5.71 918.6 7.6007 47.2458
(min., USA 2 23.62 248.23 20935.0 0.0952 1.1283
1986) China 3 16.00 1112.30 32092.0 0.0144 0.4986
Japan 4 13.00 123.22 14250.0 0.1055 0.9123
Singapore 5 12.82 2.67 318.9 4.8015 40.2007
USSR 6 8.03 288.74 38225.0 0.0278 0.2101
TVs China 1 24.90 1112.30 32092.0 0.0224 0.7759
(min., USA 2 20.17 248.23 20935.0 0.0813 0.9635
1986) Bangladesh 3 14.99 114.72 n.a. 0.1307 n.a.
S. Korea 4 14.67 43.35 4416.0 0.3384 3.3220
Japan 5 14.27 123.22 14250.0 0.1158 1.0014
USSR 6 9.63 288.74 38225.0 0.0334 0.2519
Wine Italy 1 76.99 57.56 4639.0 1.3376 16.5962
(mIn.hI., France 2 73.50 55.99 4636.8 1.3127 15.8514
1987) Spain 3 36.70 39.42 2588.9 0.9310 14.1759
USSR 4 30.00 288.74 38225.0 0.1039 0.7848
Argentina 5 20.50 31.91 962.2 0.6424 21.3053
Wool Australia 1 0.822 16.45 1151.4 0.0500 0.7139
(mmt, USSR 2 0.463 288.74 38225.0 0.0016 0.0121
1986) N. Zealand 3 0.358 3.37 301.0 0.1062 1.1894
China 4 0.177 1112.30 32092.0 0.0002 0.0055
Argentina 5 0.155 31.91 962.2 0.0049 0.1611
Energy consumption
Electricity USA 1 2727500 248.23 10987.79
(mIn.kWh, USSR 2 1630200 288.74 5645.91
1987) Japan 3 699000 123.22 5672.78
Germany 4 537600 77.56 6931.41
China 5 497300 1112.30 447.09
Coal China 1 916.4 1112.30 0.82
(mmt, USA 2 751.8 248.23 3.03
1987) USSR 3 695.0 288.74 2.41
Germany 4 506.1 77.56 6.53
Poland 5 236.7 38.17 6.20
Natural USA 1 650686 248.23 2621.30
gas USSR 2 498847 288.74 1727.67
(mIn.m3 , Germany 3 71180 77.56 917.74
1988) UK 4 65233 57.03 1143.84
Canada 5 57558 26.31 2187.69
Crude USA 1 4680 248.23 18.85
petroleum USSR 2 3692 288.74 12.79
(min. Japan 3 1147 123.22 9.31
barrels, China 4 786 1112.30 0.71
1988) Germany 5 644 77.56 8.30
BPopuiation data (in million) 1989.
b All employment figures (in tousands) are from 1987 except: Brazil, Cuba, India, Sri Lanka, and
USSR, 1986; Pakistan, Romania, and Turkey, 1985; and Argentina, 1984. Agriculturalemployment
includes agriculture, fishing, forestry, and hunting. Employment for manufactured goods is only
manufacturing employment.
C Arable land (in thousand hal refers to land under temporary crops, temporary meadows for
mowing or pasture, land under market of private gardens, land temporarily fallow or lying idle,
and land cultivated with crops that occupy the land for long periods and need not be replanted
after each harvest (1987).
Data sources for calculations in Table 3.1, FAO, and UN.
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Appendix 3C
GDP per capita" Annual growth rates (in %)b
1900 1929 1950 1987 1900-1929 1929-1950 1950-1987 1900-1987
Austria 1615 2118 2123 8792 0.94 0.Q1 3.92 1.97
Canada 1808 3286 4822 12702 2.08 1.84 2.65 2.27
Germany 1558 2153 2508 9964 1.12 0.73 3.80 2.16
Japan 677 1162 1116 9756 1.88 -0.19 6.03 3.11
Netherlands 2146 3373 3554 9197 1.57 0.25 2.60 1.69
Sweden 1482 2242 3898 10328 1.44 2.67 2.67 2.26
UK 2798 3200 4171 9178 0.46 1.27 2.15 1.37
USA 2911 4909 6697 13550 1.82 1.49 1.92 1.78
China 401 444 338 1748 0.35 -1.29 4.54 1.71
India 378 403 359 662 0.22 -0.55 1.67 0.65
S. Korea 549 749 564 4143 1.08 -1.34 5.54 2.35
Taiwan 434 631 526 4744 1.30 -0.86 6.12 2.79
Argentina 1284 2036 2324 3302 1.60 0.63 0.95 1.09
Brazil 436 654 1073 3417 1.41 2.39 3.18 2.39
USSR 797 1044 2265 5948 0.94 3.76 2.64 2.34
"GDP per capita in international dollars at 1980 prices.
bData for growth rate calculations compiled from Maddison (1989, p. 19).
Ch.apter 4
Inputs to the Soviet R&D
Sector
The three main factors crucial to the strength of a national R&D sector are:
1. Education.
2. R&D personnel.
3. R&D financing.
All three are usually dependent on one another. Generally, the quan-
titative and qualitative niveau of one will affect that of one or both of the
others. So, it follows that if the education system produces graduates with
suitable knowledge and skills, then the stock of R&D personnel will be of
respectable quality. Qualified and competent staff will attract more R&D
financing through interesting and applicable project proposals and results.
The expectations of respectable remuneration will attract more students to
these fields to prepare them for a career in research and development, and
so on.
This chapter deals with these three inputs in the Soviet R&D sector.
In order to best demonstrate the size and extent of scientific resources in
the former Soviet Union comparisons with Western and Eastern nations are
made.
4.1 Education
Education is the process of acquiring knowledge by instruction of specific
technical skills. These skills become an individual's human capital that can
be sold in the market. The cumulative total of the individual human capital
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within the borders of a country represent that nation's stock of knowledge
- a valuable national resource.
On the whole, education policies that sustain R&D should provide the
higher levels of education that fulfill certain criteria.[1] These include the
requirements to:
1. Respond to new needs at the national, local, and community levels.
2. Contribute to revitalizing the economy by producing suitable types of
highly qualified manpower and to further training of the labor force in
the context of rapidly changing technologies and economic conditions.
3. Sustain adequate levels of technological innovation through scientific re-
search progress.
In a study on national innovation systems, Richard Nelson (1992) comes
to the important conclusion (among others) that a distinguishing feature of
the countries in his sample, which were sustaining competitive and innovative
firms, was the presence of education and training systems that provide the
firms with a flow of people with the requisite knowledge and skills.[2] Indeed,
universities consciously train their students with an eye to industries' needs.
Consequently, education becomes the cornerstone of technical progress
which is fundamental to economic growth and development. Technological
advance demands from both consumers and producers require evermore in-
formation, training, and skills. Of course, producers include everyone from
enterprise managers to workers on the shop floor, to research and develop-
ment scientists, engineers, and technicians, to university scholars and assis-
tants, and many, many more. Increased awareness on the part of producers
and consumers of innovation and technology stimulates competition, raising
the general standard of living and increasing the social benefit to all.
4.1.1 General education and literacy:
The foundation for a scientific culture
The sheer size of the Soviet Union and before that the Russian Empire has
throughout history diverted attention from the economic and technological
situation of the nation. This becomes more clear when data are viewed on a
per inhabitant basis. Estimates made in the past have revealed that Russian
per capita national income in 1913 was only 15% of the United States, 22%
of British, 33% of German, 50% of Italian and Austro-Hungarian levels, and
was roughly equal to that of Bulgaria and Romania (Falkus, 1972, p. 12).
These rankings appear to reasonably correspond to those based on GDP per
capita from Table 3.1.
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Numerous authors on this topic have alluded to a deleterious economic
situation (as illustrated by the low per capita income) and a growing infe-
riority of military force as indicative of Russian relative technological back-
wardness with respect to Western Europe and the United States already in
the late 1800s (for a comprehensive account, see Chirot, 1989). In fact, after
early, impressive successes (such as the repulsion of the Napoleonic invasion
in 1812) the Russian military faced humiliating losses to smaller but techno-
logically superior foes in the Crimean War (1855) and the Russo-Japanese
War (1904-1905); at these times Russia was experiencing economic stagna-
tion (Gregory, 1982, p. 5).
Recognizing their country's increasing economic and technological back-
wardness, Russian policy makers of these early times reacted in a very simi-
lar fashion to that of their Soviet counterparts during the twentieth century
who were responding to the growing technological gap between the USSR
and the West. Compelled by all the disadvantages that accompany growing
technological inferiority, a situation that had begun to cost many lives, the
Russians reverted to a deliberate program of forced industrialization. The
state, previously disinterested in industrialization and the factors that would
have accompanied it, finally recognized the importance of a strong manu-
facturing sector built on solid technology (both domestic and imported),
and a radical improvement in the level of general education and specialized
training.[3]
The strong educational base in the former Soviet Union has already been
referred to several times in this study. Statistics indicate that the general
educationalization of the Soviet Union took place within a fairly limited pe-
riod of time. In fact, in less than 50 years (by the late 1950s) the Soviet
population went from being just over 20% literate to being 99% literate. A
figure that still holds true today. This dramatic change is especially impres-
sive considering that the various peoples spread across the great expanse of
the Russian Empire were, by and large, illiterate before the Bolshevik Rev-
0Iution.[4] By the end of the nineteenth century, the average literacy rate
for the total population was 24% - 52.3% in the cities and only 19.6% in
the countryside (Lane, 1985, p. 265). In spite of the high percentage for the
towns the average percentage was low because Russia was a predominantly
rural society at the time (see Figure 4-1). Regarding the difference between
the sexes, a 1897 census revealed that in European Russia 35.8% of the men
and only 12.4% of women were literate (Nove, 1989, p. 16).
Yet despite the striking increase in the average educational level (the
completion of four years of formal, basic elementary education) of the pop-
ulation, there is little to indicate an increase in the attainment of higher
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Figure 4.1. Soviet demographic change, 1900-1990.
education. The overall figures also do not reflect the past and current re-
gional unevenness or the impact of urbanization. The schools in rural areas
were often equipped with inferior physical and human capital to that in the
urban educational institutions.[5] Therefore, the transition of the popula-
tion from 85% rural in 1900 to 50% urban in 1960 and 66% urban in 1990
greatly contributed to the increase in the Soviet literacy rate during the
twentieth century (see Figure 4.1). The figure shows a sudden and rapid
increase in the rate of urbanization in the 1930s that coincides with Stalin's
forced industrialization and mass education programs.[6]
As to the regional differences, data reveal gaping variations between the
levels of literacy in the individual republics of the USSR. While the literacy
rate had already attained a respectable 57% as the Union average in 1926,
republics like Tadjikistan at 3.8%, Uzbekistan at 11.6%, Turkmenia at 14%,
and Kirghizia at 16.5% were far below the average.[7] At the same time
Russia, Belorussia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic republics were far ahead.
By 1959, the average literacy rate for the Union was 98.5%, and the lowest
was 95.4% in Turkmenia. The rural to urban distribution of the levels of
literacy early in the century emphasizes the lack of any consistent formal
education in the countryside. Even today, when rural education is better and
literacy is said to be nearly 99%, the dropout rate in the first eight years
of education is shockingly high, and academic studies are often disrupted
by the need to help out on the farm. Although the numbers indicate a
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respectable improvement, they show only the widespread increase in basic
abilities (up to four years of school). Therefore, the dispersion of elementary
education was successful, but it did not indicate or insure an increase in the
higher or specialized levels of education attained by the population at large,
particularly on a regional basis. The reason for stressing these points is not
to detract from the real successes of Soviet education policy, but to prevent
certain misinterpretations of the data.
4.1.2 Enrollment in higher education
A comparison of the rates of enrollment in the USSR and the USA over the
90-year period from 1900 to 1990 illustrates the evolution of the extension
of education in both countries (Table 4.1). In the United States, the num-
bers show a consistent level of general education with total enrollment in
everything from primary to postgraduate education and training hovering
around an average of 23.5% of the total population. While there are some
troughs (19.9% in 1950, WWII effect) and some peaks (29.6% in 1970, baby-
boom effect) in total US enrollment, the number of Soviet students in higher
education as a percentage of total population or total enrollment climbed
steadily throughout the decade; significant advances occurred in the 1960s
and 1970s. Some 35% of the total was enrolled in part-time or correspon-
dence education; this is a very high percentage of the total enrollment. This
point is verified when looking at the difference between columns one and two
for the USSR and columns one and two for the USA: 30.4% compared with
18.2%, respectively. This indicates that the USA had a much higher ratio
of the population enrolled in full-time higher education than the USSR.
Perhaps some explanation is due to describe the structure of the Soviet
education system. The children attended day-care and nursery schools, and
then they began kindergarten. In the late 1970s, almost 80% of the children
below age seven in urban areas were in some sort of preschool institution. In
1961 the figure had been as low as 10%, growing to 37% in 1974. This is an
indication of the increase in families in which both parents were required to
work outside the home to maintain an adequate standard of living. Children
began attending primary school at age four. After four years their education
may have been extended another four years to complete the first eight-year
stage. Their education may then have been extended further to complete 11
years of schooling. Upon graduation from secondary school there were nu-
merous possibilities for students, including technical trade schools (PTUs),
secondary technical trade schools (SPTUs), secondary specialized schools
( technicums or SSUZs), and general secondary school (the so-called full sec-
ondary education). Graduating from the last type of school was the direct
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route to enter universities (VUZs), institutes, or military academies after
which there was the opportunity for a three-year postgraduate degree pro-
gram under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences. It was also possible
to move to technicums and technical schools after completing the general
secondary school. Finally, it was possible to proceed to university education
through full-time or part-time correspondence courses after completing any
secondary education other than the general one. The students in the voca-
tional schools received an education that was much closer to the demands
of the market (especially industry) than those in the academic/university
branch of the system.
The data for the Soviet Union substantiate the bold statements identi-
fying astonishing growth and give evidence of the spread of education during
the Stalin years. The cost of education was one of the main reasons why
expenditure on "communal services" rose from 5% to approximately 10%
of GNP in the 1930s (Maddison, 1969, p. 100). In 1900, only 6.3% of the
population was enrolled in educational programs (compared with 22.5% in
the USA); in 1930, early in Stalin's reign, only 7.0% (23.9% in the USA);
by 1950 it was already 27.1% (seven percentage points more than the total
in the same year in the USA); and in 1990 an impressive 35% of the Soviet
population was enrolled compared with 23.2% in the USA (see Table 4.1).
The absolute numbers for the USSR surged ahead of those in the USA in
the 1930s and have stayed ahead until today (the dynamics of change are
shown in Figure 4.2). But what was the quality of Soviet education?
Many students were in correspondence programs, and the continuing
education courses for workers were also considered part of the educational
program. The 1930s saw the establishment of many training schemes that
were accounted for in the higher education statistics but were completely
detached from the Soviet university system and would certainly not qualify
for university or college ranking in the West.[8] These schemes included
apprenticeship on the job, courses run by enterprises, technical colleges run
by industries, the so-called FZU or factory training schools, and many oth-
ers (Nove, 1989, p. 223). Problems that accompanied the rapid expansion
included a severe shortage of well-trained instructors and a segregation and
subsequent isolation of the various educational sectors with unclear respon-
sibilities and coordination between them. Despite the disharmony, many
programs did usually fulfill their goals.
Yet, in general, the percentage of the students in higher education in the
USA as a percentage of the population has generally been above that in the
USSR over the last 100 years.[9] In fact, while almost 22% of total enrollment
in the USA is in higher education (though there is much discussion about the
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Figure 4.2. Expansion in education in the USSR and the USA, 1900-1990.
general level of the quality of this also), only 13% of total Soviet enrollment
is in higher education (from Table 4.1).
The nemesis of Soviet higher education goes back to a Khrushchev deci-
sion in 1958 not to make full secondary education compulsory for all. Con-
sequently, the availability of recruits for higher levels was indirectly limited
in the past. Khrushchev's hope was to induce the majority of pupils to go
on to technical training, either full-time or on the job, after completing a
few years of compulsory education (Nove, 1989, p. 344). He felt higher ed-
ucation was to be part-time for most students, combined with useful work
and preceded by at least 2 years of employment. Thus, the present figures
representing students in higher and specialized secondary education contain
approximately one-third or more who were correspondence, external, or con-
tinuing education students (many of whom do not complete their programs).
The scale of Soviet education, particularly higher education, grew to be
very large indeed. By 1990, there were no fewer than 898 universities in the
system, which put the USSR among the top eight countries in the world
in raw numbers, with nearly 3 million university students in universities
or other educational and training programs, and almost 400,000 university
teachers; quite a considerable size for an organization whose role in the econ-
omy as a direct contributor to R&D output has been very minor in absolute
terms and in comparison with other scientific institutions. These numbers
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still do not include the other institutions of tertiary education that mainly
take the form of higher technical schools (called specialized secondary edu-
cation) used to educate the specialized (or skilled) workers and technicians.
The 7% of GNP expenditures that went toward education in 1989, sub-
stantiate the Soviet dedication to maintaining a nearly 100% literacy rate
and high general level of education (refer to Table 4.2). These are amazing
accomplishments considering the country's cultural and regional diversities.
The last two factors were surely part of the reason the Soviet Union needed
to spend more on education than economically successful nations such as
the UK, Japan, or Germany (as a percentage of GNP). Nevertheless, the
expenditure per pupil regardless of level is among the lowest in the sample
from Table 4.2. Unfortunately, this is the result of the costs required to
maintain a large bureaucratic apparatus and directly affects the quality of
educational infrastructure, especially in rural areas, as will be discussed later
in this section.
Despite such substantial spending on education as a whole, the num-
ber of students enrolled in higher education per 100,000 inhabitants was
clearly lower in the Soviet Union than in Western countries that actually
spend less on education as a percentage of GNP. Table 4.2 shows that only
Britain had fewer students in higher education per 1,000 inhabitants than
the Soviet Union; however, the UK figure does not include all the students in
colleges and specialized higher educational institutions (Le., those of finance
and technology). This also explains the relatively low number of teachers
per 1,000 inhabitants in the UK. The USA and Germany appear to staff
their universities much more generously than the Soviets, though the Ger-
man number has been inflated by the inclusion of teaching assistants and
many lecturers from business and industry, usually on a part-time basis,
that do not hold a steady appointment at the university. Although the
USSR boasted some of the highest absolute enrollment in the world, it also
had one of the lowest student to teacher ratios in university education (after
adjusting the German number for the actual number of resident teachers).
Normally, such a feature is very positive, but in the Soviet university system
it was rather indicative of overstaffing, large bureaucracy, and inefficiency.
Many professors or teachers are employed, even though the rate of growth
in enrollment is, in fact, negative (see Table 4.3).
A final point revealed by the five-country comparison in Table 4.2 di-
vulges that the number of university students, and consequently graduates,
per employed person was significantly lower in the USSR than in the other
nations (including the UK, after an adjustment to include the students in
colleges and institutes of specialized higher education). This certainly has
implications for the quality of the labor force. In the United States, for
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Table 4.3. Soviet graduating students by sectoral affiliation (in %) and
growth in enrollment, selected years.
Sector 1970 1980 1988 1970-1980 1980-1988
Higher education Annual growth rates
Industry & construction 34.0 37.1 34.0 3.5 -1.7
Agriculture 10.9 9.2 10.0 0.9 0.3
Transport & communication 4.5 5.0 5.1 3.7 -0.4
Economics & law 8.1 8.1 9.0 2.7 0.6
Health care, culture, & sport 6.8 7.4 8.2 3.5 0.6
Education 34.7 32.2 32.7 1.8 -0.5
Art & cinematography 1.1 1.0 1.1 2.3 0.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 2.6 -0.7
Specialized secondary
education Annual growth rates
Industry & construction 40.5 37.0 33.9 1.2 -1.5
Agriculture 14.0 16.4 15.4 3.8 -1.2
Transport & communication 7.6 8.2 6.7 2.8 -2.9
Economics & law 12.9 14.7 13.9 3.5 -1.1
Health care, culture, & sport 13.1 11.9 13.1 1.1 1.6
Education 10.2 9.6 14.3 1.5 4.7
Art & cinematography 1.8 2.1 1.9 4.1 -1.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 2.1 -0.4
Source: Figures for higher education and specialized secondary education adapted from
Ryan (1990, p. 145); growth rates calculated by the author.
example, only 35% of scientists graduating from university are directly em-
ployed as R&D personnel, 45% are employed in related activities, and the
rest (20%) are employed in completely unrelated activities (Schneider, 1991,
p. 11). These university graduates contribute to the quality of the labor
force and market activity by becoming involved in fields such as marketing,
communication, and trade.
The USSR did portray a better picture than other Eastern European
countries with respect to enrollment (see Figure 4.3). The number of Soviet
students per capita in tertiary education in 1989 were more than double those
in Hungary and Romania, and significantly above those in Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and Bulgaria. But this view marks the Soviet level only as the best
of the communist/socialist bloc. In truth, it was below the per capita figures
of Germany, Japan, the UK, and far below those of the USA. The United
States is the leader among these nations and is preparing a large, educated
generation for the work force.
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Figure 4.3. Students in tertiary education, 1989 (in selected countries).
4.1.3 Higher education and fields of study
In the past, graduates of higher educational institutions in the USSR had
been directed and ensuingly biased in their areas of specialization. The fields
of study, in which Soviet students have traditionally been concentrated, do
not appear to be especially contiguous to the goal of establishing the intel-
lectual basis for a reforming economy on the path of transition to a market
economy. The past focus had been on particular national, or rather party,
priorities. There had clearly been an emphasis (and continues to be) in the
fields of industry and construction and education. Other areas that would
fall under the definition of the service sector, like transportation and commu-
nication, economics and law, health care, culture, and sport, were character-
ized by a distinct relative lack of graduates. Part of the explanation for this
trait was the Marxist and Soviet-style socialist ideology that services were
unproductive and not conducive to the kind of growth targeted by central
authorities. Another part of the explanation lies in the Soviet government's
policy to purposely avoid developments in fields that could lead to mass,
uncontrolled distribution of ideas that were not those of the state and the
Communist Party.
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Upon analyzing the data, some doubts seem to arise with respect to
how well prepared, in terms of higher education and specialized training,
the coming generations will be in order to take over the helm in developing
a modern-style growth economy in a market environment. In the USSR, the
growth of total graduates from universities and technical schools dropped
drastically from clearly over +2% per year in both cases in the 1970s to -0.7
and -0.4% per year respectively from 1980 to 1988 (see Table 4.3). Stud-
ies affiliated with the sectors of the economy that constitute an important
share of GNP (i.e., industry and construction and agriculture) continue to
be favorite fields of study, albeit with a reduced number of graduates. Areas
especially important to a modern economy (i.e., transport and communica-
tions and economics and law) must make due with a very small share of the
total graduates, which have simultaneously experienced the most marked
decline during the 1980s.
Some experts have charged that there has been an ensuing over-
production of engineers, many of whom end up performing tasks that would
have required much less training. This may have potentially been a more
serious problem than would appear at first glance. Education, like every
other sector of the Soviet economy, was supply, and not demand, driven.
Statistics indicate a tendency for the output of the higher levels of educa-
tion to overshoot and grow faster than the demand for specialized skills. So,
in spite of the declining total number of graduates in absolute terms, the rate
of students completing higher education exceeded the rate at which industry
was converting from manual to mechanized production. The motivation of
those employed was subsequently adversely affected and the perverse pay
differentials between some educated technical and manual workers implied
that the private financial rate of return to education was low (IMF et al.,
1991, vol. 2, p. 169). In the West it is the rule that more education leads
to higher monetary rewards in the market place. Lastly, the distortion aris-
ing from the older cohorts with usually inferior formal education to that of
younger cohorts blocking the latter's promotion possibilities due to seniority
has led to inefficiency and adverse motivational effects, as well as being a
waste of educational investment.
Interestingly enough, there are two similarities in course orientation in
the USSR and the USA. US graduate enrollment is also highest in the engi-
neering field, though in the US case only narrowly ahead of the social and
life sciences. Interest in engineering appears to be falling, especially over
the last five years among American students, but it is a favorite of foreign
students in the USA. So much so that they constitute 35% of enrollment
and have prevented the level of total enrollment from declining. The second
similarity to the Soviet situation is a real decline in graduates of the social
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sciences in the USA. On the other hand, contrary to the developments in
the past decade in the USSR, the number of total graduates in all fields has
been steadily increasing in the USA. If the number of degrees granted at the
first level of higher education is considered the picture changes somewhat.
In the 1980s, close to 40% of Soviet first degrees granted were in engineering,
while it was 6.5% in the USA, 19% in Japan, 16% in the UK, and 14% in
Germany (NSB, 1985, p. 192). The ratio of all.other graduates with first
degrees conferred (mainly humanities and social sciences) to engineers was
15 to 1 in the USA, but only 2.5 to 1 in the USSR during the same period.
4.1.4 Functions and status of higher education
and its role in R&D
Essential requirements for a successful transition to and development of a
sound market foundation are intellectual resources. The state of more ad-
vanced education doesn't seem to reflect this necessity. One of the main
reasons for this is that a Kultura job has lost its past appeal. Since 1935
when Stalin ordered that the pay and privileges for the better-qualified and
well-trained persons were to be enhanced, those with higher education sta-
tus have enjoyed special positions in society. In the last years of the Soviet
Union, graduates or "beneficiaries" of higher education such as teachers,
medical personnel, offices staffs, librarians, engineers, and technologists gen-
erally received less pay and privileges than skilled workers or entrepreneurs
(Nove, 1986, p. 34). "Science and scientific services" was by far the top
monthly wage-earner category well into the 1970s. In 1940, the average
monthly salaries for employees in this sector were 138% of those in industry,
214% of agricultural workers and employees, 156% of construction workers,
and 135% of those in transportation (GOSKOMSTAT, 1988, pp. 196-199).
By the late 1980s, the level of pay in science and scientific services had
fallen to 97%, 108%, 84%, and 90% of the other sectors mentioned above,
respectively.
Many potential or developing young academics or technicians have recog-
nized the possible rewards from entrepreneurship or have been commissioned
by new entrepreneurs and are thus a loss to the formal education system.
Ever-growing numbers are not completing a formal higher education. This
situation is comparable with that in the United States when professional
sport organizations draft more and more college athletes before they have
completed their previously compulsory four-year education. As a result, the
Russians must not only worry about the "brain drain" to the West, but also
about the "future-academics drain" to private enterprise at home.
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Education policy in the USSR was essentially oriented toward a teach-
ing and instructional function which, depending on the measures considered,
was more or less successful. Due to various tensions and conflicts, the re-
search element had been organized separately in specific research units in
universities or in special research institutes, if it was not neglected all to-
gether. While the importance of research activity and education has given
the functions of particularly higher educational institutions new proportions
and strategic value in determining economic, cultural, and political features
of societies in the West, the Soviet system basically served as an extension of
political values of the ruling Communist Party. Pursuing research was only
of minor interest.
What has been referred to with the misleadingly homogeneous term
of higher education in this chapter, has actually been separated into three
institutional elements in the USSR: the Academy of Sciences, the Higher
Educational Institutions, and the Higher Party Schools (Lane, 1985, p. 292).
The institutes of the Academy of Sciences (already described in Section 3.2)
have primarily been responsible for conducting research in the various arts
and sciences. This research has predominantly been of a fundamental nature
and has often been criticized as being conducted detached from industry and
market needs. Other than advising and/or teaching postgraduate students,
members of the academy have had little active contact with universities; the
former's almost exclusive preoccupation is with research.
The Higher Educational Institutions consisted of universities and insti-
tutes or polytechnics, with the former boasting a commanding theoretical
component (which was largely planned by directives from above). Although
both conducted some research (more in the institutes than in the univer-
sities) and taught some postgraduates, their main task was the training of
undergraduates, though they have often done this independently of one an-
other. The main problems, discrepancies, and often diverging educational
objectives arose due to the differing subordination: the universities were
subordina.te to the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Education (see Figure
3.5), and the institutes were usually directly subordinate to production min-
istries or in some cases to the Council of Ministers. Although the practice
has recently been dropped, graduates of VUZs and SSUZs were subject to
administrative assignment (IMF et at., 1991, p. 168). Thus there was no
real competition for positions upon graduation as is characteristic of labor
markets in Western societies.
The decade-long attempts to promote access to higher educational insti-
tutions by giving more prominence to part-time and correspondence study
(already close to 50% of enrollment) may have improved the average levels
in selected cases, but more likely it has led to a watering down of the overall
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quality of instruction, learning, and therefore also graduates. The educa-
tion received in the correspondence and part-time programs is repeatedly
stated to be of a lesser quality than that in full-time day programs. In addi-
tion, among the part-time and correspondence students dropout rates were
high, so the Soviet situation compared with the situation in Western Europe,
Japan, and the USA in terms of relative number and quality of graduates
from higher educational programs is even worse than that portrayed by the
numbers presented for student enrollment in Table 4.2.
In addition, there is an inherent conflict between the strict control of ed-
ucational and research facilities and interactions with sectors of the economy
(not to mention with one another) and with the need for independence and
creativity that are prerequisites for successful research and innovation. The
latter requires a certain autonomy for intellectual effort and the preserva-
tion of the institutional identity of particular interest groups - requirements
which were not just frowned upon by Soviet-style socialist ideology, but also
cleverly prevented.
The USA probably has the system most contrary to that which oper-
ated in the Soviet Union. The American education system is more diverse,
disparate, decentralized, and dynamic than most others in the world. The
various public and private institutions have offered instruction in an over-
whelming number of fields for secondary students, undergraduates, postgrad-
uates, and professionals. Beside their teaching role, the higher educational
institutions, particularly the universities, playa key part in the national in-
novation system as providers of R&D. University science and engineering and
science-based industries grew up together, explaining to a large extent the
usually very close traditional links between academic science and industry
science (Nelson, 1987, p. 86). In many areas, the universities have provided
industry with suitably educated personnel and ideas about products and
processes.
The continuous exchange between the two sectors in the US economy
is enhanced by academic scientists and engineers acting as consultants to
industry and industry scientists advising academic departments. More and
more, industrial firms are directly funding university laboratories to gain
privileged access to new scientific and research findings. Numerous aca-
demics have also been known to establish and operate private firms along
side their duties as researchers and professors at universities. Often, univer-
sity research is basic science oriented and somewhat theoretical, but in such
a way that it points the way for industrial R&D, which produces the new
technologies, processes, or products, to be productive. Thus, at times the
university influence will only be indirect, but it is always present. Finally,
the universities draw on their R&D activities in instructing their students
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and preparing them to contribute in some form to the academic, industry,
or supporting sectors. This dynamic process has integrated university R&D
into the national innovation system and has kept much of its work close to
the needs of the market.
On the whole, higher education and research institutes were much more
concentrated in the USSR (usually in large cities) than in the USA. Re-
search centers of excellence in the USSR included Moscow, Leningrad, and
Novosibirsk, with its relatively new higher educational complex, Akadem-
gorod (Cole, 1984, p. 271). This left the potential users of academic ideas
and personnel geographically very distant from the producers. A problem
not easily overcome in a nation that was characterized by strict mobility
and communication controls, not to mention an inadequate infrastructure.
In addition, the state was solely responsible for research projects. Part of
the reason for the dispersion of higher educational institutions and research
centers in the United States is the active role of the private sector (often
supported in part by government programs) to provide such services. Close
vicinity to educational centers has had an influence on the geography and
growth of some notable industrial sectors, and vice versa.
The Higher Party Schools in the USSR were, not surprisingly, subordi-
nate to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
and had only a minor quantitative bearing (Lane, 1985, p. 293). These
schools focused more on social sciences, and the little research done was
geared to the party's specific political programs.
Therefore, some have gone as far as to imply that higher education in the
USSR was geared to knowledge and comprehension, rather than to analysis
and evaluation.[10] The Soviet system of higher education, like many other
state bodies, had become an administrative leviathan during the period of
the planned economy. The system was also unmanageable and had almost
become insensitive to policy changes due to its complex and unintelligible
network of subordination. Even after attempts at a partial reform in 1984
and the presence of an elite section which equals the quality of any in the
world, the education system found itself unable to cope with the demands
for a flexible and technologically aware society (Sakwa, 1990, p. 292).
While conflicts between the All-Union and the republican governments
added to the bureaucratic problem facing the system of higher education,
ministries and departments also added to the confusion by running their
own institutions for training people with special skills, as in agriculture and
medicine. This led to considerable amounts of duplication and inefficiencies.
Just a few years ago, 74 ministries and departments were involved in some
manner, but 30 of these only ran one or two institutions (Rich, 1986, p. 716).
With the advent of perestroika, the State Enterprise Law of 1987 and the
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drive toward the necessity to become self-financing made the financing of
the little amount of university research that was being done more uncertain
than ever before. Both universities and institutes feared that enterprises
would be unwilling to invest in academically produced R&D, no matter how
applied it may have been, due to the shortage of funds.
In 1986, concrete plans were being drawn up to give the universities a
more prominent place in the pattern of Soviet research, currently dominated
by academy and ministry institutes. Investments in equipment and physical
infrastructure (such as computing facilities and more that are essential for a
modern education), as well as salaries for professors, were identified as critical
areas that should be improved as soon as possible.[ll] The present pay
structure discourages some of the best scholars and scientists from following a
career in the university system. Closer links between schools and universities
were a central part in the new trend. Previously, Soviet educationists had the
desire to qualify as many school-Ieavers as possible for higher education, but
this led to less-qualified students securing places in higher education at the
expense of others. In order to fulfill the planned order from superior levels
of the hierarchy regarding the number of graduates required, universities
and other institutions of higher education tended to recruit less competent
students to maintain their numbers.
As societies become more advanced and complicated, the challenges fac-
ing the education system increase. Particularly at higher levels, universities
and the education and research they provide grow steadily more important.
With the globalization of research, technology, industry, business, and es-
sentially whole economies, the need arises to modify the requirements of the
higher education system and its associated research function as well as to
redefine the universityJindustry interface which has been intensified in re-
cent years in the Western nations. This will be more closely investigated in
Chapter 5.
4.2 R&D Personnel
The personnel working in research and development represent that stock of
knowledge and ability in an economy which is fundamental to technological
change and performance. The R&D staff contributes in countless ways to
the welfare and technological progress of a nation and has an impact on
society disproportionate to its numbers (NSB, 1987, p. 52). R&D personnel,
usually designated to be made up of scientists and engineers, is crucial to
the more or less successful functioning of an advanced industrial society.
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An R&D staff's abilities largely determine the bounds to the strengths and
weaknesses of homegrown technological potential.
The activities in which the scientific and technical personnel is engaged
indicate the way in which the economy allocates its stock of human resources
and consequently determines priority areas. The activities are measured by
the number and proportion of those engaged in performing R&D, teaching,
and various sorts of other related activities. The special attributes regarding
R&D personnel and its functions identify it as both producing and dissem-
inating its work. In general, these activities include product and process
innovation, quality control, productivity enhancement, basic research to ad-
vance the understanding of nature, training future scientists and engineers,
and contributing to the scientific and technological literacy of a nation. A
technically well-trained work force is an essential contribution to scientific,
technological, as well as industrial progress.
The number of R&D personnel, like the financing of R&D, is a measure
of national R&D efforts. The former, as a measurement of physical units, is
not complicated by changes in currency values internationally and over time
(OECD, 1989, p. 22). Very precise comparisons are hampered by different
definitions for units of measure, the quality of education, the nature of a
particular job, the definition of a specific title, and so on. Nevertheless,
the number of scientists and engineers is commonly regarded as a simple
indicator for the orientation of science and technology policy, the stock of
knowledge, its trend and potential.
4.2.1 Total numbers of scientists and engineers
The number of Soviet scientists and engineers (S&E) reported to have worked
in research and development is astonishing. Not only did it more than triple
since 1965 when it was 110% ofthe US level, but it was already over 1.65 mil-
lion in 1987, a shade under twice the American number (see Table 4.4).[12J
Although the numbers of Japanese S&E were half of the US S&E and only
one-quarter of the Soviet S&E in absolute terms, they dominated the growth
statistics, registering an unparalleled 8.06% annual growth rate for the pe-
riod 1965-1975, 3.71% in the subsequent interval, and 4.7% in the 1980s,
which resulted in almost a 6% yearly increase from 1965 to 1987. West Ger-
many was probably the most consistent country, with the stock of R&D staff
growing at an annual rate of 4.22% per year between 1965 and 1987. The
growth was strong and never drastically different to the foregoing period.
All countries, including the USSR but excluding the United Kingdom, had
growth rates in the 1980s above or very near the OECD and European Com-
munities' average rates of 3.5% for the early 1980s.[13J Yet, while most ofthe
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OECD and EC countries were experiencing an improvement over pre-1980
years, the USSR was facing a relative decline.
Neglecting later developments for the moment, the early numbers of the
Japanese leader were only approached by those in the Soviet Union, which
could also boast almost 8% annual growth in the early years. On the one
hand, this was the realization of the planned employment of the substantial
increase in graduates of the science and engineering disciplines that were the
product of the education policy during the Stalin years and afterward, and,
on the other hand, the forced industrialization and the required mass (but
relatively simple) technology needed to support it. In aggregate terms, the
USSR employed 3.2 times more S&E in R&D in 1983 than the European
Communities, and already 86% of the entire OECD total. In fact, the Soviet
figure was approximately 25% of the world total by 1989. The Soviet num-
bers certainly also include technicians working in research and development
to one extent or another.
An interesting aspect regarding the dynamics of growth of the aggregate
stock of S&E personnel in the USSR is the successive reduction in the annual
growth rates during the selected periods in Table 4.4. In the second and
third time interval, 1975-1981 and 1981-1987, the growth clearly successively
declined (as it did in the UK), while it increased in Japan and West Germany
in the third period. In fact, the results of the growth rate analysis imply that
while Japan, West Germany, and the United States were arming themselves
with a pronounced increase in the stock of their total S&E personnel in R&D,
the Soviets were relinquishing their previously so heralded emphasis.[14]
This drop in the growth rate of employment in the Soviet-style planned
economic system has some implications for technological developments and
modern economic growth in the USSR and for changes in the Russia of
tomorrow. These are relatively unclear due to the questionable levels of
productivity and the quality of scientists and engineers in the former Soviet-
style system. Nevertheless, experts reporting on the situation in Soviet S&E
employment have revealed a preponderance of older people (certainly true
in the Academy of Sciences, see Table 3.4, and in general, see Figure 4.5),
and too many relatively low-grade engineers and too few researchers in the
developing sciences such as biology and chemistry (Sakwa, 1990, p. 291).
One reason for the slowdown may be the continuing emphasis on heavy
industry. This old paradigm of economic growth and development has been
based on often simple or sometimes even obsolete technological standards
with respect to today's potential, has ignored the changing demands and
needs of (primarily civilian) consumers, and has prevented the establish-
ment of a service sector as we know it in the West. All these factors influ-
ence the demand for S&E personnel engaged in R&D, and the demand for
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their particular specializations. The relative fall in the rate of increase in
employment of S&E in research and development most certainly could and
will affect the number and potential of scientists and engineers who will be
required as essential elements in charting the transition to a new techno-
economic phase of development. Their relative decline will also affect the
availability of skilled personnel as instructors at higher levels of education
in efforts to secure future generations of specialists.
When drawing conclusions about the relative levels of R&D personnel
in different countries the question of comparability inevitably crops up. The
Soviet science and technology concept designated everyone as a scientific
worker in research and development if he or she had an advanced degree
in science and engineering, or was conducting research in a scientific estab-
lishment, or was teaching in a higher educational institution. Therefore, the
number of almost 1.7 million Soviet scientists and engineers engaged in R&D
in 1989 should rather be compared to the total number of scientists and en-
gineers in S&E jobs in other countries.[15] For the USA, this number came
to no less than over 4.6 million in 1988 (the ratio of scientists to engineers
being 1 to 1.31). The numbers for other nations would also be relatively
higher, making the Soviet amount look not as spectacular as it seemed at
first glance. Therefore, the absolute total of S&E engaged in R&D in the
USSR should not be overvalued.
Soviet scientists and engineers were known to be active in numerous po-
sitions, for many of which they were either overqualified or not adequately
trained. Frequently, they also held some type of management post. Again,
this would call for a comparison with the total number of scientists and en-
gineers in S&E jobs in the other countries. In the United States in 1986,
for example, only about 40% of scientists and engineers worked directly
in research (basic and applied) and development, while circa 16% were in
management (other than R&D), 8% in teaching, 13% in production and in-
spection, 10% in statistical work and computing, and 10% in other activities
that included activities such as consulting, sales, and professional services
(NSB, 1987, p. 218). Perhaps then, a preferable measure to use when com-
paring the human resources in R&D between nations would be the S&E in
R&D per 10,000 workers in the labor force population.
4.2.2 Scientists and engineers as a percentage of
the labor force
The percentage of the labor force employed in R&D as researchers has long
been on the rise in most OEeD and Eastern European countries. Table 4.5
shows the changes for a selected group of nations including the USSR. While
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four of the countries experienced impressive growth before 1975, with the
lowest annual growth rate of 4.73% in the UK and 5.5% in West Germany,
and the highest in the USSR (5.92%) and Japan (6.89%), the US rate was
clearly negative. During this time the American economy was employing
relatively more non-R&D personnel in favor of scientists and engineers.
The trend reversed in the United States after 1975 when strong positive
growth was registered and the amount of S&E engaged in R&D per 10,000
workers in the labor force population grew from 55.3 in 1975 to 66.2 in 1986.
Over the same interval the other nations continued to experience an increase
in the numbers of S&E per 10,000 workers in the labor force population,
but at a much slower rate. So, while the USA was picking up the tempo
in recruiting S&E, the other four slacked off. Japan and West Germany
successfully picked up the pace again in the third period (1981-1987), but
the USSR and the UK could not. The former's rate remained respectably
positive at 1.84%, but the latter's dipped to -0.17%.
For the entire period of more than two decades from 1965 to 1986, the
results are also quite interesting. The figures for the number of scientific
workers in research and development per 10,000 workers in the labor force
population in the Soviet Union stand alone; initially 46.5 (72% of the US
level) in 1965, it had out-distanced all competitors by 1975 and, in 1986,
reached 1.54 times the Japanese, 1.57 times the American, 1.97 times the
West German, and 2.93 times the British levels. Although the Japanese had
only 24.6 scientists and engineers engaged in R&D in 1965, compared with
64.7 in the USA (both per 10,000 workers in the labor force population), the
Japanese had surpassed the US total in 1986 (66.2) with their own distin-
guishing total of 67.4 - an annual growth rate of almost 5%. West Germany
and the USSR more than doubled their S&E participation in the labor force
over the 21 years, with 4.08% and 3.90% annual growth respectively.
At the end of the interval, all countries (other than the UK, probably
for the same reason mentioned in note 14) had more persons employed as
researchers than the OEeD average of about 50 of every 10,000 actual or
potential workers. The favorable aggregate number for the United States
is somewhat misleading because the annual growth over the whole period
was a mere 0.11%. However, if the period is divided (as explained above)
it becomes clear that the low growth was due to the negative developments
between 1965 and 1975 (ignoring the absolute increase for the moment).
The Americans were far ahead of the other nations in 1965 and maintained
a very consistent and distinguished level of scientists and engineers in the
work force.
A comparison of the annual growth of the total labor force indicates
that except in the US case, every nation saw the percentage of the labor
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force employed in R&D as researchers increase significantly more rapidly
than the annual growth in the labor force itself in each period. In fact, the
time in which West Germany realized its most dramatic increase in R&D
employment (5.5% per year between 1965 and 1975) was simultaneously the
period in which the size of the labor force actually shrank by 0.06% per year.
This implies that the increase of R&D workers per 10,000 actual or potential
workers was also influenced by the slow general growth of the labor force (see
Appendix 4A). This fact puts a damper on the impressive figures from Japan
and West Germany; yet, it correspondingly improves the perspective of the
low numbers for the UK between 1981 and 1986, and for all the periods for
the USA. The United States has maintained a leading and very respectable
balance of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D per 10,000 workers in
the labor force population despite the substantial expansion, over 2% per
annum between 1965 and 1986, of its already immense labor force. The
Soviet Union, with the only labor force close to the American in absolute
size (actually almost 30% larger), could not register successive periods of
improved growth in the share of S&E employment, despite reduced rates of
annual growth in the labor force (1.54% in 1965-1975,1.42% in 1975-1981,
and 0.83% in 1981-1986) for the successive periods in Table 4.5.
The areas of occupation of scientists and engineers are essentially a re-
flection of their educational specialization. Therefore, both in the former
USSR and in the USA most employed scientific personnel have been con-
centrated in the technical fields of science. In 1986, 49.5% in the USSR and
52.7% in the USA were employed in technical fields of science, though the
American share had fallen by 6.1 percentage points from 10 years earlier
and the Soviet number increased by 0.8 percentage points over the same
interval.[16]
This can be interpreted as an indication of the changing priorities in
the USA and the largely continuing emphasis in the USSR. The US de-
cline has been accompanied by an important shift in structure to important
fields, particularly for new high-technology development, such as aeronau-
tics, chemistry, electronics, and materials science. In Japan, the number of
S&E engaged in R&D per 10,000 employees was significantly higher than
in the USA in chemicals, new materials (i.e., ceramics and nonferrous met-
als), and electrical machinery. The overall share of Soviet specialists in the
mathematical, computer, and physical sciences category declined over the
period, but the number of S&E in the first two subcategories increased -
still by far not like in the USA, where the general category could already
boast over one-fifth of the S&E employed in 1986. Despite the decreases
in the shares of life science graduates in the related fields of occupation in
both countries, the absolute totals of US biologists, medical scientists, and
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Figure 4.4. International comparison of the dynamics and growth of sci-
entists and engineers engaged in R&D per 10,000 workers in the labor force
population, 1965-1986.
agronomists almost doubled, while their growth rates had drastically slowed
in the USSR.
Figure 4.4 compares the relative R&D efforts of five leading nations
from 1965 to 1986, as a proportion of the labor force employed as scientists
or engineers. These data allow one to draw a tentative conclusion that
over the last decade or so there have been substantial increases in both
absolute and relative terms in R&D efforts of the primary R&D-performing
countries. All countries other than the United Kingdom, which currently
appears to be in a stagnating phase, have increased the relative emphasis
they place on R&D. In addition, the growing size of the R&D work force
was accompanied by growth in national expenditures on R&D. This topic is
discussed in Section 4.3.
4.2.3 The role, status, and activities
of scientists and engineers
The importance assigned to scientists and engineers has, in most cases, been
a cornerstone of technological advance and modern economic growth. The
USSR was the only leading R&D-performing nation that could not con-
vert the vast investment in human resources in R&D into a complementary
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improvement in the general level of technological change - there was an in-
herent inefficiency in their supply-driven desire to increase R&D personnel.
Japan, West Germany, the USA, and the UK have all provided examples of
more, effective production with less personnel. Therefore, the question arises
whether such a high level of employment of scientists and engineers in R&D
as that in the USSR was justifiable. Of course, this may be an indication
of the massive quantity of latent capacity in the former Soviet R&D sector
that could influence the global R&D market were it truly useful and actually
harnessed for productive purposes.
The Soviet Union was clearly also the center of R&D activity in Eastern
Europe. Almost eight times as many persons were employed in the Soviet
science research sector than in the total of all the smaller Eastern European
countries in that sector in 1988 (WnW, 1989, p. 67); yet, the Soviet pop-
ulation was only three times their cumulative total. Based on employment
statistics, most of the scientific activities in Eastern Europe were centralized
in the USSR (part of its "big brother" politics), and within the USSR the
activities were further concentrated in three locations: Moscow, Leningrad,
and Novosibirsk. This was partially a function of the strictly controlled mo-
bility, or rather immobility to more accurately describe it, that was a prac-
tice of USSR science and technology policy. Two of the larger employers
of scientific personnel in Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia and Poland, ap-
peared to be forced or voluntarily change their policies; annual growth rates
for employment of scientists and engineers had dropped practically to zero
in Czechoslovakia in recent years and the Polish average annual rates were
-2.34% between 1975 and 1988.[17] There are two alternative explanations
for these trends:
1. The smaller Eastern European nations had realized the need to adapt
to changing economic conditions and technological needs in the face of
inevitable economic transformation. Their size gave them an advantage
in flexibility, allowing them to put a brake on nonmarket-based growth
and subsequently to reorient policy.
2. The Soviet central authorities were essentially the main source of de-
mand for scientific and technological production - the sole market. Most
of the scientific and research projects were in some way the product of
Soviet-style science and technological policy or industrial policy. Thus,
recognizing the overstaffing at home and based on the pride of main-
taining an immense scientific community (not to mention the inability
to reduce it), fewer projects were transplanted to the smaller neigh-
bors, forcing them to rationalize earlier (though many of them may have
worked more efficiently and effectively than their Soviet counterparts).
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The complete answer presumably lies in a combination of these two
points.
The issue of labor mobility is an important one with respect to R&D
staffing. Due to strict central controls that required passports for internal
travel and government permission to relocate, Soviet scientists and engineers,
like the rest of their society, were very immobile. Unlike the situation in the
USA and most other Western industrialized countries, Soviets got locked in
very early in their careers to permanent assignments, with respect to location
as well as field of study (Gamota, 1987, p. 233). Academy and branch
ministry research institutes practically drafted skilled individuals directly
from the educational system; these were the sites where higher educational
degrees were completed. At many branch institutes the scientist became
so specialized in a particular field, he or she was unable to use those skills
anywhere else known to him or her.
In addition, the organization one worked for generally supplied housing,
so to move away meant to surrender this practically free accommodation to
the organization. There was no real housing market in the USSR; a remote
possibility existed of obtaining quarters in the new location on the black
market for housing, but the prices were usually beyond the reach of even a
scientific researcher. Therefore, if there was a move in store for an individual,
it was most probably an ordered one from the central authorities, but even
then people were unwilling to leave centers like Moscow.[18]
This separation of fields under different hierarchies led the various min-
istries, academies, and state committees to have institutes of their own, many
doing complementary or even overlapping work. All this required large staffs,
many of whom were duplicating jobs in another organization. Each institute
wanted to be self-reliant ("reinvent-the-wheel" theory) and did not want to
share information,[19] because each had to negotiate with the center to ob-
tain as large a financial allocation as possible. The idea was that big projects
required big staffs and would draw big budget allocations. However, it has
become clear that this type of isolation between co-workers could not lead
to productive synergism in a new field and impeded technology transfer (for
example, basic research results being used for developing new technology to
be used for applications).
As already described in the section entitled Actors in Soviet R&D Pol-
icy (Section 3.2.4), Soviet R&D personnel was employed in the Academy
of Sciences (its research and educational institutes), universities and other
institutes of higher education, the institutes of GKNT, and the institutes
directly subordinate to some industrial ministries. In each case the S&E
were employees of the state. Until 1987, there had been no official private
R&D activity at all.
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Table 4.6. Employment of scientists and engineers by sector (% of total).
USSR (1989) USA (1988)
Institutes of higher education 10 Academic R&D 19
Academy of Sciences 13 Government and nonprofit R&D 5
Branch ministry institutes 77 Industry R&D 76
Total 100 Total 100
The Academy of Sciences, which concentrated predominantly on funda-
mental research, commanded 13% of the S&E work force (see Table 4.6).
Before introducing an educational reform package in 1987, President Gor-
bachev noted that over 35% of the scientifically qualified personnel (incor-
porated technicians and specialists from PTUs, SPTUs, and SSUZs - not
included in Table 4.6) was concentrated in higher educational institutions of
the Ministry for Higher Education and the academy, including over half of
those in possession of the advanced degree of doctor of sciences. However,
this group carried out no more than 10% of all scientific research (Kneen,
1989, p. 74). The academy had a very nonmarket manner of dealing with
employees considered to be underperforming by sporadic attestation com-
missions (though not unheard of in some large Western companies). These
underperformers, including surprisingly many of those holding the most ad-
vanced qualifications, were customarily offered positions of reduced respon-
sibility and salary.
Of course, new people had to be hired to fulfill the planned achievements.
Consequently, employment numbers rose and the budget allocated to the
"wages funds" of the R&D institutes had to be spread more thinly. This is
part of the explanation for the erosion of the traditionally favorable income
levels of academics engaged in scientific activity relative to the compensation
for other activities in the economy. The salaries became unattractive not
only relative to those in the state sector, but even more so relative to those
in the budding private R&D sector after 1987. But because the latter was
still very limited in scope and not accessible to all, young graduates were
more and more tempted by nonacademic jobs.
Due to the academy's wide variety of activities and responsibilities an
ever-larger staff had to be maintained. There was and is no truly comparable
sector in the West; a combination of parts of the academic and government
sectors in the USA might come close. Due to the sheer size of the Soviet
R&D community, contacts between institutes and scientists were meager;
poor-quality or complete absence of communication systems and computer
links required each Soviet institute to carry a large stock of R&D personnel.
Links to branch ministry laboratories were practically nonexistent. Only
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in the late 1980s did the academy succeed in linking its institutes in the
scientific centers of Riga, Leningrad, and Moscow with a new communication
system called Akademset (Sinclair, 1987, p. xii). Until this time there were no
industrial ministry institutes integrated in the system and plans for possible
inclusion were only just being drawn up.
The branch sector is said to have employed over 61 % of R&D personnel
in 1987, and as much as 76.8% of the researchers in 1989 (refer to Table
4.6).[20] This number is very close to the 76% of American scientists and
engineers that are employed in S&E jobs in industry R&D.
Each ministry, which received its signals from the policy makers,[21] had
two special management bodies: a Scientific-Technical Council (STC) and
the Technical Administration (TA) (Fortescue, 1987, p. 98). The former was
an advisory body that considered proposals for the initiation or continuation
of research projects and the latter was responsible for staffing and coordi-
nating the distribution of funds, but it did not have direct administrative
control over individual R&D institutions - two separate bodies for activities
that should always be well integrated with one another for highest efficiency
and most promising results.
The organizational separation of science and production in the Soviet
Union, even though industrial ministries maintained their own research in-
stitutes with a major portion of the national R&D staff, was quite different
from the normal Western standards. The historical policy of centralization
and of being close to the supply of resources for fear of shortages (in the
R&D case, funding and educated personnel) led to the industrial research
sector being traditionally based in central institutes, both organizationally
and commonly geographically independent and isolated from the enterprises
they were meant to serve. In the USSR, in-house research and development
was consistently a negligible component of the R&D network - some esti-
mations mark it at only 4% of both R&D personnel and funding resources
(Fortescue, 1987, p. 105).[22] The separation of research and production is
evident throughout the entire planning system characteristic of the Soviet-
style economy. The distinction between research and production plans was
maintained from the factory-floor level right up to the national five-year plan
level.
The branchdom of Soviet production was consequently also a characteris-
tic of the scientific sector where specialization and secrecy created monopoly
power at the various levels of science or for individual institutes and is now
identified as the main source of low technological progress in the Soviet na-
tional economy. Thus, a multipurpose research institution that combined
all creative and administrative tasks became the most common form for or-
ganizing R&D. Each institute had in-house departments for everything, but
Research and Development Management 111
was still considerably detached from production. Due to the internalization
of activities, these institutes often became very inefficient, influencing the
standard of the scientific-technological output.
The policy implemented to alleviate the problems of declining and low-
quality output was to increase the number of R&D institutes. From 1960
to 1972 the number of institutes increased from 4,196 to 5,307, an annual
growth rate of 1.98% (Piskunov and Saltykov, 1991, p. 9). Following this
surge, strict restrictions were imposed on the process of establishing new
R&D institutes due to a paranoia, on the part of the central authorities, of
losing control over the network.
The result was greater employment of scientists and engineers at the
existing institutes, so much so that the average size of an R&D institute
between 1975 and 1985, based on personnel, grew by more than 25% (ibid,
1991, p. 9). Although estimates allocated an average of almost 300 staff
members per institute, some had staff in excess of 5,000. The "better situ-
ated" institutes, particularly of the MIC and some of those in the academy,
could afford to employ an enormous amount of people and attract many of
the highest-quality graduates from the higher educational institutions. The
remaining institutes of the academy and the other branch ministries stocked
up on the rest of the available S&E (often regardless of ability), because a
larger staff usually meant a greater budgetary allocation from the central
government. In the 1980s, the declining number of graduates and the slower
growth of S&E employment for research and development activities led to
an increase in the already very well-seasoned average age of scientists and
engineers employed by the institutes.
Figure 4.5 shows the age structure in the late 1980s of scientific workers
with highest qualifications in the USSR and the USA, that is, the equivalent
of a Ph.D. in the United States. The pie charts reveal a strong predominance
of the older generation in the Soviet Union. Indeed, almost 80% of the
highest level of Soviet scientists engaged in R&D were over 50 years of age
'in the late 1980s, while the comparable figure for the USA was 34%. The
consequence was also a great disparity at the other end of the scale; only 2%
of Soviets were under 40 years of age compared to 29% in the United States.
Yet, even young and potentially creative graduates were usually join-
ing gigantic scientific organizations that were all too often only extensions
of the bureaucracy and had their own traditional, entrenched scientific pol-
icy that left precious little space and incentives for academic and scientific
freedom. Immobility, specialization, special benefits, and the lack of in-
formation about the activities of others provided plenty of disincentives to
contemplate a move elsewhere, would it have been possible. Consequently,
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the overall management of the R&D institutes and the large institutes' inter-
nal policy were thwarting creative developments (which are generally said to
accompany growing employment of university graduates) and squandering
scientific potential.
The nature of economic activity determines the need for R&D personnel.
If the demand for technological innovation, the producers' desire to utilize
technological superiority as the basis for competition, the consumers' de-
mands for more selection, quality, convenience, and a higher value to price
relation, and the public demand for regulation of technology continue to
increase, the need for a continuous, probably increasing, supply of scien-
tists and engineers is secured. The quantity and quality of this supply will
prove to be a principal factor in the style and pace of economic growth and
competitive performance, as it has been in the past.
A pool of scientifically literate workers provides the stock from which
to draw much needed future scientists and engineers (Brooks, 1991, p. 134).
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More and more will the need arise to integrate the world of education with
the world or work.
4.3 R&D Financing
The OECD report on science and technology indicators states (1989, p. 17):
growing demands on science and technology (S&T) by the economy and
society and the increasing speed of technological progress call for some
flexibility in the research system in response to evolving expectations and
for sufficient continuity in the major directions of R&D and the applied
resources.
The report also indicates that the level and trend of R&D resources, their
allocation between sectors, and the relationship between the sectors are all
factors molding the capacity and potential to produce new S&T knowledge.
This is precisely the element that constitutes the nonphysical investment
capable of and essential for generating innovations.
Persons engaged in R&D at all levels require financial support to per-
form their research and development activities. In Western, non-Communist
countries the funding primarily comes from two sources: private firms and
government. In Eastern Europe, R&D had traditionally been practically the
sole responsibility of the state - the reasoning was that controlling the fi-
nancing facilitated control ofthe activities and the ideas that were produced.
The Western system relies to a large extent on competition for financing to
determine which ideas are fit to be integrated into new or revised technologies
or products that are used in the economy. In the past, R&D expenditures
have shown considerable stability in the face of economic fluctuations. Since
1980, they have for the most part continued to grow throughout the OECD
countries at a higher rate than gross domestic product.
All governments, East or West, have devised a variety of fiscal and mone-
tary mechanisms in a continuing effort to provide an amicable climate for in-
vestment in R&D. Of course, the main difference is that Western democratic
nations have very diverse and well-organized financial and capital markets,
and a relatively versatile banking system that adds many possibilities for
financing.
This section on R&D financing analyzes the general policy environment
and funding directions in the former Soviet Union and how these compared to
levels, trends, and developments in other leading R&D-performing nations.
Most interesting are the sources for R&D support, shifts between the shares
of the performers of R&D in an economy, and the distribution of the emphasis
on basic research, applied research, and development.
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4.3.1 Funding R&D activities
There is little doubt that the former USSR had made significant efforts
in R&D. Although the data quoted in monetary terms have always been
subject to questions with respect to its reliability (even more so than the
statistics on physical units in the USSR), the figures verify a continual strong
budgetary commitment to research and experimental development activities.
This emphasis was partly the result of a desire to maintain a lasting tradition
of promoting science as Marx had said it should be done, and partly for the
more practical reason that progress in science and technology would yield
solutions to economic and social problems. The latter argument is also at
the foundation of market economies where the creation of new knowledge
for this purpose has remained a priority, although the accent has shifted
toward the need to improve the diffusion and application of technology as
a contribution to modern economic development. The lack of such relevant
diffusion and application was a serious cause for concern in the Soviet Union.
Early in Stalin's rule, R&D policy-making and funding activities were
removed from the authority of the industrial enterprises and transferred
to higher management levels (ministries, agencies, and committees). The
Soviet-style central planning system extracted not only decision-making
powers from enterprises, but also the resources to make decisions. Of course,
what good is one without the other? For example, the state drew all the
profits from the enterprises (for the most part at least) only to redistribute
them to the enterprises to use for research, development, diffusion of technol-
ogy, and other things determined necessary by the central plan or directives.
Enterprises and their managers were essentially put under tutelage. Each
year the financial allocation to R&D was a function of the budgetary process
and bargaining between parties with vested interests. The main participants
in the budget process were the ministries of finance at the union and republi-
can levels and finance departments at local levels; the councils of ministers of
the Union and each republic; the supreme Soviets of the Union and each re-
public; the local Soviets of people's deputies; GOSPLAN; GOSKOMSTAT;
GOSBANK, including 200 regional offices and more than 6,000 branches;
Promstroibank and Vneshekonombank (IMF et at., vol. 1, 1991, p. 258).
Noone from the science and technology sector, or any other sector for
that matter, was directly involved in the budgetary process. In the case of
science and technology, the influence was via the joint policy-making role
of GOSPLAN, GKNT, and the Academy of Sciences. Until as late as July
1989, budgets were allocated according to fulfillment of the plan. Budgetary
expenditures were actually undertaken by two kinds of spending units: di-
rectly by budgetary institutions, and indirectly by state enterprises, to the
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extent that expenditures of the latter are supported by transfers from the
budget (IMF et at., vol. 1, 1991, p. 259). The USSR State Committee for
Science and Technology was responsible for distributing R&D monies, but
enterprises also had funds for industrial R&D.
Simply allocated money through the GKNT was considered "easy
money" and led to low-quality R&D and the free-rider problem. There
was no natural selection of research teams or institutions in developing a
particular project, since enough funds were available to carry excess staff or
what has been referred to as "ballast" (Piskunov and Saltykov, 1991, p. 13).
As a consequence, funds continued to be wasted on research studies that
had little or no commercial value and were often antiquated but were the
bargaining tools of the privileged, distinguished directors of the R&D insti-
tutes in their negotiations with the policy-making and funding bodies. Thus,
despite considerable increases in R&D funding over the years, these factors
unfortunately impeded essential changes in the improvement of Soviet R&D
quality.
The actual pricing of R&D was only done in the applied research and
development areas as these were considered to provide results that led to
the introduction of new products or processes for mass production. Pric-
ing was not used for fundamental research because it was not expected to
generate a practical result that could be priced. Therefore, those institutes
concentrating on basic science enjoyed stable and secure allocations from
the state budget, while those R&D units focusing on applied research and
development had to enter into contracts with an enterprise or respond to
a work order from a branch ministry (Bornstein, 1984, p. 85). Introduced
in the 1950s, this was no reason for excitement and was not accompanied
by mechanisms characteristic of a "free" market. The R&D contracts, and
clearly not the orders, were not usually the result of free choice and initiative
on the part of the R&D performer and the client enterprise. Instead, the
former and the latter negotiated a mutually acceptable agreement within
the framework of plan assignments received from a superior level. Thus,
competitive bidding was not a part of the contractual process.
As for other goods produced in the planned economy, the cost- based pric-
ing mechanism was also used for R&D products. The planned costs included
wages, social insurance, materials, special equipment, travel, payments to
subcontractors, and general overhead expenditures including bonuses (Born-
stein, 1984, p. 86). The costs of the complete R&D project were then es-
timated either through comparisons with previous R&D work or, in some
cases, based on norms; in either incidence the estimated cost was considered
the value of the project. Although the cost-based system did not consider
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capital investment costs (using depreciation), it often resulted in quite gen-
erous estimations primarily due to inflated wage costs. Of course, other
costs increased as they were calculated on a per worker basis, leading to
subsequent correction of the estimates.
In 1967, profits in R&D activities were recognized and a portion could be
retained by the performer. One year later, the price of applied R&D included
a profit linked to the expected or calculated economic effect.[23] The R&D
performer guaranteed an economic effect to his client and could charge 1.5%
of that annual effect as profit. If the effect could not be precisely calculated,
as so often was the case, the profit charge took the form of a markup that
was usually just an arbitrary percentage of the wage's fund. The economic
effect mechanism was complex and had only a minor role in R&D pricing.
There was no single official methodology for pricing applied R&D services
in the USSR. So, the bulk of profits came from the excess of planned over
actual costs, inducing R&D institutes not only to impute excessive costs in
their accounting, but also to actually incur many of these.
In spite of the continuing budgetary rules, the R&D community was
confronted with a number of organizational changes after 1987. These al-
terations tended to weaken the control of government agencies over the net-
work of R&D institutions. The price-setting mechanism for R&D products
was also adjusted, based less on direct central administrative influence and
more on negotiations between researchers and clients. There was no method
for obtaining any substantial individual reward for producing new products
from successful R&D because the USSR had no patent, intellectual prop-
erty, or royalty system as we know it in the West. The results of R&D
were practically free, and duplication or copying was easier than initiating
a breakthrough.
Official gross R&D expenditure (GERD) in the Soviet Union amounted
to some 43.6 billion rubles in 1989 (see Figure 4.6).[24] At the going ex-
change rate (US$100 = 62.74 R) this came to approximately US$70 billion.
While this level of Soviet budget allocated to R&D was just over half the
US level, it was over eight times greater than the amount the Soviets had
spent almost 30 years earlier.
The increase in GERD during the Gorbachev years was a reflection of
the importance he granted to R&D, his (and the Communist Party's) recog-
nition that the USSR was again falling further behind the Western nations
with respect to technological standards, and his hope that scientific advances
would spur substantial economic progress and development. In their report,
Gokhberg and Mindely (1991) question the validity of the official statistics
and offer their own estimates of R&D expenditures (refer to Table 4.7). The
authors of the report claim that the official figures are based on inaccurate
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Figure 4.6. Gross R&D expenditures in the USSR.
Table 4.7. R&D expenditure in the USSR, selected years.
GOSKOMSTAT data Gokhberg & Mindely estimates
1987 1988 1989 1987 1988 1989
Billion rubles 32.8 37.8 43.6 24.0 26.0 32.0
% of GNP 4.0 4.3 4.7 2.9 3.0 3.5
Source: Adapted from Gokhberg and Mindely (1991, p. 20) and GOSKOMSTAT (1990,
p. 172).
calculations and double counting.[25] Therefore, their estimates are 72.5%,
69.8%, and 74.5% of the official figures quoted for 1987, 1988, and 1989,
respectively. Nevertheless, either set of data clearly indicates substantial
increases in the absolute level of funding for R&D activities, securing their
importance as a part of the economic strategy of the Soviet-style planned sys-
tem (also refer to Figure 4.6 which illustrates the steady progressive funding
between 1962 and 1989).
The figures in Table 4.7 do not reveal the sharp successive declines
in funding for R&D after 1989. The decreasing budget revenues and the
consequently increasing state budget deficit, increasing autonomy and self-
financing and self-control in decision making of enterprises, and the general
worsening of the economic situation meant that less funds were available
for R&D. In the case of enterprises, it was difficult to convince managers
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to invest in innovation-enhancing activities when they were having trouble
meeting salary payments. In addition to stricter budget constraints and
declining availability of state subsidies, enterprises were levied with a new
tax in January 1991 that abolished privileges and meant a large part of state
enterprises' profits were to be collected by federal, republican, and local
authorities, leaving always less to invest in R&D (Motorygin and Glaziev,
1991, p. 17). Despite the fact that R&D remained a priority area for the
government, relatively and absolutely less was being spent on it after 1989,
as on most other publicly financed economic activities.
4.3.2 GERD as a percentage of GNP: A comparison
The annual growth of GERD in the Soviet Union over almost three decades,
1962 to 1989, was a very respectable 8.19%. It was highest in the beginning
of this period, declined in the periods 1971-1975 and 198-1-1985, before
recovering after 1985 (see Figure 4.7). Although the growth rate over the
entire time appears high, it was less than the growth rate in the USA, West
Germany, Japan, and periodically even the UK. While most DECD countries
experienced a post-1979 recovery in R&D expenditure growth compared with
previous periods, the Soviet figure really took off between 1985 and 1989,
when it surpassed the DECD average which it had been below between
1981 and 1985 (for DECD figures, refer to DECD, 1989, pp. 17-37, and
the relevant Appendix Tables). But aggregate numbers of GERD do not
provide the best indication of national R&D effort, especially for comparative
purposes.
The percentage of GDP invested in R&D is the most telling indicator of a
nation's overall endeavor in R&D, despite occasional criticism, particularly
popular at the science policy and political levels. Figure 4.7 shows the
evolution of GERD as a percentage of GNP for the Soviet Union from 1962
to 1989. The Soviet GERDjGNP ratio was over what the DECD calls the
"magic 2%" level for the entire periodj[26] in fact, it was almost 2.5 times
as high in 1989. After substantial growth in the proportion of GNP spent
on GERD during the first 10 years of the period (1962-1972), there was a
considerable relative drop following 1972. Interestingly, the DECD countries
also experienced a decline in their GERD jGNP ratios between 1975 and
1980.
An explanation for a portion of the DECD decline was the relative much
greater growth in GNP with respect to the previous period (which had been
burdened by the oil-price shock), and also to the reasonably stable growth of
the GERD. The Soviet level clearly decreased during the 1970s; yet, most of
the decline cannot be explained away with the same reason as that used for
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Figure 4.7. GERD growth and % of GNP in the USSR.
the OECD nations because the magnitude of their renewed economic activity
was far greater than that in the USSR. This would indicate the beginning of
a deteriorating position of the Soviet Union relative to the OECD countries
regarding the development of R&D effort.[27]
This deteriorating status grew in the early 1980s, when a basically sta-
ble Soviet ratio was confronted by a significantly improved trend in OECD
country ratios. However, after 1986 there was a temporary leveling off in
GERD/GNP ratios in the OECD because GNP growth rates were rising rel-
atively faster than the rates of increase in R&D expenditures. Simultaneous
to these developments the Soviet GERD /GNP ratio ballooned according to
official statistics. (Even if the markedly lower Gokhberg and Mindely es-
timates are taken, the increases are impressive.) Like in the OECD, R&D
spending in the USSR continued an upward trend that was clearly less af-
fected by slower economic growth than by other national activities. The
resilience of the GERD/GNP ratio over a longer period in the face of eco-
nomic changes and budgetary difficulties indicates the value attributed to
R&D both in the OECD and in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the gov-
ernment in the USSR could not maintain this emphasis after 1989, when
budgetary problems became more and more insurmountable (as suggested
earlier in Table 4.7).
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Figure 4.8. Level and growth rates of GERD /GNP, selected countries.
This discussion on the dynamics of the GERD/GNP ratio reveals a
minor deficiency in using the percentage of GNP invested in R&D as an
indicator for an economy's R&D effort. Namely, it is not always clear from
the ratio which of the two components had the greatest influence on the
final percentage trend. A comparison of GERD and GNP growth over a
period can help to clarify each country's funding effort. In the five-country
sample the R&D growth rates are almost always higher (for any interval)
than the comparable GNP growth rates. The greater the positive difference
between GERD growth and GNP growth, the greater the country's R&D
effort in relation to its available resources. German, Japanese, American,
and Soviet GERD growth rates between 1962 and 1989 are 3.3, 3.0, 0.2, and
2.3 percentage points above their GNP growth rates for the same period,
respectively. The United Kingdom was the only country where growth in
R&D expenditure was lower than growth in GNP.
Figure 4.8 shows the position of four Western countries, four East-
ern European countries, and the USSR both by level of R&D spending
(GERD/GNP ratio), in 1989 or the nearest year, and by average annual
growth rate of R&D between 1975 and 1989. Among the Eastern Europeans,
the USSR and Poland stand apart, culminating very high GERD/GNP ra-
tios (the USSR highest and Poland second) with exceptional growth rates
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(Poland highest) between 1975 and 1989. Poland's seemingly advantaged
position (better than any Western country in this sample during the period)
was caused by an incredible increase in the emphasis on investment in sci-
ence, culture, and education during the 1980s. After practically no growth
between 1970 and 1981 (0.77% average annual growth), the budget more
than doubled within the next seven years (11.50% per annum). The other
three Eastern European countries were unable to follow the Soviet or Polish
examples and found themselves relegated to the low-growthjlow-Ievel field
of the figure, far below any Western counterpart.
Japan presented the most favorable position of the Western nations,
being in the high-growthjhigh-level field, attaining almost 3% in each cate-
gory. While West Germany and the USA maintained respectable positions,
Britain was slipping into the low-growth field due to an only marginally in-
creasing GERDjGNP ratio. The Soviets may have had a higher level than
the Westerners in 1989, but its growth had fallen to the US level. Warnings
that official estimates tended to be inflationary (or simply overstated) lead
one to believe that the situation for R&D financing had begun to deteriorate
some time ago - considerably before the accelerated decay after 1989.
There is a general congruence between the level of R&D expenditures,
where the high spenders devoted substantially more to R&D (as a percent-
age of GNP) than the low spenders, and the number of researchers em-
ployed (per 10,000 workers in the labor force population). Figure 4.9 relates
GERDjGNP ratios to the share of R&D personnel in the labor force. There
is a reasonably strong correlation between countries which increase the pro-
portion of GNP devoted to R&D over a longer period and the increases in
the proportion of the labor force active in R&D. In the past, the share of
labor costs in gross expenditures for R&D was often over 50%, therefore
being a major determinant.
The four Western countries, the USSR, and Poland appear to be fol-
lowing the trend, although the last two required a significantly higher
GERD j GNP ratio to support a not always correspondingly higher R&D
staff. This was partly due to the always greater administrative burden that
needed to be maintained, the problem of overemployment, and all the ac-
companying costly inefficiencies. Romania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia lie
far apart from the other nations in Figure 4.9, indicating that an enormous
st aff was employed even at a very low GERD j GNP ratio. Although salary
costs were very low in these three countries compared with those in the West,
it would appear that most of the funds were used to pay wages rather than
to invest in state-of-the-art equipment. Thus, even the enlightened or indus-
trious R&D personnel could have never been as productive as their Western
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colleagues, where there were few complaints of overstaffing, and those who
were employed could rely on adequate physical infrastructure.
The relative positions of the countries presented in Figures 4.8 and 4-9
with respect to the proportion of GNP or GDP devoted to research and
development are significantly influenced by a particular nation's policy re-
garding expenditures for major defense research programs. The ranking of
countries by the share of GDP devoted to civil R&D expenditures (see Fig-
ure 4.10) sheds a different light on the state and characteristics of research
in the USSR, USA, UK, Japan, and West Germany.[28] When comparing
only civil research rather than total, the gaps between countries are dimin-
ished, and those countries that appeared so superior in absolute terms but
with a large emphasis on defense, are confronted with a relatively modest
position. Among OEeD countries, the USA and the UK have been known
to devote considerable percentages of GERD to defense programs and con-
sequently their contributions to civil R&D were between 20% and 37% lower
than those in West Germany and Japan. The science and technology policy
of the last two nations is partly the result of not being permitted to have de-
fense sectors as they existed before World War II and partly due to different
national priorities.
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In the Soviet case, whether the high (GOSKOMSTAT) or low (Gokhberg
and Mindely, refer to Table 4.7) estimates are considered, an amazing pro-
portion of Soviet investment in R&D went to the defense sector .[29] One
reason for this is that particular areas of high-technology research and de-
velopment were incorporated into the military industrial complex and funds
did not carry a distinct label; so, they may have been used to develop a new
radar system or to improve the state of technology in producing television
sets. The spillover effect may have been somewhat higher due to this fact,
but most analysts do not attribute much effect of defense R&D on produc-
tion of civil goods in the West and it would be a surprise if this had been
radically different in Eastern Europe. In addition (maybe partly in recogni-
tion of this), the proportions of civil R&D as a percentage of GDP has been
increasing in most of the big spender OECD countries since 1970.
After analyzing the GERD, its growth, its relationship to R&D person-
nel, and the differential allocations between civil and defense sectors for a
number of countries, the next stage is to examine the emphasis of R&D
funding when it comes to the character of the work.
4.3.3 Sources and character of R&D funding
In the USSR, basic research was dominated by the academic/education sec-
tor, applied research was fairly evenly distributed among all sectors, and
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development (as might be expected) was primarily concentrated in the fac-
tory /industrial sector. Rather unexpectedly, the statistics for the Soviet
Union reveal that a relatively small share of government R&D funds was in-
vested in basic research in 1989 - only 7.2% compared with 17.2% in the USA
(see Figure 4.11 ).[30] The catalyst for this development was the beginning
of reform in the Soviet R&D sector after 1987 that led to more direct R&D
financing by the reasonably well-endowed enterprises. Enterprises proved
to have little interest in basic science. In 1988, the basic R&D expendi-
tures in industrial research institutes decreased by 50% although the share
of enterprises investing in industrial R&D increased from 51.2% to 66.4%
(Motorygin and Glaziev, 1991, p. 17). Their contribution was in the applied
research area, to which government contributed only about one-third of its
budget as depicted in Figure 4.11 .
The United States government appears to have devoted 2.5 times as
many financial resources to fundamental science activities. After slow years
for fundamental science in market economies during the 1970s, many OECD
nations registered a recovery of expenditures on basic research. US figures
indicate that government left much of the responsibility for funding applied
research as well as development to the private sector. The development value
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was high due to a distortion caused by the enormous outlays of the American
government for development in the defense sector.[31]
Financial data may not be the best indicator of the allocation of funds
with respect to the character of work. As stated earlier, wages form a large
component of R&D spending. In the USSR the salaries of scientists and en-
gineers in the academic/education sector had substantially declined relative
to those of scientists, engineers, and technicians in the industrial branches
of the economy. In addition, much of the capital and infrastructure costs
in the academic/education science sector were covered by other state bud-
get allocations. However, some Soviet policy analysts appeared concerned
about what they felt was an unjustified emphasis on applied research and
development when the state of fundamental science seemed so neglected, and
possibly even deteriorating. In 1987, the research institutes of the branch
industrial ministries were allocated as much as 82% of the funding for R&D
projects from the State Committee for Science and Technology (Fortescue,
1987, p. 97).
In the United States and most other OECD countries, the R&D perform-
ers are classified according to five main groupings: the federal government,
industry, universities and colleges, federally funded R&D institutions, and
other nonprofit institutions. In the West, one can generalize that over the
last decade or so, a new trend is becoming apparent: university and in-
dustry are increasing their roles in performing R&D, while the role of the
government as a direct performer has been declining.
Although there was primarily only one funding source for Soviet R&D,
there were many performers of various sizes and fields of specialization. Due
to their diversity, status in the hierarchy, and the ambiguities surrounding
their cumulative responsibilities, it is difficult to classify these in a similar
way to those in the West. In 1989, the USSR state R&D sector consisted
of approximately 4,500 research and design organizations, 528 scientific and
production associations in industry, 23 intersectoral scientific and techno-
logical complexes, and 904 higher educational institutions (Gokhberg and
Mindely, 1991, p. 23). Research and development activities were also being
conducted by 720 enterprises and production associations, more than 1,000
design bureaus in the field of construction, and many others.
Industrial research institutes were financed by state budget sources via
special funds supervised by corresponding ministries or state R&D programs,
both of which were coordinated by the USSR State Committee for Science
and Technology (Motorygin and Glaziev, 1991, p. 2). These institutes re-
ceived additional funds directly from enterprises to conduct contract re-
search. The importance of this last source increased in 1987 when state
enterprises received the right to accumulate profits. In fact, direct financing
126 Christoph M. Schneider
of R&D at industrial institutes by enterprises more than doubled in 1988,
the number of contractual agreements between enterprises and R&D insti-
tutes rose three to four times, and industrial R&D output increased 1.6
times (Motorygin and Glaziev, 1991, p. 13). The research institutes and
organizations linked to the production ministries did by far the lion's share
of R&D, with the higher educational institutions only accounting for about
10% (Kneen, 1989, p. 74). This implies that the further an organization was
from production, the less scientific production it had.
In the Academy of Sciences, the same small group of elite people held
multiple positions (which they were elected to by their counterparts) in top-
level management, policy making, and resource allocation (Motorygin and
Glaziev, 1991, p. 3). The academy was privileged in that its presidium ob-
tained funding for the organization directly from the state budget. However,
the individual institutes received research plans and the resources determined
as sufficient to fulfill the plans from its relevant supervisory body. The con-
centration of power and control over R&D resources in the hands of small
groups of academicians suppressed any real competition between scholars
and institutes for resource support.
Due to such a monopolistic organizational structure, much academic
R&D ended up focusing on obsolete areas that were protected by those in
the academy management who were themselves usually directors of enormous
institutes specializing in precisely these topics. The length of the research
effort determined by institute directors meant that there was no need to
constantly sell the results to obtain funding and made the swings in Soviet
S&T more moderate than in the US (Gamota, 1987, p. 233). However, the
question of when to discontinue work in an unproductive area was rarely
addressed; possibly, only with the death of the director who had promoted
it.
The fastest growing type of R&D performers were also the newest -
the nonstate R&D organizations (refer to Table 3.5).[32] These included
youth research centers, permanent research teams of the All-Union Society
of Inventors and of the Union of Scientists and Engineers Society, and R&D
cooperatives. By 1990, they performed 13.5% of all R&D by volume, and
their share was growing rapidly. Their aggregate expenditures on R&D rose
from practically zero in 1987 to already over 6 billion rubles in 1990-1991,
about 14% of GERD. Their financing was chiefly secured by the value of
products they brought to the growing free market for R&D products. Many
scientists and engineers still employed in state R&D institutions had second
part-time and even full-time jobs in the newly created R&D centers.[33] In
this case the researchers faced little risk or responsibility since they were
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Table 4.8. Distribution of government expenditures for research, 1988
(in %).
Science USSR USA DEeD averagea
Natural 16.0 29.7
Medical 2.2 10.2 }36.2b
Agricultural 2.4 3.9
Technical 75.3 50.2 33.5"
Social and Humanitarian 4.1 6.0 6.8d
a Figures from 1987.
b Life sciences.
" Physical sciences and engineering.
d Social sciences and psychology.
Sources: Compiled from OECD (1992, p. 30) and Gokhberg and Mindely (1991, p. 23).
permanently employed elsewhere. The cooperatives were particularly suc-
cessful due to high flexibility, rapid completion of projects, and a completely
demand-oriented policy.
In order to be prepared for increasing demand on scarce budgetary re-
sources and to operate within the bounds of existing budget constraints,
governments were required to set R&D priorities. These areas received pref-
erential treatment in the allocation of federal funds. Questions have been
raised with respect to the infringement on scientific freedom and the re-
sponsiveness to market demand, but most governments have withstood the
criticisms and have established, and subsequently authorized, high-level ad-
visory bodies in one form or another to set national R&D priorities.
The USSR is no exception; however, the whole collection of bodies in-
volved is very large - the greater the priority, the higher the funding. This
policy was followed to the extreme with respect to military-related areas;
these areas could not help but perform respectable R&D as they obtained
the best financial, human, and physical resources. Low priority areas were
barely able to survive on the resources they were given; this could not have
been conducive to productive, progressive research anywhere. From this
perspective, some of the achievements by Soviet scientists were even more
amazing.
In 1988, the Soviet priorities differed significantly from those in the
nonsocialist countries of the Western industrialized world. An overwhelming
emphasis was given to technical sciences, 75.3% of government R&D expen-
ditures (see Table 4.8). These sciences were primarily physics, mathematics,
and engineering. The GECD average for this category was as low as 33.5%.
Even the USA, 50.2% in this general field, and Japan, tops in the GECD
with 21.6% in engineering, had lower budget allocations than the USSR,
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although they have been widely considered proponents of this field. The
life sciences, which include such important timely topics as biotechnology,
environment, and health, were clearly neglected in setting priorities in the
Soviet Union - less than 21% of the budget. In the USA, the proportion of
R&D expenditures allocated to the life sciences was almost 45%; the OECD
average was 36.2%. Finally, the support granted to the social and human-
itarian sciences in the USSR lags 32% and 40% behind the US and OECD
levels respectively.
Notes
[1] Education policy is the single most important factor with which a nation can
influence the potential abilities of its population. Under socialism, the educa-
tional system is responsible for the formal socialization of the "correct" atti-
tudes in a socialist society and, according to David Lane, for the creation of a
"communist man" (Lane, 1985, p. 262). The operation of a national system of
education molds the intellectual basis, the knowledge, and impressions of the
population at an age when information and ideology is most readily absorbed
and will to a large extent orient the aptitude and capability of individuals for
the rest of their lives. In this way, education is the most crucial input for human
development - the resource that facilitates individuals to engage in economic
activity, more or less successfully, more or less creatively.
[2] This recent comparative study of national innovation systems included 15 na-
tions in 3 groups: large high-income countries, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the USA, and the UK; small high-income countries with a strong agricultural
resource base, Australia, Canada, Denmark, and Sweden; and lower-income
countries, Argentina, Brazil, Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan. Nelson sug-
gests that the comparison between the USA and Germany, on the one hand,
and France and the UK, on the other, supports his conclusion. He summarizes
that a principal reason why the former two countries surged ahead of the latter
two, around the turn of the century, in science-based industries, is that their
university systems were much more responsive to the training needs of industry
(refer to Nelson, 1992, p. 23).
[3] Until late in the nineteenth century, such all-encompassing programs as mass
education and railroad construction were viewed as possible threats to the
established political order and were even discouraged. The developments in
Russia, remarkably similar to those in Japan at the time, are depicted as a
model where the state launched a deliberate and consistent program to ac-
celerate industrialization and to reduce the technology gap between it and its
more advanced and steadily advancing neighbors (Gregory, 1982, p. 7).
[4] About 250 years ago, Peter the Great brought in numerous foreign technicians
and initiated the vestiges of intellectual life (Maddison, 1969, p. 83). As a
result, universities and libraries were built and the Academy of Sciences es-
tablished. These facilities were primarily reserved for the elite, so some of the
aristocracy had a cosmopolitan education and there were a few distinguished
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Russian scientists. In spite of this, the masses remained illiterate and the
national technological level was low.
[5] It has been reported that roughly half of the schools in the Soviet Union lacked
central heating and running water or sewage, a quarter of all students attended
school in split shifts, and 53% of all school children were not in good health
(Sakwa, 1990, p. 22). Additionally, the absence of appropriately enticing bene-
fits for instructors in isolated areas had an impact on the quality of those hired
to teach.
[6] These figures for growing urbanization thus coincide with the increases in total
enrollment in education and enrollment in higher educational institutions as
shown in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2 during the same period.
[7] An additional reason for these low numbers in the republics was the presence
of their own culture and language that was often very distinct from Russian.
The Soviet Union consisted of 15 republics (Russia the largest in area and with
consistently almost 50% of the population), 12 main ethnic groups (and more
minor ones), and over 15 different languages. To become literate meant to
learn Russian - a foreign language for many.
[8] All improvements are to be seen positively considering the low level which had
been inherited from the Czarist period and the emigration of many educated
people and technicians shortly before and during the 1917 Revolution.
[9] This was not always true. Under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, forced indus-
trialization beginning with the first five-year plan in 1928 resulted in a severe
shortage of well-trained technical labor. Many millions were recruited from
the numbers that fled from the countryside. Unskilled peasant labor caused
many breakdowns, was exceedingly inefficient and unpunctual, and resulted in
a high labor turnover. The planned extension of the labor force called for great
efforts to teach new skills, to increase the inadequate number of engineers and
technologists, and to expand educational establishments (Nove, 1989, p. 188).
The annual growth rates for graduating engineers and technicians ballooned
to an amazing 15% between 1928 and 1941. Particularly in the 1930s and still
for an extended period thereafter, the result was the establishment of many
new schools called technicums and a very hasty production of semi-qualified
personnel.
[10] This is an interpretation of the work of J.1. Zajda (Education in the USSR,
1980, p. 105) by Lane (1985, p. 296).
[11] In order to secure computer literacy among students in higher education a
course on the "Basics of Informatics and Computer Techniques" has been in-
troduced (98% of the students have enrolled). The problem is that only 14%
of the full-time, day higher educational institutions have computer facilities
(GOSKOMSTAT, 1988, p. 254).
[12] The numbers in Table 4-4 do not reveal the impressive advances the USSR
made in increasing its stock of qualified personnel in the economy during the
1950s and early 1960s. At this time, the number of engineers and agronomists
already tripled, greatly outpacing the rate of growth in Western Europe (Mad-
dison, 1969, p. 128).
[13] Refer to Table 2 (p. 97) in the Technical Annex of OECD, 1989.
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[14] The decline in the British numbers may be a result of an exclusion from the data
of sectors other than government and industry. In the transition to a tertiary
economy, more and more S&E are self-employed or becoming employed in
services and nonindustrial, private branches of the economy. These, as stated,
are not included in the UK calculations.
[15] Gokhberg and Mindely (1991, p. 3) report that official figures for Soviet R&D
personnel did not always include all scientists and engineers from some re-
search, design, and experimental divisions of industrial enterprises (the so-
called factory science sector), and from some higher educational institutions
and other organizations. They estimate that the total number of all types of
S&E employed in scientific organizations could have been as high as 3.3 million
in 1989,2.1 million of which were engaged in R&D. This is almost double the
official estimate and should itself be treated with caution as the definitions for
S&E are unclear. The amount, however, is still considerably below the 4.6
million scientists and engineers in S&E jobs in the United States.
[16] Refer to Table 5 in Gokhberg and Mindely (1991, p. 9).
[17] Part of the explanation of the rapid decline of S&E employment in Poland
was the increasing lack of supply since 1980. From 1980 to 1987, an estimated
8,000 Polish academics immigrated to the West - the greatly feared "brain
drain" phenomena (The Wall Street Journal, April 3, 1992). These immigrants
constituted over 24% of the total drop in employment of 33,000 S&E between
1980 and 1987.
[18] Soviet policy on migration and demographics was said to be generally moti-
vated by the task of economic development. The key concept was to distribute
the population (usually selected for particular skills) in those places where it
could do the most to improve productivity (see Zwick, 1980, pp. 142-171). The
great concentration of untapped resources in eastern Russia was one of the rea-
sons for the relocation of the population to that area and the establishment of
the scientific center in Novosibirsk.
[19] Thus, personnel transfers were uncommon and even prevented by direct and
indirect measures such as the dependency on special benefits and the like. The
unfortunate result was that these institutes added internal isolation to the
already existing and impeding international isolation, but both were grounds
for increasing the number of domestic R&D personnel.
[20] The data have been compiled from Fortescue (1987, p. 97), Gokhberg and
Mindely (1991, pp. 3-5), and NSB (1989, Appendix Tables, p. 179).
[21] Recall, from Chapter 3, that the main bureaucratic institutions contributing
to R&D policy making were the Academy of Sciences, the State Committee
for Science and Technology (GKNT), and GOSPLAN.
[22] In comparison, the journal Science fj Engineering Indicators (1989), published
by the National Science Board, reports that approximately 72% of R&D was
performed in-house in the American industrial sector.
[23] In 1967 the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers was "On Changes in the
Method of Planning Expenses on Scientific Research Work and on Expanding
the Rights of Directors of Scientific Research Institutions"; and in 1968 the
party government resolution was "On Measures to Increase the Effectiveness
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of Scientific Organizations and Speed Utilization in the National Economy of
Achievements of Science and Technology" (Bornstein, 1984, p. 91).
[24] This amount represents the sum of current expenditure (on work performed
by independent scientific organizations as well as by divisions of enterprises,
scientific-production and production associations, higher educational institu-
tions and other business entities), and capital investments in construction and
installations connected with the development of science (scientific organiza-
tions, their experimental and production bases, independent laboratories, me-
teorological service installations, botanical and experimental garden, wildlife
preserves, etc.) (Gokhberg and Mindely, 1991, p. 18).
[25] The double counting was the result of work that had been fulfilled on a contrac-
tual basis by enterprises and research organizations and consequently credited
to both the executing agencies (which place the orders) and the contractors.
[26] The OECD (1992, p. 111) has designated 2% as the "apparently most desirable
target figure."
[27] The gap widened primarily with respect to the main R&D spenders in the
OECD. Seven countries (United States, Japan, Germany, France Italy, United
Kingdom, and Canada) accounted for 91 % of the OECD total in 1985 (OEeD,
1989, p. 20). In addition to these countries (except Canada and Italy), Sweden,
Switzerland, and the Netherlands spent nearly 3% of GNP on R&D in 1987
(OECD, 1992, p. 111).
[28] The OECD divides GERD into civil and defense, while the National Science
Board (of the USA) makes the distinction between nondefense and defense,
yet they both refer to the same sectors.
[29] The Soviet figures are as a percentage of GNP.
[30] Under the Soviet-style central planning system, it made no sense to make a
distinction between government and other sources of financing because the
state was sole financier. State-sponsored R&D may have been carried out by
various parties (as will be described later), obtaining monies through a number
of channels, but the origin was always the state budget.
[31] The ratio of US federal obligations for development of defense to nondefense
industries was almost six to one in 1989.
[32] In operation since the enactment of the State Enterprise Law and the adoption
of the government decree "on transformation of research organizations on the
basis of complete self-accounting and self-financing" in 1987 (Motorygin and
Glaziev, 1991, p. 12).
[33] Very often these employees sold or distributed the results of work that had
actually been done in the state R&D institutes. These were, in part, like
clearinghouses for new scientific and technological advances. The state was
therefore generously subsidizing this private sector or more correctly quasi-
private R&D activity. This is not always considered negative, since in Western
nations the government directly or indirectly sponsors and supports substantial
portions of R&D performed in private industry. In 1987, 33% of American
industrial R&D was federally financed.
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Figure 4A.1. Soviet Union - dynamics of growth: total R&D personnel
versus total labor force, 1965-1987. The year 1965 equals 100.
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Figure 4A.3. Japan - dynamics of growth: total R&D personnel versus
total labor force, 1965-1987. The year 1965 equals 100.
260
240
220
200
S
.r:.O 180jliell)
<!l~ 160
~
140
120
100
80
1965 1968 1971
Labor force
1974 1977 1980 1983 1986
Figure 4A.4. West Germany - dynamics of growth: total R&D personnel
versus total labor force, 1965-1987. The year 1965 equals 100.
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Chapter 5
Internationalization of
Research and Technology
Internationalization and globalization are two relatively new words in the
vocabulary of scholars and scientific analysts in research and development.
While the actual meaning and acceptance of these terms have developed
slowly in science and technology policy, the activities they describe have
stimulated scientific advance and technological transformation for centuries,
but particularly in recent decades with the increasing speed of change. Es-
pecially since the 1950s, the relaxation of strict national boundaries in favor
of a more integrated global economic system has changed the nature of the
world economy. Increasing internationalization of production and trade has
generated new demands on domestic R&D, while facilitating diffusion of
ideas and technologies. The weakening of geographical and political protec-
tion of markets has forced more and more industries and firms to measure
their competitive success not only on local, regional, and national scales, but
also on the international scale.
National innovation systems tend to concentrate more and more on top-
ics where there is a competitive advantage to be had. New materials and
information technologies, telecommunications, electronics, health and the
environment, and biotechnology have become generally recurring priority
topics in the plans of Western governments. Yet each nation has developed
special emphasis in selected fields: the USA has covered almost all aspects of
materials research; Japan has been more selective and has given priority to
fine ceramics, carbon fibers, technical plastics, amorphous alloys, and super-
conductors; Germany has focused on high-temperature metallic materials,
new polymers, ceramics, and new conductors; Switzerland has specialized in
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alloys and materials for electronics; Norway has stressed the study of ma-
terials for offshore techniques; Denmark has developed materials for instru-
mentation and catalysis; and so on (GECD, 1992, p. 31). Countries in the
West have highlighted particular topics within a large array of R&D endeav-
ors, which have been carried out in the international community. Therefore,
the combination of specialization and international cooperation has secured
advancement in existing scientific fields and induced headway in expanding
new areas.
Specialization in a few areas should not lead to the complete disregard
of other topics of interest in science and technology. The growth of global
R&D activities provides more incentive for developing solid overall national
innovation systems based on strong research and development activities than
for solely relying on the successes of specialization. A certain amount of
domestic research is essential in order to be receptive to scientific progress
and technological advances made in foreign countries.
Indeed, one may question why it is important for a nation to be active in
the internationalization of R&D, on both the producing end and the receiving
end. The scientific and technological levels of the United States and the
Soviet Union provide the answer by displaying two contrary scenarios. Even
if one is a major R&D producer, such as the USA or the USSR, the rest of
the world may still be inventing something of interest for them with respect
to production, policy, or improvement in the standard of living. The USSR
essentially cut itself off from this world stock of knowledge, leaving many
potentially advantageous innovations beyond their reach. Now scientists
in the former USSR find themselves far behind the technological levels of
nations that are substantially inferior to them in domestic R&D output. In
addition, the absence of internationalization has eliminated the possibilities
for the republics of the former USSR to accrue economic returns on a given
invention domestically and abroad, reducing the general ability to secure
economic benefits.
Different nations possess different capabilities to innovate and imitate,
which determine their domestic flows of product and process innovations.
The descriptive evidence would appear to indicate the presence of a strong
correlation between active participation in the international market place
and internal technological and economic development. Isolation and in-
breeding have not exhibited the ability to generate the same successes as
open market policies with respect to achieving technological advance, par-
ticularly not at similar levels of efficiency.
After 1945, postwar rebuilding began and a new world economic system
emerged that reflected the sharp division between political, economic, and
consequently social policies of different groups. The primary division in the
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world after 1945 was essentially that between the West (led by the United
States) and the East (the Soviet-dominated nations of Eastern Europe). In
effect, the Soviet bloc defined clear boundaries around itself and its East-
ern European satellites and created its own political and economic systems
(Dicken, 1986, p. 16). The practically impermeable border was known as
the Iron Curtain and the policies were a Soviet style of socialism referred
to as Communism. And it was behind this Iron Curtain that the nations
formed the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), more com-
monly known as COMECON, that determined their economic organization,
strategies, and practices.
Particularly since the end of the World War II, but intensified with the
beginning of the Cold War, repercussions of intergovernmental policies and
East-West political tensions have severely been inhibited and have frequently
specifically forbidden East-West scientific cooperation and exchange. How-
ever, science, like other sociocultural aspects, could have provided a means
for more rapidly easing the tensions. Especially the trend toward interna-
tionalization, characterized by improved global access to science and tech-
nology, provided the opportunity in the past and continues to do so today
for countries to break free from the vicious circle of lack of technological and
scientific capabilities.[l]
The true extent of the ramifications of partially self-imposed and par-
tially inflicted isolation of the Soviet science and technology community from
the industrialized Western world became clearer with the opening of the
USSR in the late 1980s. Without perestroika and glasnost the great Com-
munist superpower of the century may have been able to go on deceiving the
rest of the world and itself with respect to the quality of its S&T establish-
ment, among other things, for some time to come. Yet, this was not to be.
The crumbling of political barriers and the opening of the Soviet economy
have exposed all sectors to international scrutiny, including research and
development management and the entire S&T system. A comparison with
the international standard has revealed large gaps in the apparently solidly
founded R&D in the USSR. The civilian sectors were particularly lacking;
neither the currently available results nor the quality of scientific potential
could ensure the output of new products, innovations, or technologies to be
competitive on the world market.
This chapter first addresses the issues associated with the building blocks
of technology, namely, research and development, in a global perspective.
Comparisons are drawn whenever possible to the Soviet system, where the
presence or lack of particular international aspects directly influenced the
techno-economic growth and development. Closely linked to this topic have
been the increasingly significant effects of a globalization of transnational
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corporations' strategies as they pertained to numerous factors of operation
including foreign R&D laboratories and other such activities. The second
part of the chapter then deals with the subsequent issues regarding the inter-
national development of technology, which include technology agreements,
transfer of technology, and the role of private business in these two areas.
5.1 International Research and Development
In recent decades, the gradually increasing internationalization or globaliza-
tion of production and trade processes has extended far beyond simply man-
ufactured goods to include the key resources of production such as capital,
labor, skills, technology, and know-how. The 1980s have already provided
evidence of an accelerating, more complex, and geographically wider pattern
of international exchange and cooperation, with access to and diffusion of
technology and its components playing a major role (OECD, 1991b, p. 113).
In order to be successful in securing continued growth and rising welfare, it
was becoming essential to be adequately integrated in these global processes
in response to the new economic forces.
Therefore, one of the most important occurrences that dramatically es-
calated in significance over the years was the internationalization of R&D
planning and outlays. Initially, the institutionalization of science caused
S&T policy to be mainly conceived within the framework of national interest
and R&D effort was consequently restricted by national boundaries in both
East and West. However, the West soon recognized the need for international
communication and collaboration, while the East remained self-contained.[2]
Particularly the Western European nations, which in numerous cases were
characterized by a lack of critical mass of competencies and funds, were
assiduous in establishing joint R&D programs and facilities.
5.1.1 Foreign direct investment as a measure of R&D
internationalization
Foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percentage of gross fixed capital for-
mation (GFCF) is a measure of the interest one or more economies have in
another, and vice versa. In the last decades, FDI has become an increasingly
influential component in promoting economic growth according to analysis
based on Western nations. Moreover, trends in FDI constitute an important
channel for the internationalization of technology, including the development
of both scientific collaboration and industrial R&D cooperation, and oppor-
tunities for technology transfer. Direct investment has been recognized as
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Figure 5.1. Outward FDI as a percentage of GFCF, annual averages per
period.
the main vehicle for access to, and diffusion of, technical knowledge and
innovation and has often been accompanied by R&D activities and facilities.
In general, FDI as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation has been
increasing fairly steadily over the past 30 years in the top R&D investor
countries of the West. The rising absolute totals reveal that activities and
collaboration with partners abroad and the operations of foreigners domesti-
cally became a progressively crucial element of national strategy. Neverthe-
less, national governments and firms from the same parent nations followed
individual strategies for investing abroad that have resulted in significant
differences regarding the nature of outward and inward FDI.
Outward FDI as a percentage of GFCF has grown continually in the
four countries as shown in Figure 5.1, except for short-term dips in Japan
during the late 1970s and in the USA in the early 1980s. National govern-
ments had realized the increases in benefits and the reductions in risk of
investments if they went beyond their own borders and collaborated with
others. Enterprises also utilized the internationalization of production and
the improvements in information technologies to achieve higher returns from
their foreign investments, which in the case of R&D increasingly included
cooperation with domestic research organizations in other countries.
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Figure 5.2. Inward FDI as a percentage of GFCF, annual averages per
period.
The low and declining levels of inward FDI as a percentage of GFCF
in Japan and West Germany over the period shown in Figure 5.2 gives ev-
idence of the extremely high levels and rapidly growing rates of national
investment, making the importance offoreign interests relatively less impor-
tant. It also indicates that these two countries had greater interests abroad
than others had in them, whereas the opposite was true for the USA and the
UK, especially after the early 1970s. However, these figures omit evidence
of the crucial historical relevance of inward FDI for these nations early in
the rebuilding period after World War II, despite the rigid controls. In fact,
when direct investment into Japan was gradually liberalized in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, it was becoming less important as a means for transferring
international technological development.
The USSR and the Eastern European countries provided a completely
different picture. There is no appropriate official statistical data available
regarding FDI in Eastern Europe, primarily because it was practically in-
significant. For all intents and purposes, inward and outward FDI in the
Soviet Union and its neighbors was essentially zero, at least until the early
1980s. In the latest official GOSKOMSTAT statistical publication (1990),
there were still no figures on FDI.[3] The rigidity and isolation of the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe prevented their sharing any such benefits of in-
ternational economic activities, of which foreign direct investment was only
one aspect that contributed to competitive advantages in the world markets.
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So, while the West was generating widespread economic progress based on
considerable technological progress, the Eastern bloc (led by the USSR) be-
lieved it could achieve not just comparable but superior levels left to its own
devices.
5.1.2 Involvement in international scientific activities
Scientists and officials in East and West were often concerned, albeit not
always for the same reasons, with both official and informal exchanges with
the Soviet Union. International scientific contacts to interesting parties were
conventionally promoted, directed, coordinated, and controlled by the gov-
ernment rather than simply arranged by the individual scientist, institute, or
organization. The program of the NATO Science Committee in supporting
civil science in the alliance has been a positive example in proving that sci-
ence develops best in conditions of the true uninhibited circulation of ideas
(Sinclair, 1987, p. xiii). In contrast, the Soviet-style R&D system was typi-
fied by an isolation of R&D workers from their peers both domestically and
internationally.
International scientific cooperation has taken a wide variety of forms.
Many of these were unknown to or out of the reach of scholars and scientists
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, while they were often taken for
granted in the West. These types of collaborative activities in R&D include
international meetings of experts, exchange of students and scientists, peer
review of research proposals and publishable results, open competition for
funding of scientific work from both government and private sources (i.e.,
venture capital), and direct collaboration leading to joint projects and co-
authored research publications.
Scientific Meetings and Academic Exchanges
With respect to the Soviet Union, it was extremely difficult to obtain reliable
data (if any at all) on most of the factors mentioned above. Countless
political motives and simply the Soviet socialist ideology in general made
travel all but impossible internationally (though some restrictions were eased
in the late 1980s). Although the number of Soviets traveling abroad for
scientific exchange was said to have increased 2.5 times between 1960 and
1980, the number of 3,200 nominated for travel by the academy in 1981 was
very small by international standards. Table 5.1 gives some indication of
the level of Soviet participation in informal international communication.
Clearly, the figures for the USSR are far below those of the Western nations
leading in technology (in most cases by an order of magnitude), and are
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Table 5.1. Participation of the Soviet Union and selected Western nations
in international S&T activities, late 1970s.
USSR Japan GERa UK USA
International meetings in the country 5 27 48 67 137
Presentations by country's citizens at
meetings in the country 113 538 436 988 4,026
Presentations by foreign citizens at
meetings in the country 479 1,006 1,597 1,847 2,593
Presentations by country's citizens
at foreign meetings 118 842 1,250 1,504 4,251
aRefers only to West Germany.
Source: Adapted from Parrott (1987, p. 140).
incredibly small considering the enormous population of R&D experts in the
USSR. If the calculations had been based on per capita terms, the Soviet
figures would portray a much worse picture, particularly with respect to the
much smaller Western European nations.
The number of international meetings in the Soviet Union was practi-
cally nonexistent, only five, in the late 1970s, and consequently the number
of presentations by foreigners and residents was comparatively Iowan an
aggregate scale. The Soviets did follow the trends of most other Westerners,
in that more foreign presentations were entertained at the meetings than do-
mestic ones. Only the USA had a ratio favoring presentations by domestic
citizens to those of foreigners, but this is just evidence of the large number
of US scholars. The Soviet meetings would not have been considered very
conducive to valuable exchange between experts due to the incredible size -
more than 118 presentations per meeting. The comparable figures for USA,
UK, West Germany, and Japan were 48.3, 42.3, 42.4, and 57.2 respectively.
Perhaps it is unjust to compare the international participation of the So-
viets, who speak a relatively uncommon international language and do not
always easily communicate in English, with that of the Americans, British,
and even Germans. Yet, even in comparison to Japanese international S&T
interaction, a nation with a unique language, the Soviets were far behind.
Therefore, Soviet researchers undoubtedly suffered from not being able
to exchange ideas with accomplished foreign researchers. Even worse than
the low amount of international activities domestically, was the Soviet par-
ticipation in scientific and technological meetings abroad. The number of
Soviet scholars traveling to foreign countries to participate in meetings was
already seven times smaller than the number of Japanese in the late 1970s
and over 36 times smaller than the number of Americans. The potential for
Soviets to be introduced to possible foreign collaborators was unfortunately
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extremely minimized and constituted a serious barrier to better progress of
Soviet science and technology. The resources seemed to be laying in wait,
underutilized, and losing their potential.
The number of academic exchange (AE) visas granted to scientists to
travel to the USA gives another indication of how many Soviets traveled
abroad for scientific exchange relative to recipients from other countries.[4]
The number of AE visas issued to Soviets was always low (0.26% of the total
in the 1970s), but fell steadily and dropped to only 0.1 % of the total issued
in 1984. Not only the share, but also the absolute number fell. Almost twice
as many AE visas were issued to Iranian, and 10 times as many to Polish
scholars. Only the Iranian figure had dipped in the wake of the hostage
crisis but was recovering in absolute terms in the 1980s; all other nations
registered absolute increases between 1978 and 1984 (NSB, 1985, p. 211).
In 1984, the UK, France, West Germany, Japan, Taiwan, and other Eastern
European countries accounted for 9%, 5.1%,7.6%,7.8%,1.3%, and 1.7% of
the total respectively.
Ideas and work not required by central directives were either disallowed
or developed in secrecy, so the results were inaccessible. Negotiations for
funding were based on the political status of research institutes' directors
rather than on scientific merit. The R&D specialists in the industrial R&D
institutes did not publish any of their work - monopolization of knowledge
provided power and facilitated new ways to deceive the central authorities in
a plant's ability to fulfill the plans. At research institutes there was actually
a disincentive to publish because it was the director whose name was placed
on each publication, often with no recognition to the actual author.[5] An
additional problem has always been the language factor; Soviet scholars were
not known for their fluency offoreign languages, and therefore could not have
productive collaboration with colleagues from the West.
Scientific Literature and International Collaboration
In the West, numerous methods are utilized to measure international scien-
tific collaboration. One of those most preferred is the number of coauthored
research publications. The simple reason is that, as opposed to the situation
in Eastern Europe and the USSR, the West possesses extensive systematic
data on this topic. Open scientific literature has been the primary chan-
nel for the diffusion of R&D information both within countries and between
countries. Publication not only draws attention to a researcher's results, but
opens the work to suggestions and criticisms from colleagues, allowing for
potentially incremental improvements.
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Figure 5.3. World publications by number of authors, 1973-1986.
An analysis of the trend regarding the number of authors per research
paper that is considered a contribution to the stock of world scientific lit-
erature reveals an increasing tendency toward multiple coauthors. Figure
5.3 shows that especially since 1973, scientists and engineers throughout
the world have increasingly been coauthoring papers with researchers from
other countries. In 1973 almost 35% of world S&E publications were still
produced by only one author; however, by 1986 less than 20% of the papers
had only one author. This number has declined irrespective of the particular
field of research. It was most pronounced in clinical medicine and biomedical
research, and least in mathematics and chemistry. The number of papers
completed by two authors has also declined slightly over the same period
corroborating the trend of the multiple author international research paper.
The most dramatic increase was found in a continuation of the trend that
began in the 1960s but received little attention until it made impressive gains
in the 1970s - research papers by four or more authors. With the exception
of mathematics (a Soviet specialty), this category practically doubled in
each research field, from 15% to 31% (on average in each field), between
1973 and 1986. By 1986, this category had attained the largest proportion
of internationally coauthored scientific publications.[6] It seemed, that due
to their involuntary isolation, Soviet researchers and scientists were in a
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Table 5.2. Growth rates of the participation of selected regions and nations
in international research, 1981-1986.
-1.47
5.15
-1.42
-2.09
-0.65
Regions Growth rate (%)
OECD -0.02
USSR, Eastern &
Central Europe
Asia
South America
Africa
Rest of the world
Nations
United States
United Kingdom
West Germany
France
USSR
Japan
Canada
Growth rate (%)
-0.17
-0.24
-1.64
-0.40
-1.02
2.52
1.97
Source: Growth rates calculated based on data on percentages of all international publi-
cations in world literature compiled from OEeD (1992, p. 70) and NSB (1989, p. 331).
way forced to focus on fields like mathematics and chemistry where single
authorship was still common.
How has each nation taken advantage of the opportunities for interna-
tional cooperation within the global scientific community based on the share
of international publications? These data reveal the predominant position
of the OECD countries with respect to scientific collaboration, where almost
82% of the coauthored work in the world took place. Six countries, led by
the United States and followed by the UK, Japan, West Germany, France,
and Canada, commanded approximately four-fifths of the OECD total. The
OECD's share of international research was quite stable in the 1980s (refer
to Table 5.2). The relatively minor declines or negative growth, other than
in West Germany, of the international level of participation of four out of the
top six were compensated by strong positive growth in the remaining two
nations, Japan and Canada. Primarily Japanese collaborative activities, but
also those of China, South Korea, Taiwan, and India, were responsible for
the striking growth of Asian international cooperation; the only region to
experience growth between 1981 and 1986, and that at 5.15% per annum.
The Soviet contribution to world scientific literature was measured at
7.6% in 1986, less than one-quarter of the US contribution but just slightly
lower than the British at 8.2% and the Japanese at 7.7%, and above the
West German, French, and Canadian contributions. Despite this seemingly
positive aggregate number, the data indicate a relatively rapid decline in the
Soviet share of scientific cooperation in recent decades. The statistics reveal
negative growth of 1.02% per year of Soviet participation in international
research (see Table 5.2). Statistics indicate that this trend began in the early
1970s, if not before. The USSR was the main motor of scientific activity in
Eastern Europe, and its declining share of international scientific output was
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the main reason for the high negative growth rate of the entire region. Only
Africa portrayed a more deleterious situation in the late 1970s and 1980s.
The number of internationally coauthored science and engineering arti-
cles as a share ofthe Soviet Union's total publications grew by 65% from 1976
to 1986. This appeared quite paltry compared with a 97% average for the
big five R&D nations, West Germany, Japan, France, the UK, and the USA,
where the individual increases were as high as 116%, 114%, 107%, 82%,
and 66% respectively (based on data collected from NSB, 1989, pp. 331-
335). These figures also give an indication of the high emphasis on scientific
collaboration in countries of the European Communities.
In addition, international coauthored publications constituted only a
meager 3.3% of all Soviet scientific publications in 1986 after being as low as
2% a decade earlier. The average of the big five R&D nations named above
was 17.6%, with Japan the lowest at 9.5% due to the language barrier. Per-
haps a comparison between the Soviet Union and the best of the West seems
unfair, but the Soviet 3.3% is even inferior to the levels in countries further
from the technological frontier. The number of internationally coauthored
publications as a percentage of total national publications was, on average
(OECD, 1992, p. 71):
• 31.5% for the group of four small Western European countries that in-
cluded Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and Denmark.
• 20.9% for Canada and Australia, two large, resource-rich countries, yet
not as wealthy as the big five.
• 26.8% for a group of less well-off European countries that included Ire-
land, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Spain.
International R&D Networking
The comparisons in the previous section reveal that regardless of the poten-
tial or capacity of R&D resources or other economic criteria, most nations
(and certainly all those from the industrialized world) were much more ac-
tive in international research cooperation than the USSR. The trends also
indicate that the Soviet presence in the international R&D community has
been shrinking steadily during at least the past 20 years (if not more), while
Western nations have made great efforts to participate in multinational sci-
entific and technological exchange for mutual benefit.
The smaller Eastern European nations were also trying to improve in-
ternational scientific collaboration in the 1980s, and were a step ahead of
their Soviet neighbors in bids at Western cooperation. While during the
years under Communism they had been their own best partners with most
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cooperations with the Soviet Union, the 1980s saw these countries inten-
sify their scientific relations with the West until the amount of collaborative
scientific work was more equally balanced between Eastern and Western
partners. Hungary had been the boldest; the United States was its number
one scientific collaborator (by number of cooperations), ahead of the USSR.
Poland and Czechoslovakia began adjusting in the same fashion - a process
in which the USSR was actually becoming even more isolated and left to its
own resources.
The international character of research fields was influenced by the focus
of particular nations. The USSR, for example, and most Eastern European
countries focused international collaboration more on chemistry and physics
and less on mathematics. In the United Kingdom there has been a rather
even distribution across fields, perhaps with a slight emphasis in clinical
medicine and biology and less stress on physics and chemistry. This structure
was fairly representative for most of the international scientific collaboration
of OECD countries. A few exceptions to the rule were the significant effort of
Japan in engineering/technology and chemistry, and that of West Germany
in mathematics.
Big science, that is, research organized around expensive facilities, has
traditionally influenced the characteristic distribution across fields due to a
concentration in physics and earth and space sciences. The motivations for
international cooperation in these areas have been a consequence of the desire
and often need to share the high cost of constructing and operating sophis-
ticated facilities and conducting associated research (OECD, 1992, p. 77).
Coordinated planning and activity should ensure the best complement of
highest-quality facilities and personnel at least overall cost and optimal op-
portunity for appropriate diffusion of results.
Efforts in R&D networking and collaboration are important for two es-
sential reasons: firstly, resources for supporting research and development
can be optimally and most efficiently utilized because each partner's contri-
bution is usually based on his particular speciality; secondly, the results are
most rapidly diffused among the participating nations in an uncomplicated
manner. These R&D policy directions have been the critical influence on
the scientific and technological landscape in Western countries, just as their
absence typified the R&D management in Eastern Europe and the USSR.
An OECD survey (1992) has revealed that almost all member countries
were contributing substantial human and financial resources to international
R&D collaborative efforts and new initiatives for cooperation at bilateral and
multilateral levels. Under these conditions, Germany has lately spent an
average of almost 10% of its science and technology budget in international
cooperation, and Spain more than 12%.
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Approaching this argument from the opposite perspective requires an
examination of how much foreign R&D is done domestically as a percent-
age of national R&D expenditure. The data from the aECD publications
substantiate the preceding statements of the significance of international
R&D. Most aECD countries have been characterized by the presence of
some foreign-controlled R&D. In fact, the high-Ievel/low-growth (of GERD)
nations already described in Chapter 4, such as Canada, the United King-
dom, France, and Italy, exhibited foreign R&D to be as much as 26.3%,
16.9%, 10.3%, and 9.6% of national R&D expenditure in 1988 respectively.
In contrast, foreign R&D proved to be relatively less important in expendi-
ture terms for those nations in the high-Ievel/high-growth category. They
were spending disproportionately more on domestic R&D themselves. Thus,
in Sweden, Germany, and Japan foreign R&D was only 2.1%, 1.5%, and
0.1 % of national R&D expenditure in 1988 respectively.
A search through the official statistics reveals no evidence of any foreign-
controlled R&D activities in the Soviet Union. This is not really surprising
because typical Soviet-style ideology would not have permitted the existence
of such operations. The statistics also lack any sign of Soviet budgetary ex-
penditures for scientific cooperation with the West. Scholars from the USSR
have said that this was because there was none. Therefore, the Soviet sci-
entific community could not directly benefit from the significant amount
of international R&D activities. At times there were some indirect bene-
fits from the results of arduous reverse engineering procedures (primarily
conducted by the KGB), but these were mainly for the defense sector and
reached the scientific community with a significant time lag.
Considerable discussion has surrounded the precise origin of domestically
spent R&D. The issues have arisen due to the questionable reliability and
the inadequate systematic data collected within the framework elaborated by
the Frascati manual. However, experts have acknowledged the increasingly
important role of large international companies as one of the main sources of
foreign-controlled domestic R&D and technology.[7] These key institutions
in the global system of production and trade were traditionally referred to
as the multinationals, until the United Nations recently officially adopted
the term transnational corporations.[8]
5.1.3 Transnational corporations and R&D
The amount of R&D performed throughout the world has been dramatically
enhanced by the international activities of firms. The aECD terms the
growing transnational character of (mainly industrial) R&D and innovation
as techno-globalization. As shown in Chapter 4, industrial R&D traditionally
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accounted for a major and over time increasingly dominant share of national
R&D in both market economies and the Soviet Union. With the momentum
of the changing post-World War II global economy a new structural trend
was being nurtured. This trend became an especially awesome phenomenon
-during the 1980s when it took on imposing dimensions.
Research, development, and technological innovation increasingly be-
came critical factors in competition as costs and risks of product develop-
ment were rising and the length of product life cycles was declining. Domes-
tic markets became too small for the expanding transnational corporations
and international competition increased, causing firms to relocate various
aspects of their, operations - including those involving R&D and technology
- closer to target markets. These large vast enterprises intensified their R&D
activities in foreign countries, strengthened linkages to domestic research or-
ganizations in host countries, escalated interfirm collaboration in R&D at
the transnational level, and expanded exchange and sharing of technology
by companies of different countries (OECD, 1992, p. 83). The motivation
behind the formulation of a more global firm strategy over the years was
the desire to use resources (especially R&D) more effectively and the need
to be demand responsive in the particular target market.[9] Consequently,
extensive networks of firms cooperating in R&D and technology at the inter-
national level was created in the world without Soviet-style central planning.
Not only did transborder collaboration increase between firms, but the
large transnationals actually transplanted or erected their own facilities in
foreign countries. Political borders, at least in the West, had less and less
influence on the operations of the large enterprises operating on a global
scale. Transnational corporations had a major advantage over nations in
economic competition; that is, they were essentially not restricted to bilateral
trade or arms-length influences. These firms exhibited a high degree of
locational flexibility insofar as their production and distributional networks,
as well as the location of their R&D laboratories, have transcended the
borders of individual nations. Transnationalization implies that the target
area, spurred by a firm's foreign investment, undergoes development that
moves it from being a net consumer to a net producer of the particular
product of interest.
The transnational corporation (TNC) has been given an increasing
amount of credit as playing a major role in shaping the new global economy.
The trends toward decentralization in these often enormous international
companies have also led to a dispersion of their technological research and
development efforts. The operations of transnationals have influenced the
state of whole economic sectors in host countries. The extent of the effects
of TNC activities on a national economic system are still somewhat of a
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controversial issue; nevertheless, there is no doubt that some influences have
resulted.
The consistent operations of foreign subsidiary R&D laboratories have
been identified as providing a long list of benefits to the host country. The
interactions between transnational R&D activities and the local, regional, or
national scientific community and other social and economic as well as polit-
ical components have generally depended on the type of R&D undertaken.
Locally integrated R&D laboratories, which were responsible for local prod-
uct innovation and development and transfer of technology, were the most
beneficial units for interactions. The simple support laboratory (of a TNC's
production operation) and the internationally independent R&D laboratory
proved advantageous for host areas in selected fields of activity. Interactions
between the TNC's R&D and the host country included:[10]
• Contract jobs from the R&D unit to local scientific institutions.
• Supply of consultants or contract work by R&D subsidiaries to local
organizations.
• Exchange programs of scientists with local research institutions.
• Support and assistance by subsidiary R&D units to local suppliers.
• Use of seminars by subsidiary R&D units.
• Publication of research findings of subsidiary R&D units.
• Copying of R&D units' output by local firms.
• Local personnel in total employment.
• Turnover rate of local personnel in subsidiary R&D laboratories.
• Movement of host country personnel within the TNC.
In their bid to remain competitive and profitable in the global market,
TNCs have traditionally spent more than other firms on R&D. In fact, the
R&D function is highly significant for both the TNC itself and the countries
in which it operates, particularly because these firms tended to be dispropor-
tionately involved in the more technologically intensive sectors of industry
(Dicken, 1986, p. 197).
Discussion in the previous section alluded to the increasing absolute
and relative importance of foreign-controlled R&D as a percentage of R&D
conducted nationally in the 1980s, yet this trend began much earlier. This
should come as no surprise considering the R&D budgets of some TNCs and
their devotion to international operations. Table 5.3 provides an opportunity
for comparing the research and development budgets of government agencies
and private companies from the same countries in 1985. The outcome of the
comparison is very illuminating.
In the United States, the Department of Defense had an unparalleled
budget in comparison to any other firm or state agency in the West.[ll]
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Table 5.3. R&D budgets of selected countries, agencies, and firms a , 1985.
Total
Country Government agencies Private firms GERD
USA 116,026.0
Defensec 30,332.4 General Motors 3,625.2
EnergyC 5,834.4 IBM 3,457.0
Health and Human Serv. C 5,493.6 AT&T Bell 2,209.7
NASA 3,561.5 Ford 2,018.0
NSF 1,419.1 Du Pont 1,144.0
Agriculture 983.6 IT&T 1,085.0
'Iransportation 410.6 General Electric 1,069.0
Commerce 403.0 Eastman Kodak 976.0
Interior 395.9 United Technologies 916.2
Environmental Protection 320.4 Digital Equipment 717.3
Japan 40,064.4
Science & Technology 1,894.7 Matsushita Electr. 1,171.7
MITI 980.4 Toyota 1,126.6
Agri., Forestry, & Fish. 299.6 Hitachi 1,090.6
Defense 298.4 Nippon Electric 1,036.5
Education 260.2 Nissan 766.1
Toshiba 747.2
Fujitsu 670.1
Honda 549.8
Mitsubishi Electr. 473.2
Sony 454.3
W. Ger.b 19,983.6
Research & Technologyb 2,804.0
Defenseb 1,006.3
Economic Affairsb 473.7
Education & Scienceb 389.9
France 14,571.1
Research & Technology 3,294.4 Thomson 949.1
Defense 2,902.3 CGE 660.3
Post & Telecomm. 860.4 Renault 467.7
Transport 286.1 Rhone-Poulenc 392.9
Soc. Nat. Elf Aqu. 371.4
UK 14,443.5
Defenseb 4,106.8
Education & Sciencec 952.5
Trade & IndustryC 656.8
EnergyC 389.3
Agri., Fish., & Foodb 213.2
Australiad 2,583.6
Austria 1,035.1
Belgium 1,788.7
Denmark 785.3
Finland 879.1
Greece 201.7
Ireland 202.9
Netherl. 3,437.3
N. Zeal." 355.6
Norway 940.2
Portugald 254.4
Spain 1,629.3
Sweden 3,067.5
Switzerl.d 2,857.6
aIn million $ ppp. bMinistry. cDepartment. d1986. "1989.
Sources: Compiled from DECD (1989, p. 29) and DECD (1991a, p. 16).
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From Table 5.3 it becomes apparent that the General Motors Company
spent not only more on R&D than any other private firm with the USA
as the parent nation, but more than NASA in the USA; approximately the
same as the top five Japanese government agencies together (based on their
R&D budgets); only slightly less than the top four West German ministries;
and significantly more than such relatively big-spending R&D nations as the
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and Australia.
The average R&D expenditure of the 10 leading private multinational
firms in the USA was 121.3% of the budget of the US National Science
Foundation, and greater than the average GERD of the Nordic nations. As
a result, the R&D allocations of American TNCs to foreign destinations grew
three times faster than the R&D allocations by domestic firms in the United
States (OECD, 1992, p. 84).
Many other countries were and are parents to TNCs with impressive
R&D budgets. So too, in Japan the average amount of R&D funds handled
by the top five private international corporations was 139.1% of the average
among the top five government agencies including MITI and the Science and
Technology Agency. This amount was also greater than the total GERD of
numerous smaller well-off nations such as Austria and Denmark.
Therefore, transnational corporations command substantial S&T re-
sources that influence R&D activities in nations depending on the size and
character of their own expenditures on research and development and the
particular government's priority areas. Table 5.3 also reveals that with re-
spect to the budgetary allocation of R&D funds, the USA and the UK inher-
ently made all other federal interests clearly subordinate to the military or
defense objectives. In contrast, the governments of Japan, West Germany,
and even France emphasized science, research, and technology development
in favor of military product procurement.
The USSR was known to be the home of very large firms, yet they were
all state owned and did not engage in the international R&D market actively
themselves. In addition, during the 55-year period between 1931 and 1986
no foreign firms were permitted to control operations within the borders of
the Soviet Union. These conditions were not only detrimental to the state of
science and technology and consequently to the level of product development
in the USSR, but also resulted in a loss for the global S&T sector. Soviet
priorities were like those in the USA only much more oriented toward the
military sector.
Renowned TNCs, such as Hoechst of Germany, IBM of the USA, and
Philips of the Netherlands, have long been in the business of establishing
R&D facilities abroad. Other firms did not take long to recognize the ad-
vantages of such actions and began to follow the leading TNCs' examples in
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global strategies with perpetually increasing intensity. In order to gain the
best access and to optimally service new markets, TNCs were required to be
in touch with and if possible have rights to R&D and technology develop-
ments in numerous countries.[12] Such global tactics solidified a company's
domestic stance back home by providing a much wider base upon which to
draw ideas for innovation and adaptability. So, simply stated, benefits from
international operations of TNCs actually increased the level of social welfare
in the home country. This is a key aspect of techno-economic development
which the Soviets cut themselves off from for more than half a century.
Characteristics of the regional environment provide the conditions that
induce TNCs to establish R&D facilities in a foreign place. During the course
of its activities, the TNC draws upon the available resources that initially
influence its locational choice and subsequently contribute to the long-term
growth and development of the region by returning positive externalities to
the area. These often scarce and at times geographically relatively immobile
factors include availability of human resources and their corresponding skills,
access to knowledge, and local suppliers' know-how and networks (OECD,
1991b, p. 124). Precisely such features are required to attain long-term
growth and development.
An additional explanation for the growth in amount and importance of
international R&D activities by transnational corporations was due to the
increasing complexity of the research process. This process consists of three
phases, each tending to have different locational requirements (Dicken, 1986,
p. 198):
1. Scanning the scientific and business environment: requires access to the
basic sources of science and marketing information (research institutes,
universities,[13] trade associations, and so on).
2. Product design and development: requires large-scale team work and
access to a sufficient supply of highly qualified scientists, engineers, and
technicians.
3. Debugging and adaptation to local circumstances: requires uncom-
plicated and direct two-way, feedback contact with the users of the
innovations.
TNCs have usually only been interested in national R&D policies of
the host countries in as much as these can be exploited to the firms' ben-
efit. Many host countries have outdone themselves in providing incentives
to attract certain large corporations, trying best to integrate the activities
of the corporation into their national policy objectives. The most current
examples of this phenomenon are the measures taken by the smaller Eastern
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European countries to entice large TNCs like Dow Chemical, General Elec-
tric, and General Motors of the USA; Siemens, Mercedes, and Volkswagen
of Germany; Hitachi of Japan; and Samsung of Korea. In fact, host nations
have in the past been, and must in the future be, wary not to compromise
national policies too much just to suit the global strategy of TNCs.
R&D activities of transnational corporations tended to be strongly con-
centrated in developed market economies with a substantial proportion being
located in the firm's parent or home country (Dicken, 1986, p. 201). The
other parts of the world had not provided attractive enough conditions: in
Eastern Europe and the USSR the Iron Curtain was the political barrier to
an area where the resources would have been attractive; in the less developed
countries (LDCs) politics was less of a problem if the size of investment was
high enough, but the existence and quality of the intellectual infrastructure
was often the limiting factor.
Even within countries, key factors influenced the location, type, and
size of the R&D investment. While R&D-support laboratories are relatively
widely dispersed, large-scale R&D activities tend to be confined to areas that
can provide appropriate resources for well-functioning operation. Particu-
larly the need for qualified human resources and proximity to other facilities
(such as universities, research institutions, suppliers, collaborating competi-
tors) have confined R&D centers to established urban complexes. The Soviet
example of building cities around R&D institutes in isolated places is obvi-
ously the product of a planned economy.
International research, and particularly the dependence on TNCs to con-
duct it, should be viewed as a complement to rather than a substitute for
domestic research and S&T policy. Tapping into the globalization of research
activities and benefiting from the results thereof have been and will continue
to be a crucial element of national economic growth. However, a number of
issues are mentioned in the following sections of this chapter indicating that
reliance on foreign research and technology has not been proved to be the
save-all measure for domestic technological development.
5.2 International Development of TechnologY[14]
Historically, there have been numerous clear examples of the importance of
access to technology, whether domestic or foreign, for economic growth and
development. This participation in the production, diffusion, and implemen-
tation of technology has been a relatively well-recognized factor in the in-
dustrialization of the United States and many Western European countries
in the nineteenth century, and more strikingly of Japan in the twentieth
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century. Today, the most current examples of the importance of foreign
technology and its international diffusion are the newly industrialized coun-
tries (NICs) in Southeast Asia, whose GNP growth rates are more than just
comparable to those of the industrial world leaders.
Research and development is an embodied element of innovation and
has spread as a part of the global transfer and development of technology.
Gaining access to technological products or processes inherently facilitated
the access to R&D incorporated in those products, though not necessarily
with a clear definition of the components. Domestic R&D facilities and
specialists were responsible for ensuring the assimilation of the technology
and its potential further development - as in the case of Japan over the past
four decades.
Technology-gap trade has become a determining factor in the global
development of technology. The basic assumption of modern technology-gap
trade accounts is that technology is not a freely, and universally, available
good, but there are substantial advantages to being first (Dosi and Soete,
1991, p. 103). As a consequence, other nations are motivated to accrue some
benefits to themselves through imitation. If these nations are successful in
utilizing the acquired R&D or technology products and develop them further,
more benefits will amass. These gains can take a number of forms: very high
social returns and erosion of the monopoly position of the initial innovator.
In addition, if the new product is sufficiently different from the one that
was imitated, then the imitator becomes an innovator with a short-term
monopoly position. While postwar Japan has provided an excellent example
of such a progressive nation, the USSR's extremely limited interaction with
international trade in scientific and technological goods has prevented it
from acquiring such characteristics. If the Soviets did procure some type of
foreign technology, it was generally not developed further and was left to die
the death of prolonged obsolescence. Only goods of special military interest
came under closer scrutiny.
The internationalization of technology is partially a consequence of the
post-WWII trend (that has dramatically accelerated in recent decades) to-
ward industrial and economic globalization. This process, which includes
cross-country investment, production, marketing, and trade, has significantly
influenced the international pattern of technological development (OECD,
1992, p. 83).
It is interesting to note that the countries suffering most economically
and technologically after WWII, Japan and West Germany, registered tech-
nology balance of payments ratios considerably less than one during the
rebuilding period - an indication of higher payments than receipts. Even
today, these powerful and solidly growing economies still have ratios below
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Table 5.4. Technology balance of payments ratio (receipts/payments) for
selected countries and the USSR, 1985-1990.
Austria
West Germany
Italy
Japan
Spain
UK
USA
USSR
1985 1986 1987
0.23 0.21 0.21
0.51 0.83 0.82
0.26 0.31 0.38
0.80 0.86 0.76
0.25 0.24 0.18
1.13 0.95 0.92
6.73 6.83 6.65
0.99a 1.01 1.37
1988
0.25
0.84
0.54
0.79
0.13
0.92
5.29
1.14
1989
0.30
0.84
0.50
0.99
0.18
n.a.
5.26
1.10
1990
n.a.
n.a.
0.58
n.a.
0.18
n.a.
5.78
2.40
QAverage for 1981-1985.
Sources: Compiled from GECD (1991a, p. 58) and Kiselev and Voskoboy (1991, p. 2).
one (refer to Table 5.4). Newly growing economies like Austria and Spain
also register far greater technology payments than technology receipts. Italy,
considered a very successful but late starter nation, has recorded ratios sub-
stantially below one as well. The United States, which has seen its techno-
logical superiority significantly eroding since WWII and its growth notably
slowing, possessed and continues to maintain one of the highest positive
technology balance of payments ratios. Prior to 1985, the UK ratio had also
traditionally been substantially over one. The high ratios for the USSR may
be an indication that the Soviets were neglecting the development of domes-
tic technology in favor of technology for export to procure hard currency.
However, despite the relatively high-technology balance of payments ra-
tio, the absolute revenue from sale of licenses was fairly low in the USSR -
between one-third and one-half of most of the larger Western nations listed
in Table 5.4, and as much as 25 times less than in the USA (Kiselev and
Voskoboy, 1991, p. 3). Although the trade in technology was done at world
market prices within the CMEA, the sales of Soviet licenses to this area
(which made up 60% of total sales) brought little income indicating that
the absolute number of licenses sold was also not overly high. Only 20% of
the licenses were sold to developing market economies. The denominator of
the ratio, the payments for foreign licenses by the Soviet Union, was tradi-
tionally small and sharply decreased in the 1980s. Even early in the decade
the giant USSR was spending about one-quarter of that spent by the larger
market economies and seven times less than Japan.
Until the 1980s, when foreign policies became somewhat more lax on
both sides of the then still existing Iron Curtain, Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union had not substantially participated in the international science
or technology community to an extent that would have reflected this region's
Research and Development Management 157
potential. In fact, some experts argue that Western policies on technology
and trade controls have frequently been based more on national political and
economic considerations than on scientific assessments of the importance of
technology transfer in the East-West economic, technological, and military
balance (Bertsch, 1986, p. 115). The potential deleterious effects on the
global development of technology and the associated potential improvements
in living standards have also generally fallen on deaf ears.
Since the advent of changing policies in these nations dominated by
Soviet-style socialism, questions have been raised with respect to the ul-
timate impacts on the technology development and associated economic
growth of the countries involved, their S&T relationships with the advanced
industrial nations in the West, and the effects on the global scientific, tech-
nological, and economic processes. One might expect a sudden boost in the
internationalization of S&T, on the whole, and in the level and quality, in
particular.
5.2.1 Technology agreements
Intergovernmental agreements on scientific and technical cooperation have
always been an important official form of technology transfer, even between
the West and the Soviet Union. With the ending of World War II came
also the end of the troubled wartime alliance between the West (mainly
the United States) and the USSR and, unfortunately, the beginning of the
prolonged Cold War period which was to last more than four decades.
During this 40-year period, the industrialized Western countries (led by
a determined US government, followed by more reluctant Western European
allies) forged restrictive policies to deny the Soviet Union and the Eastern
European states the benefits of trade and technological relations with the
West (Bertsch 1986, p. 128). The limitations imposed by the Coordinating
Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), established in 1949
and 1950, were to place an embargo on exports, including technology, that
might have contributed to either military or civilian economic performance.
The limitations took the form of exceptionally high tariffs, discouragement of
credits, and restriction of trade and technology transfer facilities and mech-
anisms. The notion was to foil the root of the S&T system as well as the
products. In many ways COCOM achieved its goals; for example, scientific
cooperation like countless other activities in the USSR were, until recently,
frequently paralyzed by the continued reliance on antiquated communica-
tions networks.
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Table 5.5. Soviet scientific and technical cooperative agreements with se-
lected Western nations, in the 1970s.
With the United States Year With other nations Year
Science and technology 1972
Environmental protection 1972
Medical science and public health 1972
Space 1972
Agriculture 1973
World oceans 1973
Transportation 1973
Atomic energy 1973
Artificial heart R&D 1974
Energy 1974
Housing and other construction 1974
Source: Derived from Bertsch (1986, p. 120).
France
United Kingdom
West Germany
Italy
Sweden
Japan
Canada
Australia
Finland
1966, 1973
1974
1973, 1978
1974
1970
1973
1971
1975
1974, 1975, 1977
Trade and exchange in research, science, and technology became a com-
ponent of Western strategic policy. Led by the United States, Western demo-
cratic nations thought they would be able to influence (or rather make more
acceptable to them) Soviet foreign policy by following a more positive linkage
approach. These policies began in the Kennedy administration, expanded
during the Nixon years, and were very prevalent during President Carter's
term in office (Bertsch, 1986, p. 129). In fact, during his term, President
Nixon actually terminated the White House science and technology advisory
structure and transferred its responsibilities to the director of the National
Science Foundation (Beckler, 1988, p. 31). Before the US congress reinstated
the S&T advisory function in the executive office of the president in 1976,
a surge of US/Soviet technology transfer agreements were made under the
auspices of the NSB (refer to Table 5.5). A total of eleven intergovernmental
agreements in less than three years. This gave evidence of the void that had
been left by years of isolation from the international S&T community and
the backed-up demand or global thirst for S&T exchange from both sides of
the Iron Curtain.
Unfortunately, the Soviets were not always keen to utilize Western tech-
nology advances. Strong anti-import lobbies in the Soviet Union, par-
ticularly from the scientific community, impeded potentially more rapid
progress, especially in times when and in fields where scientific innovation
and technological change were accelerating the fastest.[15] During the Brezh-
nev decades, scientific research, mostly in computers, scientific equipment
and instruments, telecommunications, and robotics, was seriously neglected
(Glenny, 1986, p. 21). This proved to be a crucial error in policy because it
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occurred during a time when the Soviet Union still had relatively free access
to buy technology from the West. The combination of this ignorance and the
subsequent wide-ranging controls on technology transfer as a result of the
COCOM agreement between the United States and its allies severed Soviet
possibilities of keeping up with global technological leadership (at least in
the civilian sector).
In spite of the limitations of COCOM on the high-technology goods,
more simple products such as industrial technology, machines, and supplies
were relatively free of limitations. In part, this may to some extent explain
the Soviet strong expansion in these areas in the postwar period. Thus,
it becomes clear that the COCOM directly or indirectly influenced the de-
velopment of Soviet high-technology products and processes. An additional
explanation lies in the inability of the Soviet Union and its Eastern neighbors
to progress along the path of technology transfer evolution due to COCOM.
The Soviets could not reach the optimal level of traditional trade in which
technology is supplied entirely from the innovator and given directly to the
recipient and, thus, could not move to the subsequent level of technology
transfer: namely, jointly developed and pooled technology.
However, the power of COCOM pressure was inconsistent for two rea-
sons: first, the more lenient Western European attitudes; and second, the
results of Soviet/American foreign policy. The Europeans were very hesi-
tant with respect to most of the US initiatives. Table 5.5 reveals that the
Western European nations were active early in establishing scientific and
technical cooperation based on intergovernmental agreements. These na-
tions were also eager to renew existing agreements and saw the level of their
S&T collaborative efforts only sporadically complicated or influenced by US
insistence.
American initiatives based on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980),
Soviet complicity in the imposition of martial law in Poland (1982), and the
Soviet shooting down of the KAL airliner (1983) severely harmed S&T ties
between the two nations specifically and with the West as a whole. Yet,
this was precisely the time when the industrialized world was witnessing
unprecedented rates of technological advance which were the cornerstones
for improved economic growth and development. In response to the Polish
incident, three crucial areas of S&T cooperation were terminated between
the two superpowers; the agreements in space, energy, and science and tech-
nology were allowed to lapse. These had been active for 10, 10, and 8 years
respectively (see Table 5.5). The KAL incident led to the US cancellation of
renewal of the 1973 transport agreement. The resulting effects of continual
revisions of the COCOM restricted products list had many Soviet-Western
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Table 5.6. Scientific and technical coordinating centers in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, 1971-1982.
1971
Bulgaria n.a.
Czechoslovakia 4
Hungary n.a.
Poland 2
Romania n.a.
USSR 11
Source: Adapted from Sobel! (1986, p. 152).
1975
2
6
2
5
3
25
1982
2
5
5
5
5
37
collaborations running into trouble when Western scientists were forbidden
to take scientific instruments to the USSR.
After discussing the difficulties faced by the Soviet Union and other
Eastern European countries in their attempts to establish cooperative re-
lationships in S&T with the industrialized West, the question arises with
whom they did have links with respect to international research and tech-
nology. The answer is not difficult or unexpected: these nations were their
own best partners. Soviet-style research and development management and
technology transfer spread with their economic dominance in the Eastern
bloc. The extension of intra-CMEA S&T cooperation became a necessity
and was in effect in response to the exclusion of these nations from much of
the Western advancement in many important fields.
The central coordination mechanism of many CMEA research and devel-
opment activities was initiated quite early by the USSR. By 1966, so-called
coordination plans for research had been instituted. Subsequently, between
1966 and 1970,246 coordination plans were recorded, covering 3,000 projects
of special importance, and representing 40% or the total budget for research
(Poznanski, 1987, p. 13).
Table 5.6 illustrates two important aspects of intra-CMEA S&T coop-
eration. The Soviet Union completely dominated not only the activities
themselves, but also the actual coordination. Although the degree of disper-
sion throughout the Eastern European countries increased during the 1970s
and 1980s, the USSR was home to 65%, 58%, and 63% of the S&T coor-
dinating centers in 1971, 1975, and 1982 respectively (not including East
Germany). In addition, the figures give evidence of a perceived and tangible
increase in Western S&T embargoes to the USSR during and after the period
shown in the table. This growth in West-East techno-economic hostility and
the generally accelerating trends in the level of global technological develop-
ment were catalysts for the intensification of intra-CMEA S&T relationships,
agreements, and establishment of coordinating facilities. Of course, it was
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based on the same ill-fated, biased, anti-competitive, and noninternational
centrally planned mechanisms as the economies in these nations.
The extension of the Soviet management style representative of the
planned economy to CMEA S&T collaboration resulted in the development
of more tedious and awkward national and international bureaucratic con-
trol. The S&T cooperation within the CMEA framework was based on
negotiations and agreements at four levels: coordination of the five-year and
annual plans at the national state-planning commission level, cooperation of
national branch ministries arranged by CMEA standing commissions, coor-
dination of S&T activities by a special subcommittee of the executive com-
mittee, and bilateral and multilateral agreements and payment settlements
(Chiang, 1990, p. 23). The underlying principles of the intra-CMEA, Soviet-
dominated S&T cooperation essentially eliminated the market for research
and technology. The unique identities and characteristics of the smaller, and
historically very productive, Eastern European S&T systems were giving way
to a uniform, uninspired, and unimaginative international but isolated one.
Not surprisingly, some of the smaller CMEA members began to resent the
pro-Soviet bias, which may affect future cooperation.
The CMEA science and technology community and its output was di-
rected as a single centrally planned unit, only with even more bureaucracy.
The consequence was a further reduction of diversity in national R&D pro-
grams, and the elimination of any remaining hints of comparative advantages
and competition. Most of the required elements for economic growth and
development based on improving performance criteria had been eliminated.
Therefore, numerous specialists referred to the process of S&T cooperation
within the CMEA not as transfer of technology, but as transfer of inefficiency.
The globalization of R&D activities and S&T relationships have revealed
certain aspects of national systems that were previously concealed. In some
cases, nations protested that government interests caused some segments
of scientific and industrial communities to be unbalanced to the benefit of
one nation or another. The same internationalization that facilitated such
disclosures in the West, simultaneously provided a means for solving the dis-
satisfaction associated with them. A case in point was the friction regard-
ing fairness and balance in S&T relationships between the American and
Japanese scientific and industrial communities. An agreement established
areas of national importance in which both countries had complementary
capacities; it called for both governments to provide comparable access to
their government-sponsored or government-supported research facilities and
scientific infrastructure, and set forth provisions for adequate protection of
intellectual property and the distribution of related rights arising from col-
laborative activities (OECD, 1992, p. 36).
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In addition, many cooperative agreements were the consequence of col-
laboration between firms that were both dominant domestically and active
in the international market. Evidence from recent studies has revealed that
the majority of collaborative activities has taken place between companies at
home in Western developed market economies - that is, the United States,
Japan, and Western Europe (Chesnais, 1988; Mytelka, 1990; and Hagedoorn
and Schakenraad, 1991). These interfirm agreements and alliances have in
many instances already led to more concentrated world market structures
and tended to increase global market dependence. The result has been the
collective establishment of entry barriers and other attempts to limit ac-
cess to key technologies for potential newcomers. This again emphasizes the
need to be a participant in the global economy and supports the crucial ar-
gument against isolation. After so many years of self-reliance, the Eastern
bloc countries including their dominant force, the Soviet Union, were faced
with increasing exogenous difficulties impeding participation in various sec-
tors of the global economy and influencing their ability to be internationally
competitive.
5.2.2 Transfer of technology
Technology transfer has been defined as "the process whereby the produc-
tivity of resources of one country can be increased by the transmission from
other countries of information or of products and processes embodying that
information" (Hanson, 1981, p. 14).
The items of transfers include products, information, processes, research,
and know-how. The means of transfer between Western nations have con-
ventionally been the trade of goods embodying technologies, communication,
exchange of experts, student exchange, and other bilateral or multilateral
activities. Due to the restrictions on transfers to the USSR and other Com-
munist countries, additional methods of transfer such as reverse engineering,
technological and industrial espionage, and others became more popular for
the Easterners.
Western industrialized countries have often made substantial concealed
and visible efforts in the past to control and restrict such transfer to the
Soviet Union.[16] Usually as a result of American pressure based on ei-
ther military or economic reasons, several technologically leading Western
nations erected trade and exchange embargoes on R&D and scientifically
or technologically advanced products to the Soviets. However, the USSR
overcame multiple international barriers in order to gain access to a very
minimal amount of technology originating in the West since the 1940s, par-
ticularly given the size of the Soviet economy. In addition, the impact of
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these technologies was limited due to Soviet difficulties in assimilating and
diffusing advanced technologies that essentially inhibited the realization of
expected benefits. As a consequence, Soviet scientific and technological ad-
vance and industrial growth were largely achieved independently of Western
technologies.
Over the years, West-East technology transfers have taken on a multi-
tude of forms, ranging from overt to covert. While the former type included
commercial, official, and legal transfers that were largely part of the inter-
national trade function, the latter form was usually much more difficult to
identify and measure. It is impossible to review in complete detail all the
West-East technology transfer relationships, but an examination of a num-
ber of selected factors gives a view of the situation which existed in this
sector.
International trade in engineering goods provides a good example of the
level of integration of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the global
transfer of technology. Not only have the engineering industries occupied a
major place in the manufacturing sectors of the industrialized nations of both
West and East, but the share of engineering goods in total trade of man-
ufactured products has increased rather steadily over the last two decades
in these regions. The rate of growth has been higher only for the newly in-
dustrializing countries. Products of the engineering industries ranged from
the most simple to the most technologically advanced - acting as an ideal
medium to transfer all sorts of scientific and technological innovations. In-
deed, all investment goods, which have been carriers of technical progress,
originated in the engineering industries, as did consumer goods such as wash-
ing machines, refrigerators, color television sets, watches, and countless oth-
ers (ECE, 1989, pp. 7-12).
The statistics in Table 5.7 reveal that the directives of the Soviet-style
planned economy caused the bulk of Soviet and Eastern European trade to
take place within the boundaries of the CMEA. In this protected market,
the Soviet-style planned economic system determined the trade linkages for
supply-oriented production irrespective of true consumer demand and void
of any competitive aspirations. The Soviet Union stood out as the single
most important trading partner of all of Eastern Europe distributing almost
50% of its exports in engineering products there in 1987. Eastern Europe
sent a grand total of no less than 53.2% of its engineering goods exports to
the competition-free world of the secure Soviet market. The USSR exported
only 6.7% of their engineering goods to developed market economies in 1987;
in the same year all of Eastern Europe exported only 7.6% of these goods
to developed economies. This was not a special year, just an example of a
situation that had already existed for decades.
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Table 5.7. Origin and destination of engineering goods exports, 1987 (per-
centage shares of world total).
Destination
Western United Eastern Soviet Asian
Exporter EC Europe States Japan Europe Union NICs
EC 47.4 66.2 10.9 1.4 1.2 0.9 2.1
Western Europe 47.4 65.9 10,6 1.4 1.5 1.5 2.2
United States 23.1 28.1 n.a. 6.8 0.1 0.1 8.0
Japan 16.7 21.7 40.8 n.a. 0.3 0.5 14.0
Eastern Europe 3.9 7.0 0.4 n.a. 29.6 53.2 0.1
Soviet Union 3.0 6.5 0.1 0.1 49.3 n.a. 0.1
Asian NICs 14.8 18.1 45.4 5.6 0.1 n.a. 8.5
Source: Derived from ECE (1989, pp. 7-9).
Not only were Soviet and Eastern European technologically advanced
goods not going abroad to challenge the products of market economies in
their markets, but the Western engineering exports could hardly transfer
technology to Eastern Europe or stimulate high-quality production there
because they barely penetrated the Iron Curtain.[17] Only 1.5% of West-
ern Europe's engineering goods exports went to the Soviet Union in 1987
(the same amount went to Eastern Europe). Although Soviet trade with
the somewhat closer EFTA members was at 3.3% of all their exports, it was
merely 0.1% and 0.5% of US and Japanese engineering goods exports respec-
tively, and but 1% of all those from developed market economies. The trade
intensity for engineering goods trade was generally an order of magnitude
higher between the USSR and the Eastern European countries than between
any two developed market economies (ECE, 1989, pp. 7-12).
This illustrates conclusively that the Soviet Union and the rest of East-
ern Europe were essentially completely isolated from the benefits of the rapid
advances in scientific and technological development that had been achieved
under competitive conditions characteristic of open market economies. Par-
ticularly, as the pace of technological change was picking up in the 1970s, and
even more dramatically in the 1980s, improved technology transfer via trade
in technologically advanced goods would have contributed much required
impetus to Soviet R&D and subsequent technological progress, a driving
factor of economic growth and development. Another negative aspect of
this trade imbalance was the limitations to the international diffusion of So-
viet innovations, depriving the global S&T community as well as all possible
consumers.
The results of a US Department of Commerce study of the volume of
Western high-technology goods imported into the Soviet Union and Eastern
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Europe in the 1970s and early 1980s corroborate the ECE findings and con-
firm the conclusions drawn above.[18] Both the share and absolute amount
of Western high-technology exports destined for Communist countries were
extremely low and actually falling at an annual rate of -1.23% during the
period. In fact, one outcome of the study indicates that the amount of
technology transferred to the Soviet Union and other Communist countries
through commercial sales have been minor, even when compared with the
shares of the industrialized West's high-technology exports to the rest of the
world.
In addition to the inadequate international technology transfer, the
USSR suffered for decades from insufficient internal technology transfer. The
Soviet-style planned economic system lacked the fundamental mechanisms
to convert countless potentially useful innovations into actual products. Ad-
ministrative management and an anti-innovation incentive structure led to
a separation of science and production, simultaneously acting as a barrier to
diffusion. Technology transfer was thought of less in the sense of importing
goods embodying various technological standards, but more as a function
to transfer research, development, innovation, and technical advance from
where it was produced, in the R&D sector, to where it should have been uti-
lized, the production sector. Ministries and their research institutes used the
system to basically balk the acceptance of technology from other ministries.
Given the increasingly interdisciplinary nature of so much of the R&D and
the narrow specialized nature of the Soviet ministerial structure, the question
of interministerial technology transfer took on a whole new meaning.[19]
This predicament was recognized by the Soviet leadership from time to
time; typically when an event called attention to a technological lag behind
the leading capitalist countries. Thus, considerable emphasis was placed
on better integrating the R&D sector and industry by Soviet planners. A
perceived remedy was seen in the establishment of science and production
associations (about 500 in 1987), scientific and industrial amalgamations in
industry (387 in 1987, almost four times more than in 1973), and intersectoral
scientific and technical complexes (23 in 1987).[20] In light of the existing
Soviet technological development, these unions usually did little more than
increase an already overly burdensome bureaucracy.
So, the lack of both upstream and downstream international and internal
links to the Soviet R&D sector, in particular, and to the S&T community,
on the whole, influenced the technical level of production and consequently
the quality of output. Table 5.8 draws a comparison of the technological
production levels in six selected product groups between the Soviet Union
and other selected industrialized countries. In each case, the Soviet Union
lagged considerably behind the market economies with respect to the rate
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and period of diffusion of either the more advanced product or process tech-
nologies.
The statistics also reveal that the Soviet-style of planning economic
growth and development hindered the country from catching up in various
fields of production where it was necessary to assimilate modern technolo-
gies in favor of those tending toward obsolescence. Most market economies
have proved this ability, though to differing degrees. Even something as con-
troversial as nuclear power, where expansion in Western nations was often
substantially limited due to public outcries, provided a far greater share of
electricity output in the market economies than in the Soviet Union.[21]
Examples of other technologies used in industry shown in Table 5.8 re-
veal that market economies can be technological laggards also (mainly due
to adjustments on the supply and demand side, and in the institutional set-
up), but not for long. Thus, while France and Britain were behind other
Western industrialized nations in the method of steel production, turning
out only 40% and 52% using the electric and basic oxygen process in 1970,
Britain had converted completely to this method by 1980, and France by
1985. The USSR was not very far behind the British and the French in
1970, but as late as 1989 it was still only producing 47% of their steel using
the new technology.
A study of the speed of diffusion of 23 selected technologies in the Soviet
Union between 1971 and 1987 indicates a drastic slowdown in the dissemina-
tion of these technologies. The speed of diffusion fell rapidly from 1.8% per
year between 1971 and 1975 to 1.4% between 1976 and 1980, 0.8% between
1981 and 1985, and finally to as low as a mere 0.3% between 1986 and 1987
(Kontorovich, 1992, p. 217).
The economic and administrative ties were just not facilitating the nec-
essary technology transfer between institutions and economic sectors within
the USSR. At times, foreigners who had gained access to Soviet innovations
developed them faster and better than was the case back in the USSR, the
country of origin. The following examples have frequently been cited in the
literature:
• Abel Aganbegyan, a renowned Soviet economist and adviser to President
Gorbachev, toured a Japanese steel plant in 1987 and discovered that
they were using 26 Soviet patents under license. These technologies, he
indicated, were not in use in the USSR (Crawford, 1986, p. 1,644).
• Another example is directly associated with research and development
rather than the use of resulting technologies. Plasma experimentations
have been conducted at Princeton, USA, using the TOKaMAK; this is
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Table 5.8. Development of the technological level of various products in
the USSR and selected industrialized nations, 1970-1989.
1970 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Percentage of total electricity produced by nuclear power plants
USSR 0.5 5.6 10.8 10.1 11.2
USA 1.3 10.8 15.1 16.1 17
UK 10.4 13.1 20.5 19.5 17
Japan 1.3 14.3 22.8 24.9 26
Germanya 2.5 12.2 31.5 29.9 32
France 3.9 23.7 65.3 70.1 70
12.6
19
22
24
35
70
12.3
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
95
72
84
87
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
71
83
89
95
79
92
89
70
85
90
95
77
92
95
Percentage of steel produced by electric and basic oxygen processes in total steel output
USSR 26 39 44 46 47 47 47
USA 63 88 93 96 97 95 95
UK 52 100 100 100 100 100 100
Japan 96 100 100 100 100 100 100
Italy 72 98 100 100 100 100 100
Germanya 66 93 100 100 100 100 100
France 40 98 100 100 100 100 100
Percentage of steel produced by machines for continuous billet forging in total steel output
USSR n.a. 11 14 15 16 17 17
USA n.a. 20 44 54 59 60 61
UK n.a. 27 55 61 65 70 n.a.
Japan n.a. 59 91 93 93 93 n.a.
Italy n.a. 50 79 84 90 94 n.a.
Germanya n.a. 46 80 85 88 89 89
France n.a. 41 81 90 93 94 n.a.
Percentage of finished rolled steel in total steel output
USSR 70 70 70 70
USA 67 73 81 85
UK 78 89 82 91
Japan 81 91 95 95
Italy 85 74 74 75
Germanya 80 85 89 91
France 79 91 92 93
Percentage of thermoplastic output in total output of synthetic resins and plastics
USSR n.a. 47 55 55 56 55 56
USA 70 70 70 72 70 71 70
UK 73 72 72 70 70 70 70
Japan 77 78 82 82 82 83 84
Italy 79 86 85 86 85 85 83
Germanya 65 65 65 65 65 65 64
France 71 80 86 85 85 85 85
Percentage of cement clinker produced by dry method in total cement output
USSR 14 14 14 15 16 17 17
USA 40 42 56 56 58 56 59
Japan 72 78 78 78 78 78 78
Germanya 87 90 90 90 90 90 90
aGermany refers only to West Germany.
n.a. = not available.
Source: Compiled from GOSKOMSTAT (1989 and 1990).
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a Soviet concept, but the American work using the machine is ahead of
Soviet research conducted with the machine (Sinclair, 1987, p. xiv).
Deficient intranational and international transfer of Soviet research and
technology on both the input and output (product) sides was a partial cause
of increasingly deteriorating quality aspects in the 1970s and even more
in the 1980s. In the 1988 GOSKOMSTAT statistical review of the Soviet
economy this is substantiated by data and the following statement (p. 51):
"technological standards and the quality of output of many articles remain
low." The evidence indicates that a large and increasing number of consumer
goods were subject to repairs before the expiration of the guaranteed service
period in the 1980s. The sums of money required to eradicate the defects
became exorbitant, reaching almost 30% of the original production costs for
some goods.
Access to foreign scientific and technological literature has, in the past,
been another very common means for technology transfer, though predom-
inantly in the West. As described earlier in this chapter, Soviet integration
in the international publication market for S&T articles, books, and journals
was far too inadequate to substantially influence and aid technology trans-
fer. Additionally, the Soviet R&D and industrial sectors did not enjoy free
access to Western publications for political and economic reasons.
The Soviet scientific apparatus developed its own methods for tapping
information concerning the advances in research and development published
in Western literature. The review of Western scientific and engineering pub-
lications was an important means of research and technology transfer. The
main actor specifically designated with the responsibility for managing flows
of scientific and technical documents was the All- Union Insti tute of Science
and Technical Information (VINITI), also referred to as the All- Union Data
Institute. In the late 1980s, this organization employed over 26,000 people,
including 2,300 senior science writers and 2,000 translators. Its handling ca-
pacity was impressive; over 1.2 million articles and 38,000 scientific journals
were fed into the reference system each year (Semeria, 1987, p. 145).
Yet, in the 1970s, the USSR S&T community received only about half of
the scientific and technical books and journals published in foreign countries
with substantial R&D establishments, a trend that did not change well into
the 1980s (Parrott, 1987, p. 133). Limited availability and freedom to use
hard currency impeded the acquisition of foreign publications, so much so
that the academy had to reduce the total number of subscriptions by 5% in
the 1970s. Indeed, until the late 1980s, members of the Soviet Academy of
Sciences were obliged to obtain permission from its president to subscribe
to a foreign journal whose hard currency cost exceeded an established limit.
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As of 1974, the USSR was to adhere to the International Copyright Con-
vention, officially disallowing VINITI to simply copy and distribute foreign
publications as had become standard practice in the past. As a result, only
about 1,750 foreign journals were subsequently available on microfiche to
researchers, scientists, engineers, and other scholars (Parrott, 1987, p. 134).
The delays in administering and completing the conversion of foreign doc-
uments caused the citations of foreign sources in Soviet research journals
often to be many years older than the domestic sources in a wide variety of
fields.
Two final notes on the transfer of technology to and in the Soviet Union
refer to the hard currency bottleneck which plagued the S&T sector for
decades and the apparently positive increase in non-state R&D activities.
Under the conditions imposed by Soviet politics, enterprises were tradi-
tionally dependent on the state to acquire foreign technology for them. A
major barrier was the extremely strict control over foreign exchange; Soviet
enterprises essentially had no hard currency at their disposal to buy high
technology from the West until 1985. The inefficiency and slow demise of
the system was a product of the system itself, of its irrational segregation
of decision makers from producers. In addition, those responsible for cen-
tral payments for imported technology, really had no responsibilities for how
and if the imports were used. The planning agency formulated directives
on, often purposely distorted, information biased in favor of the enterprises
provided by the enterprises. However, this backfired on the enterprises when
the central agency bought technology which appeared to fulfill the plan on
paper, but was of little or no use to the enterprise. The central agency
bought foreign technology because it had control over the hard currency al-
located for this purpose. The entire process finally backfired on the whole
Soviet-style planned economy in the sense that the international technology
transfer which was centrally managed did not significantly reduce the So-
viet technological lag, and frequently actually made the existing system and
infrastructure malfunction.
Since the enactment of the 1987 State Enterprise Law, the growth
of R&D cooperatives and other organizations outside the state sector has
looked like a promising boost to the sagging R&D output.[22] However, the
great majority of these institutions seems to be engaged primarily in con-
sulting or performing transfer of technology rather than in the creation of
new knowledge (Kontorovich, 1992, p. 232).
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5.2.3 Joint ventures and TNCs in technology transfer
Joint ventures (JVs), as a form of business operation, have become a com-
mon method of interfirm cooperation to facilitate various activities, includ-
ing the transfer of technology, for the most part in Western industrialized
nations. Until the late 1980s, this type of commercial enterprise had little
if any influence on economic activity involving advances in know-how and
diffusion of R&D results. However, though their absolute impact remained
small, it increased dramatically throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union as perestroika progressed in the late 1980s (refer to Figure 5.4). Com-
bined with the increasing importance of the internationalization of R&D, the
globalization of technological development, and the expanding influences of
transnational corporations, it can be anticipated that JVs will play an in-
creasingly important role in the techno-economic evolution of the USSR and
Eastern Europe. Therefore, it is worthwhile to mention a few words about
East-West JVs as a medium for technology transfer.
Over the last 30 years, joint ventures in Western countries incorporating
R&D operations have been identified as an indicator for the growing trend
toward strategic alliances by companies on the international scale. Beginning
in the 1970s, there was notably rapid growth in joint ventures involving R&D
activities (OECD, 1991b, p. 119).
Joint ventures with the participation of foreign companies became a
new institutional form, instrument, and source of funds for research and
development in general in the USSR, and for the evolution, production,
and diffusion of specific advanced forms of equipment and technologies. In
the late 1980s when new laws increased the possibilities of joint ventures
with Western partners, the establishment of this category of international
cooperation on a large scale was novel in the Soviet Union.[23] The past had
seen isolated instances of cooperation with Western countries and companies
before, but these were the exception rather than the rule. In actual fact, the
operation of mutual business activities between Soviet and Western (non-
Communist) partners was not permitted for more than half a century before
1986.
The rapid growth in the number of JVs depicted by Figure 5.4 revealed
that the latent potential in this previously absent institutional niche was
very voluminous. While the beginning was quite meager with only 19 JVs
established in 1987, the subsequent explosion saw an excess of 3,000 estab-
lished by June 1991 - an annual growth rate of almost 255%. Since January
1987, JVs have been the main form of inward foreign direct investment.
A major motive behind the increasing number of joint ventures was their
ability to facilitate the acquisition or transfer of sophisticated technologies
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Figure 5.4. Number of joint ventures in the Soviet Union, 1987-1991.
and subsequent implementation into products and processes. Additional ad-
vantages included the utilization of management experience and material
and financial resources for the development of quality science-intensive pro-
duction in the USSR. However, out of the 1,274 joint ventures registered
in the Soviet Union as of 1 January 1990, only 307 were actually opera-
tional (Gokhberg and Mindely, 1991, p. 26). By mid-1990, 1,754 had been
registered, of which 541 were active (IMF et aI., 1991, p. 76). While the
vast majority of JVs was set up with partners based in OECD countries
(72%), CMEA countries were the home of 11% of the partners, and 7% of
the partners were from developing countries.
Less than 2% of the total number, but over 7% of those that were opera-
tional, engaged in R&D. Uncertainty regarding long-term economic stability
and appropriability of returns caused many foreign investors to shy away
from long-term investments. R&D has typically been in areas in which it
is very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve an immediate return on the
initial investment. Germany, Finland, and the USA have led in the absolute
number of partnerships, and Germany and Italy have had top ranking with
respect to the size of total initial capital investment. The average size of
initial contribution per investment by a foreign partner has decreased from
2.4 million rubles in 1987 to less than 1 million rubles in 1989 (Gokhberg
and Mindely, 1991, p. 26).
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By 1990 joint ventures were already making an impact on the Soviet
economy. Almost 67,000 persons were employed in JVs, of which more than
98% were Soviet citizens (IMF et at., 1991, p. 78). The JVs began at-
tracting highly qualified personnel because they were paying at least 300%
of the average monthly wage at the time. Finally, the new business unions
were following the theories regarding their activities influencing international
technology transfer. The vast majority of JV imports (86%) was made up
of machinery and equipment, in particular computer technology.
Nevertheless, joint ventures have not achieved the extent of impact re-
flected by their sheer numbers due to an inbred ideological misconception
about the purpose of a joint venture in Eastern European socialist thinking.
This misinterpretation has led to the lowly ratio of JVs active in R&D and
is pervasive throughout the Soviet-style planned management characteristic
of economic activities carried out in the CMEA for generations. In Eastern
Europe and the USSR, JVs were first seen as a secure and less bureaucratic
trading link, in which technical equipment delivered by a Western partner
was exchanged for Eastern goods, generating some very scarce hard currency
in the process (Hentze and Wiechers, 1991, p. 227). The Western partner
is usually lured by the possibility of gaining access to large new markets
particularly to government-controlled markets in the short or long term.
The absence of many goods which are taken for granted in the West have
made JVs in Eastern European countries attractive because they can prolong
the life of a product or technology that has reached saturation (maximum
potential diffusion) in Western markets. Such ventures will do more than
supply the new foreign market. Eventually, after mastering the production
process and satisfying domestic needs, the excess products could be exported
to earn much needed hard currencies. The Japanese system of relocating
aging but still important production of high-technology goods to economic
satellites has given the increasing role of JVs in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe new relevance. In addition, high initial costs of R&D were usually
carried by the foreign partner, leaving the domestic partner the opportunity
for further modifications with relatively low incremental R&D costs. The
main costs of the Eastern European partner would be in engaging in R&D
that would facilitate assimilation of R&D and technology from the foreign
partner.
Until 1988, Soviet central government agencies, primarily the USSR
State Committee for Science and Technology, were in charge of obtaining
or selling licenses for technologies utilized or produced domestically. Previ-
ously, no enterprise could directly sign an agreement with a foreign partner
regarding technology transfer. Each agreement was negotiated, organized,
and finally allocated to enterprises by state bureaucrats, not scientists or
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managers. After 1988 enterprises were permitted to make such agreements,
but only with the approval of the State Committee. The majority was ap-
proved, notwithstanding a long administrative application process.
With the increasing freedom of enterprises after 1987, a more stabilized
general economic and political environment have made technology transfer
at the firm level playa more significant role in the future for the region.
Joint ventures have been only one such form. As the previous political and
ideological borders and barriers break down, large foreign corporations could
begin to have an impact on the transfer of technology and R&D facilities to
the emerging market economies of Eastern Europe.
The great advantage of a transnational corporation is that simply by
locating some particular operation abroad it becomes capable of transferring
technology. However, the mere existence of a foreign-controlled activity may
not be enough to generate active transfer of R&D, know-how, techniques,
skills, or other elements. With respect to the benefits to the host economy,
the critical factor is the extent to which the technology is made available
to potential users outside the firm either directly, through linkages with
indigenous firms, or indirectly via the "demonstration effect" (Dicken, 1986,
p. 362). Caution with respect to the magnitude of the spillover of TNC
operations should be maintained.
On the one hand, a TNC can be very beneficial to the domestic S&T
community if it possesses assimilation potential and the TNC engages the in-
tellectual resources of the host country. However, TNCs have been known to
be protective in very new markets, keeping their knowledge and technology
for themselves and only distributing finished products. In some cases, the
TNC is sufficiently powerful to force the host nation to make considerable
concessions, further impeding the transfer of technology from the foreign-
controlled operation to the domestic market. Such concessions also prevent
the natural evolution of an economy and the market mechanism. Recent ex-
amples of this have been the large international Western car manufacturers
investing in the newly opening Eastern European economies. In the Third
World, TNCs have been commended for transferring the best in production
technology but simultaneously criticized for generally not transferring the ca-
pability to generate new technologies to the affiliates. The big internationals
have been depicted as transferring know-how (production engineering) and
not know-why, that is, basic design and research and development (Lall,
1984, p. 10).
The Soviet Union presents a different case than most less developed
countries due to its enormous stock of scientists and engineers, elaborate
S&T organization, and strong tradition in developing domestic R&D. There-
fore, TNCs could benefit at least as much from tapping the host country's
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intellectual resources as the USSR could benefit from the establishment of
foreign R&D laboratories within its borders. Foreign companies would bring
with them the crucial elements of a market system, especially those most
needed in the USSR such as competition, global perspectives, and require-
ments for high quality and efficiency.
Notes
[1] Of course, those nations that cannot generate or attract enough investment
to make technological leaps forward may in effect fall further behind due to
the same internationalization process, subsequently increasing the gap between
rich and poor countries.
[2] Although the exchanges between Eastern European countries including the
Soviet Union were quite extensive, the similarities of their adopted Soviet-style
system, which was common to all, resulted in little variety and no real need
for any competition.
[3] The latest figures found for FDI (only inward) in the Soviet Union are only for
the Russian Federation after the collapse of the Union. In the last quarter of
1991 it was only about US$1 billion (The Economist, April 11, 1992, p. 69).
[4] There were also restrictions placed by the Americans on various foreigners to
enter the USA depending on their countries' specific political relation to the
USA at a point in time. US restrictions would intensify or ease depending on
the perceived threat.
[5] Dr. Yury Struchkov, for example, a Russian chemist from the Institute of
Organoelemental Compounds in Moscow, was named as the author of a total
of 948 scientific papers between 1981 and 1990 (The Economist, 1992, p. 87).
On average he was producing 1 every 3.9 days. Interestingly, half of his papers
have not been referred to once, not even by himself. His nearest competitor for
most publications in the same period was a Western scientist with 773 papers,
cited on average 21 times each.
[6] A study of the importance of contributions to world scientific literature con-
ducted in EC countries found that the largest number of citations were to
publications by researchers from two or more countries (for more details refer
to the study by Narin and Whitlow, 1990).
[7] Porter (1990) addresses this issue at length. He states that, by far, the most
important influence on innovation has come from the R&D efforts of firms
(p. 634). Firms themselves must apply technology to the needs of their in-
dustry, putting the principal emphasis on research in commercially relevant
technologies. Firms are typically also interested in speeding up the rate of
innovation rather than slowing diffusion.
[8] A transnational corporation is a firm which controls operations in more than
one country.
[9] The logic was simple: if company A did not challenge its competitors in, say,
the European market, then competitors would use profits in that market to
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finance their attacks on company A in its home market or the market where it
was strongest.
[10] For a very detailed discussion (based on survey and interview results) of is-
sues relating to both parent company perspectives on dispersed R&D and the
viewpoints of their foreign subsidiary laboratories performing this work refer
to Pearce and Singh (1992). Chapter 7 reviews the interactions between R&D
subsidiaries and host countries.
[11] Though not extensively involved in financing foreign R&D, some universities
in the USA were also renown for having very high R&D budgets; for example,
the research fund administered by the top-spending university (Johns Hopkins)
exceeded the total GERD of New Zealand, was 1.5 times greater than that of
Portugal, and almost twice that of Greece or Ireland.
[12] One direct method to achieve this was the acquisition of foreign firms which
had R&D laboratories (OECD, 1992, p. 84).
[13] A review of OECD and national statistics (i.e., from the NSB) indicates
that international industrial-academic R&D has recently been expanding more
rapidly. This trend had been present for some time, but became increasingly
common during the 1980s. A TNC's motives behind the establishment of R&D
facilities abroad in collaboration with resident academic institutions have gone
beyond the desire to have first rights to discoveries of new products, processes,
and trends of demand. The global strategy of these international firms requires
them to unite resident expertise in fields like basic research or others with the
TNC's particular style for technological development. Simultaneously, host
countries have traditionally had great interests in such international industry-
academic alliances in the hope for multiplicity of new growth sites or the es-
tablishment of science parks or technopoli or both.
[14] This section reviews the practical issues relating to the importance of foreign
technology and its application in the appropriate measure, particularly focusing
on the Soviet Union and the East-West relationships. It is not the intention of
this section to review the voluminous literature on this subject. For a critical
examination of the role of technology in current theories of international trade
and competitiveness refer to Dosi and Soete, 1991, pp. 91-118.
[15] The anti-import lobbies seem to have become a part of Soviet-style ideology.
It can be traced to all the leadership cliques throughout this century, whether
by free choice (personal conviction) or by necessity (due to isolation from and
restrictions by the West). Even under Gorbachev in the late 1980s, at the
27th Soviet Communist Party Congress, then Prime Minister Ryzhkov criti-
cized branch industry and science for excessive keenness to purchase products
from abroad that could have been manufactured at home and referred to an
"unrestrained chase after imported technology" (Kneen, 1989, p. 71).
[16] The Soviet Union did a great deal to combat this forced isolation and gain
access to or adapt foreign technology. There were no legal constraints such as
royalty, copyright, patent, or licensing arrangements to inhibit copying from
the West (Maddison, 1969, p. 130). However, the absence of these very mea-
sures may have also acted as a major disincentive for greater domestic S&T
productivity and progress.
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[17] Until the late 1980s, all exporting and importing of the Soviet Union was under
the joint direction of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations,
which oversaw 12 specialized All-Union Foreign Trade Organizations (FTOs),
and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which oversaw 30 FTOs, while GOSPLAN
was responsible for the foreign trade plan (IMF et al., 1991, p. 435). All
administrative bodies based their plans on supply-side objectives, with little
or very filtered input from the actual producers.
[18] This study is cited and described in detail in Bertsch (1986, pp. 117-120). A
few key points are reiterated here.
[19] The behavior of state enterprises contributed to the deterioration of the sit-
uation. Besides acting on ministerial directives, the enterprises were always
hedging against changes. So, in the 1980s, as the economic conditions became
ever more precarious, the enterprises were not implementing their cherished
new equipment (whether domestic or a rare foreign import) but stockpiling
them. Official statistics reveal stunning increases in enterprises' inventories of
technologically advanced engineering goods including automated manufactur-
ing systems, electrical equipment, machinery and equipment for the chemical
and food industries and power generation, etc. In addition, uncertainty regard-
ing the replacement of foreign capital assets caused them to be overutilized
far beyond their productive and efficient life, leading to a waste of valuable
resources, and way beyond the period these high-technology products are op-
erated in non-Communist countries (Goldman, 1987, p. 131).
[20] Official statistics from the State Committee of the USSR on Statistics
(GOSKOMSTAT, 1989).
[21] The Soviet-style command system was impervious to public opinion; that is,
if the public had sufficient accurate facts at its disposal to form an opinion,
which was rarely the case, it was generally not permitted to voice an opinion
contrary to the central directives.
[22] The growth of these institutions, their financing and performance of research
and development, and their employment of scientists and engineers are dis-
cussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
[23] The growth of JVs in European countries of the former CMEA including the
USSR has been tremendous. In the four months between June and Octo-
ber 1989 the number shot from 1,375 to 2,090 such operations (OECD, 1992,
p. 101). This is clear evidence of an extensive backed-up and unsatisfied
demand.
Chapter 6
The Burdens of Abundance:
R&D, Technological Change,
Resource Allocation, and
Productivity
This chapter attempts to reveal the extent of the ample supply of natural
and human resources at the disposal of Soviet planners. Upon reviewing the
evidence, it becomes plausible to visualize that these immense reserves of
inputs together with the stranglehold of the central planning system (CPS)
on the economy have influenced the technological requirements determined
by Communist policy to achieve economic growth. The management of
R&D was influenced in the same process, as it was intrinsic to the level of
technology demanded from above.
However, only minor improvements in the efficiency of resource utiliza-
tion could turn the entire situation around and secure enormous advances in
techno-economic growth and development in the former Soviet Union. De-
veloped market economies have been saturated with much higher levels of
technologization and growth has slowed as gains from increases in efficiency
have become more difficult to realize. Significantly smaller efforts toward ad-
vance could bring the regions in the former Soviet Union incrementally much
greater rewards than the same efforts would in the West. The potential is
there.
The issues discussed in this chapter are not solely relevant to the R&D
issue, though the purpose is to determine linkages and relationships. The
reader interested only in R&D may wish to skip this chapter. It addresses
the bearing of the central planning system and the bargaining, which was
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characteristic of the Soviet-style system, on R&D. The exposition also con-
centrates on how the organization influenced the management of R&D, the
incentives, motivation, and consequent productivity of researchers and sci-
entists. Basically, the chapter attempts to reveal the extent of the ample
supply of natural and human resources at the disposal of Soviet planners
and how these may actually have been burdens of abundance to a more
productive R&D sector.
Understanding the nature and logic of the policies characteristic of
Soviet-style central planning that governed the R&D sector of the USSR,
requires a perception of one of the greatest man-made paradoxes of this
century and perhaps beyond: namely, the crisis amid plenty in the Soviet
Union. In spite of being bequeathed with an abundant supply of mineral
and human resources, Communist Party politics successfully cultivated an
economic system in which shortages of outputs were common, and those
products produced were typically of low quality. Yet, probably, it was pre-
cisely the abundance that was the actual origin of the dilemma. Therefore,
the Soviet Union's good fortune may, in fact, have been the nation's ma-
jor misfortune, at least in the past. With today's experience, knowledge,
and rapidly democratizing political environment, measures could be intro-
duced to promote socioeconomic growth and development beyond that in
the saturating economies of the West.
Extensive-style economic growth in the USSR was frequently identified
as a natural product of the great size and endowments of the Soviet nation.
A typical postwar five-year plan prescribed basic application of funds and
capital investment to increase 1.5 times, fuel and raw materials extraction to
expand by 25% to 30%, and an additional 10 million to 11 million persons to
be recruited into the national economy (Aganbegyan, 1988, p. 7). Therefore,
the generous availability of relatively educated labor and valuable mineral
and energy resources largely determined the manner of economic growth
and development under the long years of Communist rule, particularly with
respect to industrial policy. Due to the thorough use of the supply-driven
planning mechanism, this policy subsequently influenced the policies and
plans for the upstream and downstream sectors of the economy.
The entire central planning system determined everything in the econ-
omy from the priorities of and the resources for research and development
of innovations, the needs for and objectives of scientific activities, and the
technologies used for production, to the prices and quantity of output of
all products produced and how and to whom these would be distributed.
Theoretically, Soviet-style central planning was really an incredible system.
The coordination and planning by a single central agency, GOSPLAN in
the USSR, could have facilitated the optimal allocation of resources and the
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maximum benefits to society as a whole. However, it did not. In effect, the
opposite took place - and society became poorer for it.
Misallocation of resources and static inefficiencies arose. The levels of
technology required to fulfill the quantity-oriented plans were not modified
and did not mature due to the absence of the need to be profit-making in a
market sense; costs and revenues were based on artificial prices. The enor-
mous supply of labor in the full-employment economy and the access to an
undervalued and seemingly bottomless pit of raw material resources negated
the demand for more advanced, efficiency-enhancing, and input-saving tech-
nologies. Numerous accounts of Soviet industrial production refer to the
negative aspects of the Soviet-style incentive mechanisms that essentially
stifled innovation. Thus, the demand for new products and processes and
other advances in knowledge and know-how came primarily from the top
down (the planning agency only subordinate to the USSR Council of Min-
isters), and not from the bottom up (the managers of production facilities).
Soviet economic policy caused the nation to become stuck in second gear of
industrial evolution.
As a result of total state ownership and the CPS, Soviet producers did
not face the limitations on inputs or the rising costs of production that
forced producers in market economies to invest in R&D. In the more or
less democratic West, both governments and enterprises were interested in
methods to reduce costs and increase gains. Research and development were
crucial in providing new techniques and products that improved a nation's or
firm's competitive position, accumulating benefits which raised the standard
of living.
The CPS prompted Soviets to be faced with completely different sets
of constraints and consequently distinct optimization functions. The coun-
try was tormented by contradictions. For example, capital investment was
strongly promoted in heavy industry, yet labor-saving technologies were
frowned upon by plant managers. Labor was hoarded to guard against or-
ders to spontaneously increase production, lowering productivity and worker
discipline. Besides, more employees meant more clout and higher status for
the directors; some S&T research institutes employed thousands, even tens
of thousands of persons.
In another example, rewards for output were based, for a long time, on
the value of gross output. Therefore, the magnitude of a production op-
eration was determined by the value of output plus the value of raw and
intermediate materials (EIU, 1990, p. 32). The greater the value, the more
impressive the manager's successes, influencing his rewards such as bonuses
and promotions. So managers attempted to utilize the most expensive ma-
terials and as many inputs as possible, rather than produce the output at
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the most resource-efficient level. Waste was the order of the day, with in-
direct penalties for those who introduced technological advances to increase
efficiency and decrease the amount of input per unit output. All this led to
productivity decline and all its accompanying aspects.
In the absence of continually growing limitations on the use of person-
nel or raw materials due to either shortage of reserves or rising costs (only
possible with a real price system), a system becomes infected by static in-
efficiencies that can eventually cripple economic growth and development.
The effects reverberate throughout the economy, lulling all sectors to react
to the artificial constraints. Therefore, production amid plenty in the USSR
required technologies to be functional in turning out masses of a particular
product regardless of the labor, raw material, or energy inputs needed. As
a consequence, the researchers, scientists, engineers, and technicians (pro-
ducers and developers of the techniques and ideas) were generally subject to
the fulfillment of R&D plans based on the relatively simple technical needs.
In this way, the USSR was inflicted by the vicious cycle of technological
decay; a continuous loop eroding technological progress, except, of course,
in sectors of special national interest as defense and space. In most fields of
technical change the USSR fell well behind Western industrialized nations.
Eventually, the Soviet R&D sector also fell victim to overemployment, ineffi-
cient resource use, underutilization, and the outputs were products tailored
to the resource-rich nation.
6.1 The Burdens of Abundance
"Too much of a good thing" and "easy money" are figures of speech that quite
accurately describe the Soviet-style central planning. The main objective of
such a style of government was to eliminate the evils of a market economy.
First and foremost, it was seen as an opportunity and a means to prevent the
waste of resources resulting from duplication of activities which were said
to be characteristic of a competitive environment. In addition, Communist
ideology guaranteed a full-employment economy; in fact, all men and 90%
of women of working age were employed - on the surface, a haven for equal
opportunity. And finally, the Soviet-style CPS was structured to have the
potential to generate rapid economic growth on demand from policy mak-
ers. This last goal was heavily based on the intensification of raw material
and energy use, and amazing escalation of capital investment in relatively
unsophisticated heavy industry, particularly iron and steel.
Soviet foreign and trade policies were also strongly anchored to the level
of primary industry. The trade relations the USSR conducted with Western
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industrialized nations were dominated by the flow of exports of fuel and raw
materials to the West. In fact, although the extractive industries accounted
for only 7.5% of Soviet industrial output in 1979, it generated 52.5% of the
total value of Soviet exports (Wright, 1983, p. 617). This business procured
84% of all valuable hard currency earnings for the Soviets in 1980 (Gold-
man, 1983, p. 623). Manufactured products, chiefly heavy machinery and
other engineering products which required energy- and material-intensive
production, usually did not meet the quality requirements of Western na-
tions and consequently dominated Soviet exports to developing countries. In
exchange, Soviets mainly imported raw materials from these regions. These
processes of exchange only further accentuated the Soviet reliance on pri-
mary and simple secondary industries; subsequently increasing the obstacles
even more to modern, progressive economic growth and development.
The resource-based central planning in the Soviet Union spilled over
into its Eastern European neighbors. The Eastern bloc industrial and trade
policies closely resembled the directions set out by the USSR for political
and economic reasons. Table 6.1 reveals the significant extent to which the
USSR was subsidizing the smaller Communist countries of Eastern Europe
with respect to the price and quantity of their energy imports.
Six out of the top 10 importers of Soviet crude oil and oil products were
Eastern European nations, and the seventh was Cuba. This group accounted
for 74% of the amount imported from the Soviet Union by the top 10 nations,
as much as 61% of the quantity demanded by the top 20 importers, and still
over 55% of the total Soviet exports of these energy products. The average
price per ton charged to the Eastern European six and Cuba was just over 41
rubles, and as low as 37 rubles if Yugoslavia is omitted from the calculation.
In contrast, the average price per ton paid by the Western non-
Communist nations that constitute the remainder of the top 20 importers
ranged between 62 rubles for Sweden and 113 rubles for France, with the
average at approximately 74 rubles - more than twice the price charged to
the socialist satellite countries of the USSR in 1976. However, the top 13
Western importers of Soviet crude oil accounted for only a 38% share of the
top 20 total imports, which was 34% of the absolute total and 62% of the
amount imported by Eastern Europe and Cuba.
The dependency of the smaller Eastern European countries grew as the
Soviet Union became more than just the source of a secure and inexpensive
supply of energy and raw materials. The large USSR market also became
the main customer for Eastern European, low-quality, uncompetitive man-
ufactured goods. One side was inadvertently encouraging economic futility
in the other.
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Table 6.I. Top 20 importers of Soviet crude oil and oil products, 1976.
Rank Country Quantitya Priceb Revenuec
1 Czechoslovakia 17.2 34 587
2 East Germany 16.8 32 537
3 Poland 14.1 42 591
4 Italy 12.0 65 783
5 Bulgaria 11.9 38 445
6 Finland 9.6 66 638
7 Cuba 8.8 33 288
8 Hungary 8.4 45 377
9 West Germany 7.1 81 577
10 Yugoslavia 4.9 65 319
11 United Kingdom 4.1 68 279
12 France 3.3 113 372
13 Netherlands 2.7 81 220
14 Sweden 2.7 62 167
15 Belgium 2.1 66 139
16 Spain 2.0 64 128
17 Greece 1.9 68 130
18 Denmark 1.6 68 109
19 Austria 1.5 67 99
20 India 1.1 89 98
Totald 148.6
aMillions of metric tons.
bRubles per ton.
cMillions of rubles.
dlncludes countries not listed.
Source: Derived from Cole (1984, p. 401).
In fact, only at the 26th Session of the CMEA (in 1985) was a program
tabled to address the increasing need to create more favorable economic con-
ditions for improving technological levels to world standards and to consider
methods regarding conservation of energy and raw materials (Sobell, 1986,
p. 146). The Soviet spokesman encouraged a move away from cooperation
in the provision of ever-increasing volumes of raw materials toward cooper-
ation in technological restructuring, which was expected to lead to better
processing and allocation of the available resources.
The examples of generous and cheap Soviet supplies to the small nations
in Eastern Europe, as well as the Soviet acquisition of their relatively low-
quality products, reveal the astounding size of economic gains (profits) the
USSR was willing to sacrifice just to secure the diffusion of an ideology that
was the basis of the pervasive technologies utilized and the demands of re-
search and development throughout the East bloc. Political compliance with
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Soviet-style preferences was the price to be paid for distorted, then attrac-
tive advantage that inevitably led to economic decline. Had, for example,
the oil been sold in the Western market, then the enormous hard currency
revenues could have been used by the USSR to procure foreign technologies,
and it would not have fallen so far behind the levels of the industrialized
Western nations.
A similar scenario could be drawn for other fuel and nonfuel mineral
products from the USSR. Therefore, the highly resource-intense methods
of production were rational under the prevailing conditions, and were read-
ily assimilated throughout Eastern Europe.[l] However, this domineering
mode of production simultaneously prevented technological evolution driv-
ing progressive research and development of innovations as was the situation
in Western industrialized economies based on market principles. In addi-
tion, the absence of competition between producers provided no incentive
for engaging in the risks of technological innovation.
Whether in a domestic or international sense, Soviet industrial policy
was molded by the bounteous presence of natural and human resources. In
fact, the only time one of the highly rigid five-year plans was abandoned
during its term was due to the discovery of new deposits of natural resources
(Cole, 1984, p. 42).[2] This was the sixth plan from 1956 to 1960. The
problems of planning began and grew because of the inherent inflexibility
of administering plans in which the scope was strictly bound, limiting the
capacity to adjust to changing conditions, and the increasing complexity of a
maturing economy. In the earlier years of the USSR when the activities were
few and simple enough to be managed by central directives, the resources
were employed to achieve very promising returns and in a relatively efficient
fashion.
Nevertheless, beginning already in the 1960s, faced with rapidly increas-
ing economic and technological complexity, the central planning system re-
mained tied to its policy of using original simple technology, high consump-
tion of raw material, and energy- and labor-intensive ideologies causing ever
greater misallocations and inefficiencies. In effect, it seems truly unreason-
able to believe that it is possible to create an efficient and productive system
considering the amount of calculations and data required to formulate the
five-year plans of the Soviet economy during the twentieth century. Thirty
years ago, a Soviet mathematical economist demonstrated that in 1980 the
economy would require 10]6 calculations to formulate a plan, and that the
entire working population of the USSR would be required to work for a to-
tal of five years just to formulate the 1981-1985 five-year plan (Cole, 1984,
p. 42). It becomes clear that even the great wealth of resources could no
184 Christoph M. Schneider
longer make up for the inadequacies of planning that led to the lack of neces-
sary technological advance needed to generate more value from the economy
for the economy.
6.2 Natural Resources
The Soviet Union covered approximately one-sixth of the land surface on
the globe, and controlled the largest share of natural resources, in both
variety and volume, of any nation. The resource balance was favorable in
both absolute and per capita terms. In fact, resource-policy dominated all
other decision making to such an extent that enormous industrial complexes
were established in the middle of nowhere, with cities built around them to
supply the necessary labor to exploit the reserves. The amounts of centrally
directed investments were enormous.
With only a very limited role for prices to stimulate real product or
process improvement, the disproportionate growth of heavy industry in the
USSR was primarily achieved by systematically increasing the amount of
energy and raw material inputs. In spite of the great size of the production
sectors, the state of technological development remained relatively low due to
the basic interest in setting economic targets in terms of quantity rather than
quality. As a result, the bottom-up, or market, response that stimulates the
need for R&D in Western economic systems was missing in the Soviet-style
command economy.
The advantages of Soviet policy made the country the most impressive
producer of primary products, fuels, and semimanufactures in the world.
For decades, the USSR was consistently among the top 10, often among the
top three, in output of very important and high-value products due to a
worldwide limited supply (shown in Table 3.2 and Appendix 6A).
6.2.1 Fuel resources
Historically, that is, from 1737, when the first 52 hand-dug wells began pro-
ducing, until 1902, shortly before the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia was the
world's largest producer and exporter of petroleum.[3] Unfortunately, the
rigid energy policy set forth by the early Communist governments in the
five-year plans favored the development of the rich coal reserves. This de-
layed the exploration and utilization of oil and gas as energy carriers and
prolonged the useful life of coal and the old-style industries and industrial
processes associated with it. In the 50 years following 1902, so much empha-
sis was on planning coal expansion that by the mid-1950s coal constituted
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Figure 6.1. Output of crude petroleum and natural gas in the USSR and
USA, 1938-1987.
over 65% of Soviet fuel production (based on heat value), while oil and gas
barely made up 20% of the total together.
This explains the late and slow growth in the level of oil and gas pro-
duction shown in Figure 6.1. However, since the late 1950s, Soviet energy
strategy followed the world trend and began accelerated development and
utilization of oil and gas resources, as depicted by the steep up turn in the
production curves in the figure. In less than a quarter of a century a signifi-
cant reallocation had altered the picture of the Soviet energy balance. That
is, by 1980 coal output represented only 25.4% of total fuels production; oil
accounted for 45.3%; and gas, for 27.1%. Cumulatively the latter two added
to 72.4% - a complete reversal of the Soviet energy policy in the early 1950s.
In the global production of energy, the Soviet Union attained a very
respectable position in the second half of the twentieth century. In fact, the
USSR led all producers in output of natural gas by the 1980s, with 770,000
million cubic meters in 1988 (more than 1.6 times its nearest competitor).
It had also become the world's largest oil producer in the late 1970s, with
an output of 4,554 million barrels in 1988 (more than 1.5 times its nearest
competitor). At least in fuel production, that is, in natural gas and oil,
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the USSR had finally realized the dreams of most Soviet Communist Party
leaders to overtake the United States (refer to Figure 6.1). Yet, in retrospect,
one now asks whether this was truly such a desirable strategy.
As revealed by the figures in Appendix 6B, the USSR was also among
the top three producers of other types of energy; second in the world in
electricity output (62% of the global leader); and third in coal production
(77% of the global leader).
Earlier in this chapter, the importance of natural resources in the Soviet
economy was stressed by indicating that discoveri.es of new sources have
been the only nonmilitary reason for altering the rigid five-year planning
system. The role of raw materials, particularly energy resources, was also a
pivotal aspect of and consequently came to dominate industrial policy and
investment. As the relatively easily accessible primary fuel deposits in West
Siberia were depleted in the 1970s, the energy industry moved to the east,
north, and offshore. Consequently, centrally directed capital investment was
increased to at least 30% to 40% of all investment in industry (EID, 1990,
p. 197), and absorbed as much as 46% of the growth in industrial capital
spending.
Because little attention had been paid to successively pressing for ad-
vances in technology and management techniques, the extraction industry
was plagued by a shortage of innovations and incentives to increase efficiency,
improve management, and expand exploration beyond the planned orders.
The result was rising costs. Already 20 years ago, the Soviet leadership was
obliged to increase the share of energy in total industrial investment to main-
tain growth in output. In the 1980s, the situation had become desperate.
The five-year plan for 1981 to 1985 (inclusive) announced by GOSPLAN
stated that energy investment would grow by 50%, making the share of en-
ergy in the planned increment of industrial investment an amazing 85.6%
(Gustafson, 1989, p. 36). While this looked encouraging, many of the sup-
porting industries were not treated so well.
This again demonstrates the continued neglect of investing in the intro-
duction of innovation in industry that not only could have alleviated some of
the pressure on primary industry, but could have simultaneously increased
the efficiency of extraction. The data show that, despite the increase in
investment growth from 38% between 1971 and 1976 to 48% between 1981
and 1985, the growth in energy output declined from 28% to 13% for the
respective periods (Gustafson, 1989, p. 40). So, nearly three times as much
investment growth was required to produce and deliver one additional unit
of energy in the early 1980s as had been needed a decade or so earlier.
In fact, the 1960s saw one ruble of production in the extraction industry
require two rubles of capital investment, while in the 1981-1985 period the
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same ruble of production required seven rubles of investment (Bradshaw,
1991, p. 9) - an indication of dramatically rising inefficiencies. This was
combined with an increased bias toward investment in human and natural
resources for the production of military machinery at the expense of civil-
ian machinery under Brezhnev; the latter was responsible for supplying oil-
and gas-field machinery. Output problems, essentially shortages, arose as
the technologies became obsolete. It had become increasingly difficult to
replace them with contemporary innovations because the nonenergy indus-
trial sectors were faced with stagnant budgets and results of R&D at state
institutes had gone on largely in isolation of production. This was simply
an unsustainable process.
Primarily in the United States, but also in other Western nations, rapid
economic growth and expansion in the 1950s and 1960s slowed the previously
consistent trend toward improvements in energy efficiencies at the level of
the world economy. Nonetheless, the USA and other Western nations were
repeatedly faced with oil-price shocks originating in OPEC that caused the
accelerated launching of energy-saving and energy-efficiency programs in the
last quarter of this century.[4]
In comparison, the Soviet Union was in energy heaven; it never faced
these external shocks or pressures due to its enormous domestic supply, and
lived insulated from world prices. The small Eastern European countries
were consequently also insulated. However, in the late 1980s such a shock
was becoming a dire reality for the USSR and its socialist partners; decades of
living with an overly generous energy policy had taken their toll. The Soviet
energy industry began to collapse due to the deterioration of mass-produced,
low-quality extraction equipment and machinery built under the quantity-
intensive ideologies. The inability to produce sufficient fuel and nonfuel
raw material exports reduced hard currency income desperately required for
refitting the extraction and transport infrastructure. Thus, the crippling
of the most prominent Soviet sector nationally and internationally was a
product of the system's own, built-in deficiencies that drew wealth from
only this one sector.
6.2.2 Nonfuel resources
As previously mentioned, the Soviet Union was also a leader in the output
of nonfuel primary products and semimanufactures. Appendix 6A shows
graphically the superior position of the USSR in the output of eight rare
and valuable products. The USSR ranked first in the world in the produc-
tion of lead and iron ore; second in gold, magnesium, zinc and phosphate;
third in diamonds (measured in carats); and fourth in bauxite. Most of the
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arguments expounded for the extensive use of energy carriers in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe apply just as well to the nonfuel goods.
The Soviet dominance in the production of these goods was partly a
function of the sheer size of the industry, exemplified by enormous, vertically
integrated enterprises that enjoyed largely monopoly status, and seemingly
limitless economies of scale. Yet, in truth, these monstrous production op-
erations were more directly the result of vast reserves of natural resources,
both fuel and nonfuel.
On the one hand, geological exploration in search of global fuel reserves
in the late 1980s revealed that the USSR had the greatest natural gas re-
sources in the world, the second most voluminous coal deposits, and the fifth
largest known oil fields. On the other hand, the extent of nonfuel mineral re-
serves in the USSR presents an equally impressive picture. Table 6.2 shows
the overwhelming natural advantages of the Soviet Union over Western Eu-
rope and the United States with respect to the share of a selected number
of basic materials (crucial for industrial production) in the world total. The
Soviet numbers are also high in absolute terms, indicating an extended life of
known recoverability - otherwise known as plenty of materials for the future.
The availability of minerals was a blessing for Soviet Communist lead-
ers, who wanted to protect the USSR from being dependent on any other
nation, especially a capitalist one. Ironically, the Soviet-style politics of
self-sufficiency essentially made the smaller Communist countries in Eastern
Europe dependent on the USSR, for raw materials, then for industrial de-
velopment, then for even more raw materials, and finally for products which
other industrialized nations were long trying to move away from. However,
the immense domestic supply of minerals put the Soviet Union in a unique
position for industrial production: virtually no limits (other than man-made
ones) that stalled the perceived need for technological change. Out of the
16 minerals listed in Table 6.2, the USSR is the most fortunate beneficiary
of nature compared with other industrialized nations. In such valuables as
silver, manganese, and iron it possessed some 30% of world reserves; in oth-
ers, such as nickel and copper, one-eighth of the global total - figures other
industrialized nations could only dream of.
In spite of its clearly inferior natural endowments, or more likely as a re-
sult of these, Western Europe has been forced to rationalize and to become
as efficient as possible. Due to the physical constraints of not having ac-
cess to substantial raw materials domestically, and the limitations on funds
available for international purchase, Western Europeans and the Japanese
had to rely particularly on and invest consequently in advances in technolo-
gies that facilitated the sparing use of material resources. Not only were
these nations reasonably successful in fulfilling this objective, but they did
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Table 6.2. Nonfuel mineral reserves of the USSR, Western Europe, the
USA, and the world.
Quantity of known !ese!ves
Western USSR as a
Mine!ala Wo!ld Europe USA USSR % of world
Potassium 109 8 n.!. 42 38.5
I!on 96,700 8,500 2,000 31,000 32.1
Manganese 700 n.!. n.!. 200 28.6
Silve!b 5,500 n.!. 1,300 1,500 27.3
Asbestos" 3.5 n.!. 0.12 0.88 25.1
Nickel 75 n.!. n.!. 10 13.3
Coppe! 310 n.!. 85 40 12.9
Sulfu! 2,470 60 305 300 12.1
Phosphorus 22,000 n.!. 6,800 2,600 11.8
Lead 95 8 n.!. 10 10.5
Chromium 940 n.!. n.!. 80 8.5
Zinc 124 14 34 8 6.5
Antimony 4 n.!. n.!. 0.25 6.3
Aluminum 1,170 38 9 60 5.1
Tin 4.33 n.!. n.!. 0.21 4.8
Indust!ial diamondsd 630 n.!. n.!. 25 4.0
aMillions of tons, unless otherwise specified.
bMillions of ounces.
<Production.
dMillions of carats.
n.r. == none or few reserves.
Source: Derived and adapted from Cole (1984, p. 104).
so simultaneously expanding the variety and improving the quality of out-
put and raising the general standard of living of the population within their
respective borders dramatically more than was achieved by the Soviet-style
resource-intensive production.
Even the USA, which is much wealthier than either Japan or West-
ern Europe regarding raw material reserves, has combined strong economic
growth and development with increased material saving or natural resource
productivity. The changes in the United States have, to a large part, been
based on a desire to participate with competitive goods in the world market
and on a sound commitment to encourage and support research and devel-
opment of new products and techniques to enhance the competitive edge.
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Table 6.3. Comparison of techno-economic efficiencies measured according
to energy and steel intensity in selected Eastern and Western industrialized
nations, 1979 and 1987.a
Energy and steel intensity, USSR = 100
Nation Energy Steelb Energy Steel
France 33.7 31.1 9.2 7.1
West Germany 37.9 38.5 12.1 11.2
Italy 44.0 58.5 10.5 13.5
Japan n.a. n.a. 7.2 13.0
United Kingdom 55.0 28.1 15.0 8.7
United States n.a. n.a. 16.3 8.0
Bulgaria 98.3 64.4 72.4 52.6
Czechoslovakia 86.6 97.8 71.9 90.6
Hungary 71.0 65.2 53.3 48.4
Poland 101.7 100.0 82.1 80.6
Romania n.a. n.a. 106.3 116.7
Soviet Union 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1979 1987
----------
"Calculations are based on data from the Economist Intelligence Unit (1990) for 1979-
1980, the United Nations (Statistical Yearbook 1987), and the World Bank (World Tables
1991) for 1987. As a result, the magnitudes differ somewhat more dramatically than can
be accounted for by increased energy and raw material saving in the West and resource
intensification in the East over the eight-year interval. However, the trends and relation-
ships are consistent with and support the arguments presented.
b1980.
n.a. = not available.
6.2.3 Techno-economic efficiencies
Discussions on the competitive edge must take into account the concept of
efficiency. It has been shown in the example of the energy sector that the
efficiency of investment was low and falling at an imposing rate in the USSR
over the last quarter century. However, other aspects of resource use also
reveal serious inadequacies in utilizing raw materials and energy to their
optimal potential, particularly with respect to the standards in Western
industrialized countries, though experts have stated that even these are still
far from optimal.
The disproportionate growth in heavy industry and the disregard for
efficiency in the use of resources in the Soviet Union can be illustrated by
the energy and steel intensities. In Table 6.3, these are used as indicators
to compare the levels of techno-economic efficiency of the USSR with other
industrialized countries. From the table it is clear that the Eastern European
countries use several times more energy and raw materials to produce a unit
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of GNP than Western Europe, the USA, and Japan. Among the Eastern
European countries, Bulgaria, Poland, and the USSR were battling for the
inauspicious title of most inefficient energy user in the 1970s, while Romania
was the most inefficient energy user during the 1980s. Czechoslovakia joined
Poland and the USSR as the most raw-material-intensive producers in the
1970s based on steel intensity, and Romania was the most inefficient user of
raw materials in the 1980s, with the USSR and Czechoslovakia close behind.
For Western Europe, the USA, and Japan, the data in Table 6.3 dis-
close no surprises. The United States (and Canada) have steadily been the
most energy-intensive countries, while the Western Europeans led by Italy
have used more raw materials to produce a unit of GNP as measured by the
steel intensity. Although the data from the two selected years are not per-
fectly comparable, they do indicate that production has gone toward energy
and raw-material savings in general, and significantly to a greater extent in
Western Europe, the USA, and Japan than in the Soviet Union and East-
ern Europe. If the trend over time is reviewed, there is evidence that this
energy and raw-materials savings strategy began at least 30 years ago in
some countries in Western Europe and has recently grown more rapidly (for
a more detailed analysis of the transition of the steel and coal industries see
Griibler, 1991).
Russia was already the world's largest iron and steel producer in the
early nineteenth century (Goldman, 1983, p. 625). Although this status was
lost for more than one century, modern times have seen the USSR acquire
this front-running position again. The emphasis on this industry has also
filtered to the other smaller Eastern European nations based on the Soviet-
style model. Without exception, all Eastern European countries, led by the
Soviet Union, were expanding their output of iron and steel until the late
1980s, while Western industrialized countries had long realized the need to
switch to a new technological paradigm. North America and Western Eu-
rope realized this transition and began several decades ago to concede their
market share in total world steel production to the countries that produced
just as well and much more cheaply, namely, the NICs and LDCs. The dy-
namic evolution of the global iron and steel industry implies that the USSR
and its neighbors were hanging on and pumping enormous amounts of re-
sources into an industry which they would have been better off to give up in
favor of a change to the subsequent techno-economic paradigm or phase of
economic growth and development.
In an attempt to summarize all these facts and trends, one must real-
ize that during the early decades of the Soviet Union, the ample supplies
of resources facilitated economic growth the easy way. It thwarted or, at
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least, put off the immediate need for the introduction of technological ad-
vances to some future time. Unfortunately, the future caught up with this
Soviet-style economic growth and development strategy very quickly. Soon,
Soviet technological standards fell behind the levels in Western nations and
resource use was intensified and considered a simple and inexpensive way
of compensating for the growing void; this policy was certainly easier than
planning innovation.
The Soviet Union entered the final stage of decline, simultaneously the
initial phase of restructuring, when the holes in the sinking Soviet economy
could no longer be patched fast enough. Resource reserves remained large,
but always more difficult to extract, and production subsequently declined.
The generous returns from the sale and use of easily accessible resources,
which insulated against the need to stay at the frontier of nonspecial interest
fields for so long, had inhibited the necessary development of the techniques
for withdrawing the more inaccessible deposits.
For example, the USSR petroleum-drilling industry traditionally relied
on the turbodrill or the rotary drill as its basic exploratory- and development-
drilling tools, both known to be ineffective below depths of approximately
2,300 to 3,000 meters (Meyerhoff, 1983, p. 317). The consequent drilling
problems (combined with the planned directive for the energy industry) al-
lowed only about 6,000 wells to be drilled in the Soviet Union in 1977. In
comparison, 46,479 wells were drilled in the United States and that with just
800 more rigs. As a result, Soviet drilling did not mature nearly as much
as North American drilling as shown by the number of known oil and gas
fields, 26,200 in the latter and only 2,500 in the former. The solution was
sought in importing modern petroleum technology from abroad, despite the
ever-increasing shortage of the consequently more valuable hard currency.
However, already in the early 1980s some experts predicted it would take
up to 20 years to modernize the industry, and much longer without foreign
technology (Meyerhoff, 1983, p. 358).
Therefore, as the USSR moved into the last quarter of the twentieth
century its political and economic system had cheated the country out of the
general economic benefits of consistent R&D-generating innovations, it was
reaching the limits of its then technical extraction potential, and the system
had left the nation insufficiently prepared for modern-style growth. Inferior
technology meant deteriorating fuel and raw materials production in the
long term, which in turn meant reduced ability to make up for technological
inferiority, at least at the international level - perhaps a blessing in disguise.
Thus, the vicious circle began to close, strangling further development
and growth in the economy ruled by central planning. However, mastering
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the new constraints could liberate previously underestimated, indeed unex-
pected, growth potential in the successor regions to the Soviet Union.
6.3 Human Resources
For decades, the Soviet Union had been characterized by a prolonged phase
of industrialization during which extensive (or wasteful) growth strategies
were followed. Within this framework, the predominant objectives were the
mobilization of unemployed (or underemployed) production factors (Sobell,
1986, p. 138). The transition to subsequent stages of more modern economic
growth distinguished by the diffusion of new technological innovations and
greater emphasis on quality and selection and on more intensively generated
growth was not achieved as in other industrialized societies of the twenti-
eth century. The cause was an enduring reliance on the extensive forms of
old-style industrialization to generate wealth because of the generous avail-
ability of latent production factors. One such factor was the supply of labor.
Communist belief called for each able person to be employed in the economy
in some fashion. Of course, overloading of the employment factor combined
with the fundamentals of the Soviet-style political doctrine generated a mo-
mentum to slow, even prevent, a move to more efficient, modern styles of
economic growth and development in the USSR.
The Stalinist extensive growth strategies demanded more and more la-
bor, in addition to industrial raw materials. Rapid industrial growth and
forced urbanization came at the expense of rural deprivation; forced collec-
tivization extracted capital from the countryside to fund the construction
of steelworks and factories (Bradshaw, 1991, p. 8). All those coming to the
new economic/industrial centers were guaranteed employment on the ba-
sis of Soviet full-employment ideology. This policy lingered on through the
decades of Soviet-style Communist economic growth and development until
the disintegration of the USSR in 1991.
6.3.1 Employment and labor productivity
Between 1950 and 1990 the USSR was the third most populated country
in the world; China was first; India, second; the United States, fourth; and
Japan, seventh. The work forces and numbers of persons employed were
correspondingly large and followed the population ranking. Table 6.4 shows
a comparison of the number of employed persons in the Soviet Union and
other industrialized or industrializing countries from the West and the South,
and the growth over 37 years between 1950 and 1987. The mature economies
of Western Europe had very low annual growth in persons employed, ranging
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between 0.01% in Austria and 0.79% in Italy. Japan's employment growth,
1.35% per annum, was also lower than that in the Soviet Union at 1.46%.
Of the industrialized Western nations only the USA had a higher growth
rate than the USSR, but the origins of this phenomenon have already been
explained in conjunction with the expansion of the science and engineering
work force (see Section 4.2.2).
Judging by the growth rate of total employment from 1950 to 1987, the
USSR appeared to be a middle-of-the-road country, expanding considerably
faster than the average mature Western industrialized economies, but not
nearly as rapidly as the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of Southeast
Asia, India, or China. Interestingly, of the four most populated countries
in the world and Japan (number seven), the USSR registered the largest
proportion of employed persons relative to the total population at 51.5%.
The two more populous nations, China with 45.8% and India with 38.2%,
and the two countries with less inhabitants than the USSR, the USA with
45.2% and Japan with 47.7%, had a considerably smaller percentage of their
population employed. These are the first indications that the Soviet Union
was employing more people than would have made economic sense, primarily
in capitalistic terms but also with respect to the central policies followed in
China.
The three columns on the right side of Table 6.4 give an impression
of the relative levels of labor productivity for a selected group of countries
including the Soviet Union and the average annual growth rates between
1950 and 1987. For this initial comparison, labor productivity is calculated
rather crudely, taking total gross domestic product in international dollars
and dividing by total employment.
The level of the general labor productivity indicator rose for each coun-
try in the sample over the 37-year period in Table 6.4. The annual average
growth figures indicate an inverse relationship between the USSR and the
industrialized Western countries portrayed by the growth figures for em-
ployment: namely, other than two exceptions, each Western industrialized
country outperformed the USSR with respect to improvement in labor pro-
ductivity. Japan led the way with 5.72% growth per year, almost two and a
half times the Soviet level. The NICs were closely following the Japanese in
growth figures, clearly outdoing the Soviets although the former had about
double the annual rate of increase in employment. Even China, with its im-
mense population and yearly employment growth also twice the Soviet level,
surpassed the latter's labor productivity growth by 1.5:1.
Again, this evidence would tend to indicate that the Soviet labor policy
was to hire as many people as possible disregarding their marginal contribu-
tion to output. One reason for hoarding labor was to influence the amount
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Table 6.4. Comparison of employment and labor productivity in the Soviet
Union and selected nations, absolute totals and growth rates, 1950 to 1987.
Total employmenta (mIn.) Labor productivityb
1950 1987 gr/yrC 1950 1987 gr/yrC
Austria 3.215 3.226 0.01 4,579 20,610 4.15
Finland 1.959 2.458 0.62 5,342 19,141 3.51
France 19.092 21.269 0.29 6,445 24,806 3.71
West Germany 21.164 25.702 0.53 5,923 23,594 3.81
Italy 18.536 24.819 0.79 5,862 20,757 3.48
Japan 35.685 58.530 1.35 2,616 20,484 5.72
United Kingdom 22.400 24.542 0.25 9,377 21,199 2.23
United States 61.651 111.303 1.61 16,540 29,724 1.60
Soviet Union 85.246 145.972 1.46 4,784 11,535 2.41
South Korea 6.377 15.952 2.51 1,817 1l,040 5.00
Taiwan 2.872 9.187 3.19 1,443 10,097 5.40
Thailand 1O.119 25.913 2.57 1,255 4,725 3.65
India 161.386 304.227 1.73 800 1,715 2.08
China 184.984 505.775 2.76 999 3,697 3.60
aIncludes all forms of employment.
bCDP in international dollars at 1980 prices divided by total employment.
cThe average annual growth rate in %.
Sources: Selected from Appendix 3A, growth rates calculated by the author.
of central budget allocations, which was based on number of employed in an
enterprise. The result was an abundance of labor, often idle, waiting to be
commissioned should there suddenly be an increase in orders by the central
plan.
If the comparison of total employment displayed in Table 6.4 were mod-
ified to represent the comparison of the change in the sum of employment
in primary and secondary industries,[5] as in Figure 6.2, a slightly modified
picture results which still substantiates the arguments in this chapter. Figure
6.2 shows the transformation of the economies in the same group of coun-
tries selected for Table 6.4 over the period from 1950 to 1987. The graphic
representation reveals how the mature, Western industrialized nations ac-
tually registered a decline in employment in agriculture and industry. This
coincided with the rapid expansion of the service sector in these countries,
forcing them to face an increasingly limited supply of labor for primary and
secondary production. The consequence was a need for increased efficiency
based on the utilization of results from research and development for new
products and techniques.
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Figure 6.2. Comparison of the change in the sum of employment in agri-
culture and industry for selected countries between 1950 and 1987.
The Soviet Union, on the contrary, recorded a significantly higher level
of employment in agriculture and industry for 1987 compared with the level
in 1950.[6] This was also true for the NICs and China, but in their cases this
change was due to the growth of the industrial sector which was in its infancy
in 1950, employing usually far less than 10% of the total persons employed in
the economy. These nations entered a period of remarkable growth in which
economic output expanded many times over. However, the Soviet Union did
not record any such spectacular growth during these almost four decades.
This raises the question: What were all the Soviet employees doing?
If the calculation of general labor productivity (listed in Table 6.4) is al-
tered to reflect more precisely the output generated by the economy per per-
son employed in agriculture and industry, then additional support is given to
the hypothesis that the abundance of labor combined with Communist ide-
ology obstructed the economic development of the USSR. Figure 6.3 shows,
as expected, that the Western industrialized countries experienced multiple
increases in their output per employee in primary and secondary industries.
The NICs and China also recorded astounding growth, despite the extremely
high rates of annual additions to employment, especially in industry.
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Figure 6.3. Comparison of the change in output (GDP) per employee in
agriculture and industry for selected countries between 1950 and 1987.
The Soviet Union's pattern differs from the pattern of any other nation in
the figure. Between 1950 and 1987, the USSR registered one of the highest
annual rates of increase in employment but the lowest yearly growth in
output per employee in primary and secondary industries of the countries in
the sample. In fact, the output growth was just 50% of the average of the
other nations - verifying that the primary objective of Soviet-style economic
policy was employment of production factors, and not their efficient use.
Labor practices in the USSR were the result of the directives from above.
Enterprise managers used different labor practices depending on the require-
ments to secure their income and influence. In the process the managers and
the system were losing their grip on the working population after the tough
Stalin years. Under Brezhnev, piecework tariff penalties for not achieving
planned or commanded output were slack and workers resisted attempts to
tighten up on them by operating their own unofficial quotas (Dyker, 1986,
p. 155). Therefore, overstaffing became a typical characteristic of the Soviet
industrial scene, with enterprise managers who really had very limited pow-
ers of dismissal and rarely incentives to do so (rather the opposite). Only as
late as 1969 was a new system introduced; in this system some enterprises
were permitted to make selected workers redundant (Dyker, 1986). Due to
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a complicated list of prerequisites, which included releasing someone only
subject to finding them another job in cooperation with the local authority,
as little as 10% of the industrial labor force was working under the more
disciplined system by 1980.
In addition, the low average productivity in many enterprises, especially
in engineering, reflected suboptimal scales and low technological levels in
auxiliary operations ranging from R&D laboratories to component manu-
facture. The vertically integrated nature of enterprise structure virtually
made each large enterprise self-sufficient in everything from resource acqui-
sition to product distribution. The enormous staff was a substantial barrier
and often utilized its lobby against the introduction of managerial or tech-
nical innovations that could alter the established procedures to the staff's
disadvantage.
6.3.2 Labor productivity and the R&D sector
The general availability of relatively qualified personnel, whether at the R&D
level or at the shop-floor level, led to the perseverance of labor-intensive
working procedures and to the aversion to introducing more modern, labor-
saving technologies. Therefore, the R&D sector was affected in two ways:
firstly, by the general overstaffing problem which negatively influenced em-
ployee discipline; and secondly, by the lack of demand (if only from above it
was at least better than nothing).
Regardless of subordination to the academy, ministry, or enterprise,
overemployment at research institutes led to low productivity, inefficiency,
and a poor working atmosphere due to underutilization. The excessive stock-
piling oflabor resources was the result ofthe managers' or directors' interpre-
tations of distorted signals and commands initiated by the central planning
agencies. More precisely, the causes of overemployment included:
• Hoarding of talent on the part of institute directors trying to secure a
preferred status for their institutes (each institute's achievements influ-
enced the director's future career).
• The desire to fulfill the plans from above, utilizing more employees as a
tool in negotiations with superior levels in order to achieve an increase
in the wages' fund of a particular institute and to gain the employees
favor.
• Protection against the loss of bonuses by being prepared for both unex-
pected and expected increases in centrally planned demand.
• The pursuit of a relatively comfortable existence by the scientist, which
included a rather high status in society, a relatively high wage, extensive
fringe benefits, and often not overly strenuous work.
Research and Development Management 199
Soviets sought to compensate for their all too often poor, worn out,
or simply unavailable instrumentation and equipment by expending count-
less hours on work which in the West would have been done on computer-
controlled instruments. The "do-it-yourself approach" was frequently a
product of necessity due to irregular supply or basic unavailability, but re-
quired a large staff. This overstaffing solution was no remedy for the short-
comings arising from the lack of more simple but necessary conditions for
R&D projects such as adequate clean rooms, state-of-the-art vacuum tech-
nology, and computer-aided design systems.
In an attempt to quantify the output and compare the productivity of
the Soviet R&D sector with those in other countries, one particular indi-
cator must be chosen. In this chapter, the number of patents has been
chosen despite its well-known deficiencies as an indicator of technological
innovation. This unit of measurement is seen as imperfect in Western coun-
tries because not all inventions or innovations are patented. Many large
enterprises use countless other methods to protect themselves from other
firms acquiring their technological advances before the firm strategy would
allow these to become a tradable good. Market orientation has provided
enterprises with alternative modes for appropriating rewards from R&D (in-
cluding secrecy, lead time, marketing, and entry barriers) and there may be
a lesser role for the more formal methods (i.e., copyrights, patents, trade-
marks) as would be expected ex ante (Schneider, 1991, p. 24). In the case of
the Soviet-style system, it may appear even more perverse to use patents as
an indicator of inventiveness because there have been no intellectual prop-
erty rights, patents, copyrights, trademarks, or royalties comparable with
those in market economies (Schneider, 1991, p. 21).
Nonetheless, patents do provide a sense of the trends in innovative ac-
tivities. Patents are representative of total inventions in that it is assumed
that patented innovations are the same share of total inventions for every
year, country of origin, owner, or field of technology that is being compared
(NSB, 1985, p. 80). Although it has been accepted that not all patents are
of equal significance to technological change, no optimal system of weighting
each patent has yet been determined and is consequently not considered in
the following calculations.
The data on Soviet patenting have been compiled from NSB (1991).
Verification of these numbers are found in the various editions of the offi-
cial statistical handbooks of the State Committee of the USSR on Statis-
tics (GOSKOMSTAT) in the subsection titled "Science and Technological
Progress." This was earlier under the section called "Intensification of Social
Production," but was recently moved under the heading of "Development
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Table 6.5. Patenting output and productivity in five leading R&D nations,
1989.a
Inventiveness of domestic
Patents receivedb scientists and engineersc
Domestic Internatl. Totald Domestic Internatl. Total d
Soviet Union 83,308 864 84,172 50.3 0.5 50.9
Japan 54,755 42,109 96,864 130.9 100.7 231.6
West Germany 16,893 30,278 47,171 111.5 199.9 311.4
United Kingdom 4,233 9,107 13,340 42.5 91.5 134.1
United States 50,013 39,663 89,676 60.1 47.7 107.8
aproductivity based on gross expenditure on research and development.
bIncludes only patents received in United States, Japan, West Germany, France, United
Kingdom, Italy, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, South Korea, Soviet Union, and India.
cNumber of patents per 1,000 scientists and engineers engaged in research and develop-
ment.
dDomestic and international.
Sources: Data compiled from Tables 6-21 to 6-31 in NSB (1991).
of Material Production." In fact, the USSR had no patent or other intellec-
tual property-securing system as known in the West, but there was a system
of registering inventions; the figures in Table 6.5 and Figure 6.4 refer to
innovations registered under this system.
At first glance, the Soviet Union looks as though it was a very industri-
ous inventor, producing just slightly fewer registered inventions and patents
than Japan, which had the most in 1989, and the United States (see Table
6.5). However, Soviet scientists and engineers received almost 99% of their
patents domestically and only 1% abroad. Of course, this was a function
of their isolation and desire for self-sufficiency, but it required very differ-
ent R&D management compared with the Western S&E; Americans and
Japanese received almost equally as many patents at home as abroad, while
Germans and British actually received twice as many abroad as at home.
This indicates that the Soviets were scientifically very active at home, but
practically invisible abroad.
The three columns on the right-hand side of Table 6.5 reveal the level
of productivity of the R&D sectors of the nations measured in patents per
1,000 S&E engaged in R&D. At the national level, that is, including both do-
mestic and foreign patents received, the Soviet Union was clearly the most
unproductive nation. The United States was two times more productive;
the UK, almost three times more productive; Japan, almost five times more
productive; and Germany, over six times more productive than the USSR.
Even more astonishing is that the USSR, with its apparently enormous to-
tal of 83,308 domestic patents in 1989, recorded a lower level of domestic
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Figure 6.4. Distribution of patents granted to domestic and foreign scien-
tists and engineers in selected countries, 1989.
inventiveness than the other big-spending R&D nations with the exception
of the UK. Again, this evidence shows that, in spite of or probably because
of the generous availability of scientists and engineers employed in research
and development, the Soviet Union was the least inventive of the leading
R&D nations in the world.
A key reason for increasing scientific and engineering employment in the
USSR was founded in the belief that what could be done abroad could be
achieved by Soviet S&E at home. There was a real aversion to the utilization
of foreign inventions. In fact, much of the talk of technology transfer has
been based on the acquisition of turnkey-style plants, not foreign licenses
or patents which could be used and developed further in the USSR. Soviet
ideology proclaimed that domestic resources could generate better and more
technological advance, primarily based on domestic R&D, than that achieved
in the West. Figure 6.4 reveals that the Soviet Union granted almost no
patents to foreigners in 1989 (1.5%). This figure was slightly higher in the
distant past but stabilized between 1.5% and 2% in the 1980s.
In comparison, Italy, Canada, and the United Kingdom granted 98.7%,
93.4%, and 86.3% patents respectively to foreigners. Even such strong R&D
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nations as West Germany, France, and South Korea granted the majority
of patents to scientists and engineers of foreign origin. However, both the
United States and especially Japan demonstrate that a country can grant
more patents to nationals rather than to foreigners and still be well in-
tegrated in the world market and be a leader in global technological and
economic growth.
The fundamental consequence in the Soviet Union is that the domestic
R&D sector had to fill the void left by the absence of foreign contributions.
This meant that the number of scientists and engineers had to be contin-
ually increased with the growing technological gap to the West. Internal
isolation, lack of interaction among experts in the same fields, supply-driven
projects, and an aversion to sharing information have forced institute direc-
tors to continue to increase staff because the S&E personnel in practically
each laboratory had to perform all the internal and auxiliary functions from
secretarial work to constructing their own instrumentation. Of course, some
prestige was also involved. The results were low and declining efficiency and
real productivity after the 1950s.
The point is that the Soviet policy makers achieved exactly what they
had hoped and professed Soviet-style central planning would eliminate - the
duplication, misallocation, and waste that was ascribed to be characteristic
of competitive, capitalist economies. Many Westerners have cynically stated
that the CPS was also not socially optimal because it was only successful in
equally distributing poverty rather than wealth among the population. Un-
fortunately, reality verifies that the consequence was deficient technological
and economic growth and development given the potential.
In summary, the abundance of human and natural resources in the So-
viet Union clearly influenced policy and the style of economic development.
The USSR presents a paradoxical picture: inadequate economic development
despite generous reserves of raw materials and slow technological advance in
spite of a large, well-trained stock of workers, particularly scientists and en-
gineers. The hypothesis put forth in this chapter has tried to illustrate that
the reasons for crisis were due to and not in spite of the plentiful supply of
production factors.
In the case of the productivity and output of research and development,
resources were the determining factors both directly and indirectly. The So-
viet industrial policy, based largely on extensive, old-style economic growth
in which the emphasis was on mobilizing ever greater amounts of inputs in
order to generate more output, set the requirements for R&D. Therefore,
the demand was essentially already determined in a distorted system and
originated in a single consumer - the five-year plan. So, other than a few
special sectors, like space and defense, R&D was really geared toward lower
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technological requirements of an economy stuck in the second gear of in-
dustrialization. The R&D sector itself was naturally managed in a similar
fashion; subsequently finding such phenomena as overstaffing, wasteful use
of resources, and distorted or biased orientation of research projects should
not be too surprising.
However, the structure of the CPS in the Soviet Union and its manage-
ment of the economy does in some way leave much hope for the successor
nations of the USSR. With relatively small measures of rationalization, re-
orientation, and improved efficiency, incrementally much greater advances
could be realized for the economies on the whole. This topic is discussed in
more detail in Chapter 7.
Notes
[1] In fact, relatively cheap energy before the oil-price shock in 1973 led produc-
ers in the West to respond in a similar fashion. The significant energy price
increases caused the West to turn to greater efficiency.
[2] Another five-year plan had been aborted before completion 15 years earlier,
but this was for military reasons, more precisely the German invasion in 1941.
[3] This and other data in this paragraph are collected from essays concerned with
Soviet natural resources in Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy
edited by Jensen, Shabad, and Wright. The data are successively on pages
306,625,252, and 278. See also Bradshaw (1991, p. 8).
[4] These shocks took the form of embargoes, production cutbacks, and additional
strategies by the cartel of oil producers in order to force increases in the world
price.
[5] These include agriculture, forestry, fisheries, mining, manufacturing, construc-
tion, gas, and electricity and are referred to in this study as agriculture and
industry.
[6] However, the cumulative total of employment in agriculture and industry as a
percentage of total employment practically did not change between 1950 and
1987, an unusual development in comparison with activities elsewhere.
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Figure 6A.1. Bauxite production of the top 10 producers in the world, in
1988, in thousand metric tons.
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Figure 6A.2. Diamond production of the top 10 producers in the world,
in 1988, in thousand carats.
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SOUTH AFRICA
USSR
USA
AUSTRALIA
CAHADA
CHItIA
.............. ..
........... .
HIl!'!!!ll!HI!Il!l'I!l!llHlllllll! 281
:;:;:;:::;:;:;:;:;:;:;:::;:;:;:;:::;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;: 158
!!!i'!'"'"'"!''"!!!!!!'''''"''!!'"'!!! 128
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::96
........ . .
. . .:::::::::::::: 618
BRAZIL ~36
PHILIPPIHES "'35
PAPUA HEU CUIHEA "'29
COLOMBIA "'29
Figure 6A.3. Gold production of the top 10 producers in the world, in
1988, in metric tons.
lROH ORE PROOOCIIOH (1988)
(in 1888s oC "etric tons)
USSR
AUSTRALIA
BRAZIL
IHDIA
USA
CHIHA
... :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 248.888
CAHADA !!,!;!!!,!;!;!,;;;;!;!,!;;;;,!'!;;' 38.742
SOUTH AFRICA ......24.676
S~EDEH "'13.298
LIBERIA "'12.778
Figure 6A.4. Iron ore production of the top 10 producers in the world, in
1988, in thousand metric tons.
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LEAD PROOOCTION (1988)
(in 18888 or netric tons)
.. :::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::: ::::::: 518
AUSTRALIA ;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:::::::;:;:;:::;:::;:::;:;:;:::::;:;:;:::::::;:;:;:;:;:;:::::;:::;:::;:; 423
USA Irliil; I! iill Iiii j i! ~ i !jll i illllll! ~ i! i i ll!i 11 j i Ii i i lilillilll! illll 'II iii III ill:l !'lill Ii iii Iii 396
YUGOSLAVIA 96
BULGARIA 95
SOUTH AFRICA 91
Figure 6A.5. Lead production of the top 10 producers III the world, in
1988, in thousand metric tons.
MAGNESIUM PRODUCTION (1988)
(in _tric tons)
USA
USSR
1'-'::.;.:.::'-":::.;.:.::;..:;:::"'::;..:;:•."'...;.:... '-".•.;.:.•• '-"••..;.:.•. '-".::"'::;..:;:::"'::.;.:.:::'-"::.;.:.• '-"....;.:.::'-":::"'::.;.:.:::'-"::.;.:.::'-":::.;.:.::'-":::.;.:.::'-":::",::.;.:.:::,-"::.;.:.::"-,,-,,,-,,-,,-,,-,,.;.:.:,-,,:::.;.:.::=::: 177.826
NORUAY iHi'HHliliHiT1HliiHi'!lH' 54.784
JAPAN :::;:;:::::;:::;:::::;:;:::;:::::: 'El • 996
FRANCE ~13.873
ITALY ~7.862
CANADA ffillilI7 •888
CHINA .7.888
UNITED KINGDOM 1.724
Figure 6A.6. Magnesium production of the top nIlle producers in the
world, in 1988, in metric tons.
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PHOSPHATE PRODUCTION (1988)
(in 1888s of netrie tons)
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USA .. ::::::::::::::::.::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:::::.:::.:::::::::::.:::::::::::.::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::. 48.888
USSR ;.;.;.;.: ;. ::::;::::: ;.: .;.;.;.:.:,::::; ::;:;:::::;:::::::;:::;:;:;:;:;:; 32.288
MOROCCO III ~ ~ II!! tIl II till II lllllll!l! !ll! III II! II 'flli! i I!! III II Ij llllll! II 21 ~388
CH INA :;:;:;:;:::;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:::;:;:;:::::;:::;:;:;:::::::::::::;:::::::::: 12.888
TUN ISIA """''''!!'!!'!'''!""~!!!16. 826
JORDAN :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~:: 5.666
BRAZ IL .;,;,;,;,!,;,;,;,!,!,;,!,! 4.214
TOGO _3.464
ISRAEL l1li2.548
SENEGAL l1li2.446
Figure 6A.7. Phosphate production of the top 10 producers in the world,
in 1988, in thousand metric tons.
ZINC PRODUCTION (1988)
(in 1888s of netrie tons)
CANADA :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 1.349
USSR ;:;:;:;:;:;:::;:;::::::;::::;:::;:;:;:::;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:::;:::;:;:::::;:;:;:::;:;::: 958
AUSTRAL IA !'!!! nll' llll' III n'Inlll illl'!!nnlllllllill 11111 nnlill il 785
PERU .;:;:::;:;:::;:::;:::::::::;:::::::::::::;:::::::;:::::;:::::::::;:::::;:;:;:::::;:::;~485
CH INA ,,!!! !!!!_","'!!'-'=!!!!"_!!!!.'..'-'"!!!!'. 344
nEXICO 261
NORBI KOREA 228
SUEDEN 187
Figure 6A.8. Zinc production of the top 10 producers III the world, in
1988, in thousand metric tons.
208
Appendix 6B
Christoph M. Schneider
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTIOH (1987)
(in "illion. of k~h)
USA
USSR
JAPAH
................... iii::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 2.685.627
UH I TED CERI1AHY :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 529.992
CHIttA
CAHADA
,;,. ,.~,m". , , !!!2' 497.267
FRAHCE i,;i ", !,I-!j,i i'" 356.288
UHITED KIHCDOtl "388.247
IHDIA 217.588
BRAZIL 282.287
Figure 6B.1. Electricity production of the top 10 producers in the world,
in 1988, in million kWh.
COAL PROWCTlOH (1987)
(in 1888s of "etrie tonal
CHIttA
USA
USSR
.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:::::::: :::'::::::::::::: .. iii::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 927.965
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::iii::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 831.754
UH I TED CERI1AHY ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::iii::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 494 .288
POLAND .!!!!!!!l!!!!!IH!!I!!!II .!•.!..!•.!I!!!!.._!_!- _.; 266.285
AUSTRAL IA :::::::::::::::::::::::::::~:::::::::::::::189.569
IHDIA "·i,.,,,; ,;~,i;,;·; ,i,,,·;·,,;,' 185.355
SOUTH AFRICA 177.282
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 126.872
UHITED KIHCDOtl _184.435
Figure 6B.2. Coal production of the top 10 producers III the world, in
1988, in thousand metric tons.
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HATURAL GAS PRODUCTION (1988)
(in "illions of cubic _ters)
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USSR
USA
CANADA
NETHERLANDS
UNITED KIHGID1
ALGERIA
INDONESIA
ROMANIA
NOIlWlY
SAUDI ARABIA
1"..-'-'.. :..:;.-'-'...:..:.. "'..-'-'::"':::-'-':::..:;.::-'-'::.:..:.:::-'-'::.:..:.::"':::.:..:.:~~'-'-"''-'-'''-'-''-'-::-'-'::.:..:.:::'''::.:..:.::''':::-'-':::..:;:::-'-': '-'-"''-'-'''-'-''-'-~''':.:..:.::''':::c..:..:.I::: 778.888
:-:.:-:-:-: ,-:-:': .-:.:- ::::::::::::;:;: :;:,: :,: 472.498
'liHlllldd 98.228
Figure 6B.3. Natural gas production of the top 10 producers in the world,
in 1988, in million cubic meters.
CRUDE PETROLEutI PRODUCTION (1988)
(in "illions of barrels)
USSR
USA
~::~:.~:::~::~:::~::":":":::~::~:.~:::~::~:::~::~:::~::":":":::~::~::~:::~..":":"...~..":":".~~..~...~.:":":"::~:::~::~:::~::~:::~:.":":"..~..~..~...~..":":"...~~,.,.,.,.,,4 .554
SAUDI ARABIA HHHJ;!HHH1!!H!!I::JH'l1!1l!'i'lllH 1.719
IRAQ ""mm...""'"... '!'!!!!!!!' "'...!.. 979
MEM ICO :::::::::::::::::~:::::::::::::::::::::::::: 922
UNITED KINGID1 i,ii!;!;!;i,;,i,' ,:!;i-i",i"",i,ia, 867
IRAN 886
VENEZUELA 685
CANADA 586
Figure 6B.4. Crude petroleum production of the top 10 producers in the
world, in 1988, in million barrels.

Chapter 7
R&D Management in the
Transition: From the Soviet
Union to Russia
With its large, educated population, more than adequate amount of scien-
tists and engineers, and an abundance of resources, the status of the USSR
as one of the world's greatest industrial powers would have appeared to have
been assured. This, however, was not the case. The preceding chapters have
illustrated and discussed the wealth and potential of the Soviet system, the
status of research and development or, more generally, science and technol-
ogy, and the influence of Soviet-style management on these components and
their role as essential catalysts for economic growth and development.
A blending of economic and innovation theories has impressed on us that
the social manner of doing things, which implies the absence of individual
competition as described in the Arrow model, will make all of us better off.
Soviet-style socialism did not achieve this. Under no such circumstance did
the central planning system prove that it could achieve results superior to
those of other systems. In fact, the inadequacies of management techniques
based on Communist central planning principles have made the overall suc-
cesses of capitalist market economies appear even more respectable had the
latter not such an opposite example to be compared with.
Studies on the mismanagement of research and development in the for-
mer Soviet Union or, rather, the preceding management based on distorted
economic signals reveal, however, that there is much room for improvement
and future promise. A reorganization of R&D management under new condi-
tions as part of the transition to a market economy could lead to the blossom-
ing of this sector. As a key element of economic growth, the appropriate style
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of investment in R&D could, in turn, act as a catalyst facilitating and aiding
expansion and development, benefiting Russian residents and influencing the
status of the successor republics (mainly Russia) of the former USSR in the
international scientific, technological, and economic communities.
History has proved time and time again that there is no future without
a past. This is no less true in the field of research and development, or in the
science and technology sector as a whole, than in any other area - perhaps
even more so, due to the value of an accumulated stock of knowledge in the
propagation of new innovations. Throughout history, and most accountable
since the first industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, the impacts of
new innovations have influenced the organization and development of society
from technological, economic, and cultural perspectives. Countless major
and minor challenges and opportunities have been afforded by developments
in new technologies. The potential for new innovation lies in a long-standing
commitment to support domestic R&D that cultivates and secures national
technological capabilities.
The Soviet Union made such a historical investment. Successful science
was part of the cultural pride and identity; in fact, it was anchored in ide-
ology. Today, the USSR no longer exists, but, to a large extent, its science
and technology sector, which boasted to have one of if not the largest R&D
establishments in the world at the time, lives on for the most part in the
new Russian Federation.
The following excerpt from a recent volume on technical change and
economic theory emphasizes the requirements of the past for growth and an
improved standard of living in the future.
Previous capital is needed to produce new capital, previous knowledge is
needed to absorb new knowledge, skills must be available to acquire the
skills and a certain level of development is required to create the scale
effects that make development possible. In summary, it is within the logic
of the dynamics of technology and growth that the technologically more
advanced get richer and the gap remains and widens for those left behind.
[Perez and Soete, 1988, p. 459]
Judging by its assets described in the preceding chapters, a large part
of the former Soviet Union is not a candidate for being left behind, least of
all in research and development. Today, the level of achievement in many
fields of scientific endeavor appear to be lagging behind the levels attained in
other leading R&D nations. Nonetheless, the achievements in specific areas
provide evidence that they are still contenders in global S&T advancement.
During Gorbachev's years of perestroika between 1985 and 1991 in the
USSR and even more so in Russia today, which is undergoing remarkable
changes in all spheres at the hands of courageous reformers, efforts indicate
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a continuing importance for the role of scientific and technological develop-
ment. Russia is faced by a dilemma in becoming part of the international
S&T community where results and performance determine success: preserv-
ing the potential of the enormous S&T establishment (which may in truth
be too large for its own good), while attempting to become more efficient
and productive by rationalizing and letting the market determine what is
needed. As it was, the system could not and would not serve the needs of
a modernizing market-oriented economy. However, a scientific-research base
is important to a modern economy.
This chapter focuses on the following two themes:
• To emphasize the value of the R&D establishment and accompanying
elements created under the former Communist regime in Russia's bid to
rejoin the world scientific and economic communities.
• To discuss the requirements of a good R&D organization and its contri-
bution to post-Soviet growth and development.
7.1 Rejoining the World
7.1.1 From the scientific perspective
In the Soviet Union from Lenin to Gorbachev, science and technology, in one
form or another, was heralded as the universal remedy for all problems. It
was to make Soviets better off at home and the country's position more im-
portant internationally. S&T was considered the highest form of culture, the
path to social prosperity; it was to serve the masses rather than be exploited
for individual profit. The scientific community had fantastic dimensions and
enjoyed special status in every sense. The products of scientific endeavor
were to be the springboard to technological advance and economic growth
superior to that elsewhere, particularly in the Western capitalist countries.
Previously, Soviet science could be proudest of its achievements in mil-
itary and space technology. Unfortunately, both did little directly for con-
sumer welfare, and even indirect spinoffs were extremely limited (though this
should be no surprise considering the deficiency of defense R&D spinoffs in
the West). Soviet-style R&D management cultivated a progressively growing
technological gap to the West in many scientific fields despite the system's
basic natural advantages. These included the capacity to mobilize resources
to achieve "mission-oriented" innovations, to train the labor force with the
appropriate research and design skills, to acquire specific foreign technology,
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and to theoretically avoid potential duplication with its centralized deter-
mination of innovation, its mandatory enforcement of introduction of inno-
vation, and its centralized investment and materials allocation (Linz, 1992,
p.65).
After hearing for decades that scientific and technological advance would
cure socioeconomic decay but experiencing only sparing results, the Russian
public has become skeptical of the actual recovery power of R&D investments
for economic improvement. In addition, a premise gaining more recognition
is that, in Russia today, the central government is acclaimed to be more
progressive and reform oriented than the local authorities and often (state)
enterprises. This indicates that the Academy of Sciences, some industrial
ministries, and special committees will carry much of the responsibility to get
a new style of R&D under way. Of course, they will partially be carried by
past momentum and significantly by the hordes of scientific and engineering
workers and equipment of yesterday.
Perestroika facilitated the introduction of democratization of manage-
ment and decentralization in existing scientific institutes (for better or worse)
in an effort to restructure institutionalization and reorient motivation in the
Academy of Sciences, industrial institutes, and government. Evidence from
personal interviews with scientists generally documents their continuing be-
lief that scientific activity is value free. Hence, given the right political sys-
tem and social foundations and the freedom to work without interference,
their research naturally would produce great benefits for society (Josephson,
1992, p. 29). Russian policy makers are now in the position to grant the sci-
entific profession such an environment. Some progress has been made and
the first results are promising. One example has been that the increase in
relative freedoms and f1.exibilities have facilitated the rebirth of independent
professional organizations of scientific experts more than a half century af-
ter the Communist Party wiped out such groups (Josephson, 1992, p. 30).
Such developments have revealed that characteristics of the Western scien-
tific community can be successfully and rewardingly integrated during the
reorganization of R&D management in Russia.
The USSR was plagued by a central planning system that was actually
based on bargaining elements which distorted economic signals and led to
futile efforts to implement the optimal plan because of the disguised void
between plan and reality - the "inefficiency hole." However, the advantages
that have become remnants of the former system can catapult Russian R&D
and industrial potential to unexpected heights under the conditions charac-
teristic of a new political and economic environment which the reformers are
attempting to foster.
Research and Development Management 215
Not only will Russian R&D rejoin the mainstream of the international
scientific community, but also Russia will rejoin on both economic and tech-
nological foundations. One is crucial to the success of the other.
Russian R&D has inadvertently been obliged to become a part of the
global scientific and technology system at a time when many of the leading
R&D nations are facing similar problems, though to a differing extent, to
those that have arisen in Russia's bid to create a market economy. In the
West, budget deficits are burdening governments, forcing federal funding
cutbacks wherever possible and S&T habitually falls victim to the process;
particularly, of course, fundamental science which is most strongly supported
by the government in the West. In Russia, reduced funding in basic science
could have a substantial human cost due to the large number of scientists and
technicians employed in this branch. Of course, the accompanying increase in
freedom to change to a job in another institute, field, or completely different
sector (as long as experience or education allows), which was previously
unknown, may help relieve some of the unemployment and its related social
costs. In fact, many persons may finally take the employment they wished to
achieve with their education (where possible) rather than the position that
was commonly determined for them.
Additionally, R&D in general, but to a greater degree the applied side,
is being forced to earn its way in the world. So what the Russians perceive
as a result of becoming a market economy is a feature confronting Western
applied science (though conventionally rather well supported primarily by
the private industrial sector) in an effort to make what appeared to be a
good system more cost-effective.
Partly as a result of simple necessity to prevent the R&D sector from
completely vanishing, the reorganization of R&D management in Russia be-
gan with more urgency after the breakup of the former Soviet Union. Russia,
as the largest of the successor states, ceased financing more than 80 cen-
tral agencies including structures of the former scientific community (Levin,
1992, p. 1). However, within a few months the Russian Academy of Sciences
- as it had originally been known from 1917 to 1925 - had been formed, re-
placing the Soviet counterpart, and several organizations (the former USSR
State Committee for Science and Technology, the Russian State Committee
for Science and Higher Education, the Committee for Science and Public
Education of the Russian Supreme Soviet, and the short-lived Ministry of
Science and Technological Policy of the Russian Federation) merged into one
unified agency, the Ministry for Science, Higher Education, and Technology
Policy of the Russian Federation. Thus, some of the administrative changes
have begun, members of the academy are elected in a more democratic fash-
ion, and funding mechanisms are guaranteed but not yet organized. Much
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is still to be done in the reorganization of R&D management embodied in
a new diversified and competitive science policy that is emerging from the
transition to a market economy, but a start has been made.
7.1.2 From the enterprise perspective
The changing economic environment in Russia, with reformulated institu-
tional, organizational, and motivational structures, requires modifications of
the existing innovation decision-making process. In an effort to integrate
in the world economic system and produce goods of international standards
for the domestic as well as foreign markets, Russian managers face many
new decisions, one of which is considering how to best allocate their R&D
budgets. The price they can procure on the market and the diffusion of their
product will determine their revenue from which the R&D budget is derived;
this is characteristic of applied research in Western market economies. Un-
der such conditions managers can finally truly evaluate rewards and risks of
investing in and introducing innovations.
Under Soviet-style research and technology management innova-
tions were often imposed on enterprises from the hierarchical indus-
trial/institutional system. Whenever possible enterprises balked in the face
of changes due to the then ruling incentive measures. The gradual reduction
in the magnitude of expected punishments for not meeting orders between
1953 and 1982 led to a lack of discipline and enforcement (Ellman and Kon-
torovich, 1992, p. 10). Managers and directors of enterprises (whether these
were research institutes responsible for producing innovations or factories
ordered to produce final products) had less motivation to reach output tar-
gets. Instead of punishment, superior levels of the hierarchy revised their
targets downward resulting in a cumulative brake on technological change.
Yet, as the present reforms continue a major barrier to innovation in the
past is significantly shrinking in importance: namely, the supply of inputs to
be utilized with the new technology. Under the old system a manager had to
mount considerable effort to secure the inputs for the old-style production,
suggesting that the introduction of new techniques would have confronted
him with a potentially double negative effect -loss of bonuses due to reduced
output as a result of retooling and forecast difficulties in the supply of newly
required inputs further impeding production. The former distribution sys-
tem has mostly vanished now. A functional new one has yet to be developed.
The doors to input suppliers are open domestically and internationally to
whomever can pay the price.
Today, enterprises have essentially two choices with respect to innova-
tion: either they innovate themselves, basing their decisions on consumer
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demand, supply conditions, costs of inputs, and so on, or they choose to
imitate. However, the simple method of imitation utilized in the past will
no longer be sufficient; products will have to be developed further by domes-
tic (preferably in-house) R&D personnel to match the specific requirements
of local demand. But, the enterprises cannot achieve these results during
the transition completely on their own accord. A combination of market
signals and government planning is needed to speed economic development
and growth (OTA, 1992, p. 11). The latter, as the Soviet Union found out
the hard way, cannot replace the advantages of the market and forces of
competition.
It is, however, now quite clear that free-market principles based on per-
fect (or even imperfect) competition provide sufficient incentives to invest in
as much R&D as would be socially optimal for a whole nation. This is the
argument used to justify government intervention. Examples from Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan, nations that all experienced exceptionally rapid
growth, reveal the presence of state intervention to alter but not destroy mar-
ket signals. Protection of the domestic market and direct funding of R&D
were forms of intervention, as were policies to steer low-cost capital, pref-
erential access to foreign exchange, assistance in negotiations with foreign
companies for access to technologies, and support of domestic technology de-
velopment and implementation through a variety of fiscal incentives (OTA,
1992, p. 10). Thus, numerous examples can be given on how to best utilize
domestic R&D potential while preserving the drive for entrepreneurship.
Furthermore, should the enterprises prove to be duly successful, then
their products will also be sold in the West, in turn influencing the market,
prices, and industrial organization there.[l] Evidence from historical devel-
opments in other nations, which have been resurrected from rather dismal
situations to become economically and socially successful (i.e., Japan, Ger-
many, some NICs), would tend to indicate that imitation will be the initially
favored strategy at least for the immediate transitional phase. As world lev-
els of quality and selection come within reach, supported by the very capable
domestic R&D sector, the role of innovation will again substantially increase.
Of course, the industrial structure will make a difference.
Russia has inherited the industrial structure cultivated by decades of
Communist industrial policy. In general, it is one dominated by labor- and
capital-intensive industries, but recently there have been signs of at least a
willingness to shift to more modern industries along the path of industrial
evolution. Countries beginning much later than the USSR on the road to
industrialization like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have already gone
through more shifts. They also began with labor-intensive and moved to
capital-intensive industries, moving primarily from light manufacturing and
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import substitution to heavy and chemical industries. These countries, how-
ever, have all gone one step further. They have moved into the knowledge-
intensive industries which have facilitated the production of products (i.e.,
computers) that have allowed the development of downstream industries and
consequently promoted economic growth and development.
Although much enterprise activity will be devoted to satisfying the
backed-up demand resulting from decades of no selection, the enterprises
will be joining the world at the research and technology level, on the one
hand, and at the product level, on the other hand. R&D-based technological
change (particularly production technology) and diffusion of that technology
will contribute to economic growth and the improvement of the standard of
living, inevitably making Russian producers and consumers important ele-
ments of the world economy.
7.1.3 The international aspect
In today's world, science and technology has become a worldwide phe-
nomenon. The process has been under way for some decades, and inter-
national exchange and participation have been crucial to the successes of
numerous nations that had to climb back from serious economic and/or
technological setbacks. Open borders to scientific exchange, which includes
the flow of experts, ideas, experiences, assistance, and supporting materi-
als (such as computers), have served as a catalyst for economic growth and
development in the past.
Russia was once no exception. Even as far back as Peter the Great and
Catherine the Great, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, respec-
tively, scholars and technicians from many countries including Sweden, the
Netherlands, Denmark, and Prussia were invited to practice their craft in
Russia, while Russians were sent to England and elsewhere for training and
study. It was during the Communist rule in the twentieth century that the
Soviet Union turned a cold shoulder to the ever-increasing multilateraliza-
tion and internationalization of both basic and applied research efforts, not
to mention development.
Chapter 5 of this study has been devoted to the internationalization of
research and development. Although this process became significant enough
after World War II to warrant more serious study, the real thrust to inter-
nationalize began in the 1980s and continues today. More and more inter-
national scientific associations and consortiums are being established in an
effort to spread the risks and costs of research and development, to gain from
the pooling of scholars from disparate fields in different nations, and to be
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assured access to the results of the cooperation. It has become increasingly
difficult, costly, uncertain, and less fashionable to go at it alone.
In addition, the accompanying advantages of foreign direct investment
and multinational corporations' activities are chief determinants in the ac-
quisition of foreign technology. The significance of these elements increases
when one considers that much of the newest and most protected Western
technology was already being chiefly transferred by multinationals in the late
1980s. In each case the value of the domestic research and development base
influences the attractiveness of a particular country for foreign interests and
investors. Judging by the stock of scientific resources inherited from the So-
viet Union, Russia will have much to offer and will be an attractive partner
in international research. Thus, it seems Russia has chosen to return to the
world stage of science and technology during a time when more interaction
between the players is desirable and much can be gained.
Becoming a part of the world economy and transforming the internal sys-
tem to a market-oriented style simultaneous to the opening of the S&T sector
will facilitate a working environment more conducive to better technological
choice and more efficient use of R&D resources. Prices of products, costs
of inputs, and returns on investment will finally have meaning in choosing
policies and projects. Links to the world will do much for the development of
domestic markets to which domestic research and technology must cater and
from which demand impulses are expected to aid in guiding reformulation
of principles and institutions.
One of the keys to a future for the Russian S&T sector is to sever
all links to the former legacy of ideological orientation. Cooperation with
other nations, mainly those of the industrialized West, will prove to bear
important fruits for the development of Russian R&D, molding it to be a
significant factor in economic growth. Benefits can be realized in the pro-
curement of marketing- and technological-assessment infrastructure, policy-
setting processes, methods for science management, means for modernizing
and retrofitting those branches of industry worth saving, and measures for
determining and demonstrating how applied research can be used to make
traditional industries competitive (Popper, 1992, p. 114).
It would be incomplete to consider the international aspects of the im-
portance of R&D and technology for economic growth without citing the case
of Japan. Notwithstanding the differences, a comparison with Russia today
makes the Japanese case especially useful because of the similar historical
events. Already in the pre-WWII period Japan had entered a phase of in-
ternational isolation that extended until the end of the war. Postwar Japan
inherited a technological gap to Western industrialized countries and inflated
heavy industries (machinery, metals, and chemicals) often associated with
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the previously extensive military sector.[2] Inward foreign investment was
practically prohibited and to compensate for the isolation the state increased
the allocation of resources to research and development. This strategy was,
however, unsuccessful in closing the technology gap to the Western leaders.
If there were no mention of names or dates, this portrait could just as fit-
tingly apply to the late phase of the Soviet Union and the early predicament
facing Russia.
One of Japan's most notable solutions to the dilemma was to acquire
advanced foreign technology in many ways, with an emphasis on knowledge
rather than capital, largely exclusive of inward direct investment (Goto,
1991, p. 10). The Japanese perceived technology as knowledge and infor-
mation embodied in many forms ranging from persons to equipment. In
postwar Japan a vigorous program of personnel exchange with the leading
Western nations was initiated and supported in both the enterprise and aca-
demic spheres. Japan also imported the backlog of technologies developed
overseas during the war, and soon moved to new technologies not yet perva-
sive elsewhere and developed these further at home for both the foreign and
domestic markets. The entire process of effectively utilizing imported knowl-
edge and technology to create Japan's own technological base and promote
economic growth was helped by the level of indigenous science, research,
development, and technology (primarily created during the isolation period)
and a well-developed education system. Firms were very active in import-
ing, concluding technological agreements with American and Western Euro-
pean companies, and in sending engineers and managers abroad regularly to
search for, find, and return with interesting and useful activities being done
elsewhere.
This short account of the postwar Japanese situation was to reveal the
benefits of utilizing effective international R&D policy to spur domestic
growth. Although there are not too many such examples, it gives a hint
of successful measures that can, in one form or another, by useful in the
management of Russian R&D during the transition to a market economy.
Growth will create a demand for more advanced technology, which promotes
more growth. Advanced technology can be produced at home or acquired
from abroad. The latter is not an automatic product of the cyclical process
described, but requires a deliberate effort on the part of the buyer and the
appropriate environment into which it is introduced if it is to be productive.
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7.2 The Role of R&D in Russian-style Growth
During the turbulent and often painful times of change in Russia, the fol-
lowing basic question is being raised more frequently: What is the role
of modern-style R&D management and technology in a society undergo-
ing rapid social, economic, and political change - a country in transition
to a market economy? Of course, there is no single clear, guaranteed an-
swer, but certain precedents do give some indications. Little doubt remains
that the stock of knowledge and the ability of a nation to harness it and
consistently procure subsequent advances in that stock, which includes cu-
mulative and progressive research and development, influence the rate and
style of economic growth.
Since the 1950s, simultaneous to the growth in the world economy, there
has been significant acceleration in the pace of scientific progress, in the levels
of education, in the numbers and proportions of scientists and engineers in
research and industry, in the importance of science-based industry, as well
as in many other research- and technology-founded factors exemplified by
the industrialized Western economies, and for part of the period by the
centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe. Science-based inventions
have been a major factor differentiating the products and processes of the
twentieth century from the nineteenth century (Nelson et at., 1967, p. 40).
Specific and organized research and development directed at opening up
new possibilities has replaced chance developments in relevant sciences and
biased concentration in individual issues.
In economic sectors or activities singled out as priority areas of the
Soviet economy impressive growth was registered based on the research, de-
velopment, technology, and labor force established and promoted under the
former system. A case in point comes from the progress (though inconsis-
tent) in resource development. One of the foremost Western authorities on
the Soviet Union provided the following example of the development of the
Tyumen oil fields in Western Siberia in a paper written in the early 1980s:
[The] first petroleum discovery in this desolate, remote area was made
only in 1959. The first exploitation of the fields took place only in 1964,
when a mere 200,000 tons of oil were extracted. Yet by 1980, despite the
mosquitos, swamps, permafrost, and difficult supply conditions, produc-
tion was 312 million tons, or slightly over half of all Soviet production.
Moreover, virtually the entire effort was carried out with existing Soviet
labor and technology. [Goldman, 1983, p. 628]
Who is to say that the science, technology, and skilled labor that are
largely a product of the former system could not, when united with new
market-oriented policies, make similarly significant contributions in other
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sectors influencing overall Russian growth and development? The propo-
sition adhered to throughout this paper is that a substantial effect can be
expected.
Investigations regarding what contributes to growth have identified ad-
vances in knowledge (AIK) as a key factor.[3] These advances refer to im-
provements in the techniques of production, distribution, and business orga-
nization that are adopted during a particular period (Denison and Chung,
1976, p. 78). Inherently, they will depend on the level at the beginning ofthe
period; indicating that they depend on past advances. Therefore, introduc-
tion of research and development results in both technology and management
organization that affect a nation's production is of prime importance.
If the example of postwar Japan is taken as a comparison, there are cer-
tainly differences, but strikingly many similarities to post-Communist/post-
USSR Russia. In their analysis of why Japan grew so fast Denison and Chung
(1976, p. 10) describe some of the postwar Japanese features that resemble
the post-USSR Russian situation: namely, the loss of nearly half its land
area, repatriation of large amounts of military personnel, shortages of food,
clothing, housing, and other daily necessities, agricultural and industrial
production reduced to a fraction of what it had been a decade earlier, in-
flation, large government deficits, and so forth. Finally an economic reform
package was introduced that laid the foundation for recovery and growth.
The expansion was then determined by numerous factors, but none so singly
significant as advances in knowledge.
In Japan, the contribution of AIK clearly helped to close the technol-
ogy and productivity gaps, and turn the postwar lag with respect to other
Western countries into world leadership 40 years later. It had more influ-
ence than economies of scale or reduction of international trade barriers.
The Japanese growth rates of most of the crucial sources of growth identi-
fied by Denison and Chung were greater than their counterparts in many
of the leading Western nations including the USA, Canada, Belgium, Den-
mark, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK
between 1953 and 1971. The category AIK was no exception: Japan secured
more growth from AIK than any other country in the world, and in so do-
ing moved closer to the technological and managerial frontier (Denison and
Chung, 1976, p. 49).
So, the process in Japan was successful, but the number of such exam-
ples is still quite limited (Le., the United States and a number of Western
European countries in the nineteenth century, West Germany after World
War II, South Korea in the 1980s, and some others; see Abramovitz, 1979;
and Maddison, 1969, 1982, 1987). The purpose here is not to suggest that
Russia will become a global technological leader (though it may possess some
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of the necessary attributes), but to illustrate that significant growth could
be achieved in the appropriate environment based on the nation's vast re-
search and development resources. However, one can only speculate at this
time, but, should the economic and political framework facilitate a growth-
compatible environment, then the Russian research, science, and technology
sectors would certainly give the AIK category much influence as a source of
that growth. Overly strong commitments to past or existing technologies,
levels of employment, or management structures can hamper a potential bid
to catch-up.
The advances in knowledge are rarely portrayed as sources of growth in
isolation. Most frequently these are linked to productivity; essentially the
initial gaps between actually existing and potentially possible productivity
(Abramovitz, 1979, p. 17). Studies devoted to the productivity growth of
the Soviet Union have revealed that during certain periods the rates were
high enough (in fact, higher than in Western nations) to close the techno-
logical gap (Bergson, 1978,1983; and Gomulka, 1971). Unfortunately, these
rates never persisted for a sufficient length of time. After attaining rates
during the post-WWII years close to those required to narrow the gap to
the Western leaders, the USSR growth rates dropped to a level significantly
lower than those in the so-called industrial latecomers like Japan and Italy.
A latecomer is said to be in a position to achieve faster growth than the
technological leader for a certain period due to the access to the leader's
technology (Poznanski, 1987, p. 53). The amazing aspect about the post-
WWII growth in the USSR is that it occurred largely without access to
foreign technology.
Nonetheless, the initial gap in productivity levels, which have to a great
extent been attributed to technological lag, will not absolutely shrink if the
latecomer does not develop its own capability to produce original technol-
ogy. Originally, the Soviet-style system of R&D management was successful
in generating technological innovation that, when used in the CPS, raised
total factor productivity and enhanced growth. By 1975, statistical reviews
of the levels of Soviet productivity revealed that the ability of the domestic
R&D sector declined in attempts to produce sufficient original technology to
reduce the productivity gap and a phase of equilibrium technology gap was
reached. [4] However, the presently changing economic and political envi-
ronment in Russia may prove to be the necessary remedy for the systematic
weaknesses existing in the old Soviet system. It could launch the resource-
and talent-rich Russian R&D sector into a phase of effective technological
catch-up, stimulating rapid productivity increases, accompanied by faster
overall economic growth and development.
224 Christoph M. Schneider
The central planning, Soviet-style economic system was successful in
turning, in many ways, a historically backward, technologically lagging, and
to a large extent virgin land into an industrial powerhouse by the 1960s
and world superpower for most of the twentieth century. Therefore, if the
economic and political situations are modified to become somewhat more
democratic and market oriented, future gains in economic growth and devel-
opment would seem to be assured. The newly industrialized countries, for
example, have attained astounding achievements in technological advance
and economic growth, but they began from a much more technologically in-
ferior position than the situation Russia finds itself in today. The NICs have
continuously complemented and offset their domestic production of technol-
ogy, by innovation or imitation, with extensive imports offoreign technology.
As Russia becomes a more integrated element of the world economy this op-
tion becomes increasingly viable and could support a new growth strategy.
7.3 Prospects and Prescriptions for R&D
Management and Technological Advance
in the Transition to a Market Economy
and Beyond[5]
7.3.1 Reform, transition, and R&D
The presentation of R&D in the Soviet economy in the previous chapters
reveals the enormity and complexity of the task to appropriately manage
this factor. It has particular relevance due to its position at the core of
the relationship between science and technological growth. Management of
research and development in the USSR was characterized by a conflict be-
tween political, national, and historical priorities (competing at all levels of
science and technology), and countless distinct cultural and regional pecu-
liarities. Although the economic transition has been recognized as necessary,
the existing influences appear to adhere to an excess devotion to maintain all
institutions and employment in R&D, including the applied area. Different
solutions are required in both the basic and applied areas. Since the breakup
of the Soviet Union in late summer 1991, the processes of transformation in
Russian science administration and policy have been accelerated, but have
yet to be successfully concluded.
Two factors have differentiated Eastern and Western R&D systems:
• The origin of basic research: A great portion of R&D was conventionally
done in the special research institutes of the Academy of Sciences rather
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than in the higher education institutions. In this sense, the Soviet system
resembled the French system most of those in the West. Generally, there
are different mixes in the West, but determining the precise mixture for
the Russian R&D community is, perhaps, not the most crucial issue at
present.
• The role of the enterprises: In the planned economic system, indus-
trial R&D was not the responsibility of enterprises' management. If
perestroika, in its new form under the Russian reform-oriented leader-
ship, proceeds and competition is successfully established through de-
monopolization and privatization, the present system will prove to be
infeasible and the number of free-standing or independent industrial re-
search laboratories will diminish because the industrial enterprises will
themselves take up the research. Building a R&D laboratory into the
enterprise allows the firm to work effectively and in a proprietary fashion
with the laboratory to reduce the actual needs for formal legal instru-
ments (such as patents) in order for companies to best appropriate their
returns.
The organization of science often reflects the organization of the econ-
omy. The differentiation and separation between fundamental and applied
science is a crucial policy issue. This has direct implications for the distinc-
tion between basic and commercial R&D. The latter depends not only on the
quality of R&D personnel. In a market economy, resources for applied R&D
are primarily allocated by the market mechanism in a decentralized manner
responding to market forces. Resources for basic research are largely sup-
plied by the government. Thus, a review of the experiences and literature on
the integration of science and technology in a market economy would seem
in order before considering policies that can propagate a simple division of
R&D activities into nonprofit (fundamental) and commercial (applied).
Research and development, like the general situation in the USSR, was
confronted with a lack of interactions between users at economic, societal,
and regional levels. In analyzing Soviet R&D, a number of criticisms can be
distinguished that have not been uncommon in the West:
• Technological progress in the USSR has been characterized as proudly
originating essentially in its own roots. This influenced the manner in
which scientists and engineers solve problems, often far from economic
reasoning, particularly in the short term, as it is unnecessary to start
most investigations for new innovations or inventions from scratch in
today's international scientific community.
• Science has habitually neglected the market influence of society's de-
mands. Science and technology appeared to be more imposed on society
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in the centrally planned economies than in the West. S&T was based on
social integration much more in Western nations than in socialist soci-
eties. It is considered by some a paradox that a capitalist-based system
has led to a better quality of life.
• A major problem was the branch system or monopoly, which has been
previously discussed in this book. While management of S&T in the So-
viet Union is rapidly becoming increasingly obsolete causing significant
inefficiencies and unproductiveness in the economy, the advanced West-
ern industrialized countries are building new systems with technological
growth potential.
The Russian science and technology policy, which is being developed
parallel to the other measures for economic transition, could have a more
relevant and applied perspective for dealing with issues concerning the man-
agement of R&D if the following initiatives are undertaken:
• Conversion of the defense-oriented R&D to concentrate more on civilian
issues. This is, at least to a some extent, beginning to happen. In fact,
some specific branches within the military industrial complex (MIC)
were already responsible for producing certain civilian goods in the 1980s
under the still Communist leadership. Additionally, there is a need for
simultaneous commercialization and privatization of the state MIC that
can make conversion effective.
• Directing a portion of the scientific effort toward specific areas that are
less sensitive to short-term price changes so that valuable resources and
potential will not be lost.
• Closer interaction with other policy areas. Science does not operate in
a vacuum, so it should not be isolated from but integrated into soci-
ety and the economy, facilitating the liberation of creativity and the
encouragement of exchanges and reviews.
• Closer ties with user needs. These make R&D effective and commercial-
izable. If R&D is linked to industry in a more competitive environment,
it is consequently tied to user needs.
• Actual integration of R&D into industry in order to link it more closely
to the production process and eliminate administrative and bureaucratic
inefficiencies and barriers. This implies a need for the development of
more in-house research.
With regard to the time horizon of R&D activity, an increased devo-
tion to short-term projects causes the squeezing out of relevant long-term
research. Furthermore, the question concerning the portfolio of R&D has
been a contentious issue in the West; this was also true in the final phases of
Research and Development Management 227
Soviet reform and is still the case now and will continue to be so in the Rus-
sian reform of R&D policy. The rise of the independent industrial research
laboratory owned by a firm in the West was to separate some of the scientists
and engineers from short-term work. A typical example of the structure is
a central laboratory (dealing with long-term issues) and decentralized lab-
oratories that are close to production, doing short-term, demand-oriented
work. A final note related to timing: the R&D community in the former
USSR and now especially in Russia is struggling to accommodate economic
reform and not the other way around.
In order to make valuable contributions when proposing alternative mea-
sures for change, good and reliable statistics must be available. Numer-
ous questions have arisen in the discussion surrounding the reform of So-
viet/Russian R&D management and the science and technology sector as
a whole with respect to the availability of representative statistics, their
value, reliability, comparability, and meaning. The information available
indicates a need for major restructuring in the field of R&D statistics in
Russia. Before any policy decisions are made, it is crucial to have a clear
and undistorted picture ofthe existing situation (i.e., R&D performance and
potential). There is a need for modern and comparable statistics because the
historical data collected are the product of the old institutional structure and
were normally presented in isolation. The new style in the last years of the
USSR and in the first years of the Russian Federation is to rely heavily on
surveys. But, whether these generate the best results, particularly because
so much depends on the respondents to the questionnaires, is uncertain.
As a result of traditionally inflated numbers coming from the Soviet
Union, there is much interest in the precise definitions of the measures re-
ported. For example, whether only full-time workers are included in R&D
employment, who is actually classified as a scientist,[6] what precisely dis-
tinguishes a higher educational institution, what should or should not be
included in material and technical resources, and so forth. The meaning of
certain indicators must also be clarified. For example, the age of equipment
leads to questions of whether they were state of the art when purchased;
or an increase in graduate students may not have as positive an increase as
first thought if, as in the USA, there is a strong influx of foreign students
(indicating that the number of domestic students may actually be decreasing
while the total is increasing). Finally, the key will be a successful restructur-
ing of R&D categories to allow the best domestic analysis and international
comparisons (possibly on a value basis). A first step may be to compare the
definition of former Soviet categories or indicators with those defined in the
Frascati manual and routinely used in OECD countries.
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7.3.2 The survivability of R&D
Western experts often question why and how the Soviet science and tech-
nology sector was able to grow so large in the presence of such formidable
obstacles. Obviously, there were political and ideological goals at the foun-
dation, not those of the economy or the market.
The recent decline of R&D financing must be seen as a process of weaning
the R&D sector from full state dependence. Market forces inevitably result
in a dilemma; no success without failure. But, the uncertainty incorporating
the risks offailure and the benefits of success provide precisely the incentives
required for competition. On the whole, Soviet state enterprises did not show
sufficient initiative. Thus, private entrepreneurs may do better in striving
for survival. In the case of computers, for example, it appears that a great
market for specialized and tailored software existed in the USSR. However,
the best technology is only one requirement needed to achieve market share;
other requirements are development, service, marketing, and so on.
Science and technology is a mixed system in most Western economies.
The key is to move the research into an innovation quickly so that it can enter
the market soon in order for the benefits of the product to be available. In the
steel industry, for example, the producers themselves develop the research
because of interindustry competition (this is referred to as suicidal R&D;
if they do not do it, their competitor will). While the decrease in Soviet
state funding was been accompanied by an increase in contract funding, the
quantity of research contracted out in the West is kept to a minimum. The
Western combination of in-house and external R&D is a perfect example of
the mix of market and planned economics: internal R&D is more part of the
planning rather than part of the market because the risk is high, uncertainty
often makes contracts unenforceable, and once much has been invested in a
project there is a desire to preserve that continuity.
Soviet policy makers should proceed with caution when attempting to
directly apply present Western standards with respect to R&D management
in any industry or sector because many of these standards are undergoing
transitions in the West. It would be preferable to aim for long-term goals
rather than short-term advance that would only approach a current level
that may prove to be obsolete by the time it is attained.
7.3.3 (Pre- )Conditions for successfully restructuring R&D
The Soviet economy appeared to be the most monopolized of industrialized
nations. Soviet innovation was a function of the bargaining process and was
associated with rising inflation. In comparison, Western innovation has been
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identified with falling prices as a result of reduced costs brought about by
the diffusion of the innovations.
The following four factors are essential to successful innovation in the
West and could, to varying extents, contribute to improved R&D manage-
ment in Russia:
1. Industrial R&D is largely financed by firms and performed in the indus-
trial laboratories owned by firms. The R&D must be done in facilities
that are directly responsible to management.
2. A competitive approach to technological change is required. Russian
S&T experts have identified the domination of monopoly power (the
failure to have a competitive industrial structure) to have hindered in-
novation. Thus, there is a need to restructure the system in order to
encourage competition. A look at the industries with great growth and
clear technological progress in the West reveals that they have all been
characterized by avid competition. A diversity of approaches to tech-
nological change developing simultaneously is an essential element that
generates technological change in a market economy. Competition is
required to provide incentives (Le., the threat or risk of failing, not to
mention the sweet taste of success).
3. Scientists and engineers enjoy freedom to move. Mobility is essential for
creativity. Communication is required in generating a proper structure
conducive for innovation. Of course, too much mobility is deleterious for
the firm's innovative activity for proprietary reasons.
4. University research plays an important role in industrial innovation in
the West. The usual mechanism is people in industry identifying the
needs that would be profitable and then looking to science for the an-
swers; thus, it is need and demand driven rather than science driven,
though science facilitates finding the solutions.
The Russian Federation cannot now simply look toward contract re-
search to solve the nonmarket problems of the S&T sector. Toward the end
of the Communist era in the 1980s, when reform had become an inevitable
requirement for survival, contract research was frequently identified as a
favored route to achieve market orientation in research and development.
More emphasis should be accorded to the need for a move toward in-house
research. The fact that Soviet R&D laboratories were and have remained, in
a way, disconnected from manufacturing presents a real problem. A possible
solution may be to divide them up by assignment and subsequently allow
the market to direct the labor to those fields in demand.
Some of the problems that previously plagued the R&D community in
the USSR and continue to burden it under Russian authority are not unique
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and, therefore, should not be viewed so pessimistically. Inevitably, due to
the market environment that is at its basis, Western science does not have
an overall, coherent, concentrated, and organized unified quest for truth;
rather, there is an intense individual sense of competition. This compe-
tition may not be without costs. But the advantages of dissemination of
scientific results are very great in the West, and thus it is actively inspired.
From this perspective, the results of a recent survey investigating R&D man-
agers' behavioral reaction to the reform of R&D organization, which revealed
that managers generally favored decentralization, private ownership, mobil-
ity, and other aspects of reform, are encouraging and display courage and
ambition on their part. On these grounds, the outlook for Russian S&T
becomes more positive.[7]
The area of international technology transfer is important and will gain
in importance as the process of transition to a market economy continues. An
entire chapter in this book has been devoted to this subject. The emphasis
on the export of technology is understandable due to the need for hard
currency, but a more appropriate policy orientation would place the emphasis
on technology imports. This will bring the necessary results for long-term
modern economic growth if the surrounding environment is receptive.
The current need for foreign currency should be secondary to the effort to
build up internal welfare based on domestic economic growth. Some experts
contend that the more technologies can be imported, the faster the economy
will grow, assuming that the domestic research and technology levels are at
least sufficiently compatible to facilitate easy and useful assimilation. The
technological balance of payments will be negative, but the trade balance
could be running a large surplus (as in Japan, Germany, South Korea, Tai-
wan, and others). Other problems (including hard currency shortages) will
be solved in the long run, but some strategic vision from the state on R&D
imports can be helpful immediately (particularly where problems may arise
with respect to the financial limitations of enterprises).
7.3.4 Areas for restructuring R&D
One of the first places to begin restructuring with some of the greatest po-
tential rewards is the monstrous, until recently well-financed military indus-
trial complex. Conversion of the military industry is a common and widely
discussed topic in Western industrialized economies. Countries like Japan
or the USA have gone through quite extensive conversion programs in the
past.[8] The conversion can come from above in the guise of a centrally
planned conversion, or it can come from below when each enterprise seeks
its own destiny. The latter, decentralized manner was typical in the USA. In
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Japan, conversion was sudden, but goals of the ensuing policies were to facil-
itate competition with an early emphasis on serving the world market with
domestically developed products. Conversion from below is usually more
successful because it produces products and technology that the civilian sec-
tor is demanding. The reorientation from the defense to the civilian sector
has great potential due to the big backlog of demand for civilian products
which has arisen during the decades of concentrating on military production.
The Russian Federation has many assets that can be provided through
conversion and the transition to a market economy. Many firms of the de-
fense ministry are already producing a number of civilian products, primarily
because no civilian firms are engaged in such production. Also, this great
nation has a very well-educated and highly trained population, particularly
in the fundamentals. The West will need to provide assistance in certain
areas such as education (exchange of students, scholars, managers, etc.) and
technological agreements. Knowledge is more important than equipment
(and much cheaper because it requires less foreign exchange) in the long run
when the purpose is to build up domestic S&T potential.
In developing the appropriate environment for progressive R&D there
is an essential need for the construction of legal support for innovative ac-
tivities. The law is to be a facilitator of rather than a barrier to R&D. It
is difficult to provide a complete legal structure for research, development,
innovation, and diffusion. This structure must be adaptable and flexible as
more is understood about the innovative process. Of course, providing model
forms of contracts and legislation is valuable, but scope must be provided
for adaptation and evolution of such documents.
Preservation of the rights of individual scientists is very important. The
individual inventor may not playa big role alone in developing innovations,
but his role in an R&D enterprise is and will be crucial. There is a definite
need for support for the intellectual labor market. There is no question
that the concept of property rights must be clarified. In the West, different
industries use different methods in appropriating rewards from R&D such as
secrecy, lead time, patents, and others. Market orientation gives enterprises
alternative modes for appropriation and there may be a smaller role for the
more formal methods (Le., copyrights, patents, trademarks) as would be
expected, ex ante.
It is ironic to observe that in the transition of the Soviet Union to a
market economy, it is Lenin's question that we face: What is to be done?
This section attempts to move us a considerable distance in thinking about
this question.
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There seems to be general agreement among both experts of So-
viet/Russian R&D and scholars of Western R&D systems that basic, funda-
mental R&D will need support during the transition to a market economy in
Russia and thereafter. There is no economy which relies entirely on private
funding in this area. It is the nature of basic research that it investigates
not directly profit-making areas, in which firms (profit oriented in a market
economy) tend to underinvest. Applied research should be primarily funded
by the private sector with the exception of private R&D that is aimed at or
tailored to specific national preferences (i.e., defense) and areas where goods
are not really traded in the market (Le., health, environment, ecology, and
others ).[9]
Funding becomes a key issue in the transition as there may be inadequate
demand for applied R&D during this stage of development. The danger
of insufficient private sector demand is the potential loss or destruction of
valuable human capital (research teams, etc.) that may be very productive
in the future Russian economy. These may need to be the beneficiaries of
some transition (temporary) subsidies.
As stated earlier, a diversity of organizational forms is ultimately de-
sirable. The same organizational form is not necessarily appropriate for all
types of S&T activities. Many Western experts are strong advocates of the
view that the market should select appropriate organizational forms, but the
market can only achieve such a solution with a decentralized style of labora-
tories and institutions with a variety of alternatives. Therefore, some science
and/or industry might be quickly integrated into a new system, while others
may stand alone for some time.
Even if one believes that R&D done within the manufacturing enter-
prise will become the dominant organizational form, engaging the existing
laboratories in contract R&D activities is likely to be a viable route during
the transition if market forces are allowed to operate in full. It may prove
to be tough for laboratories to be absorbed into firms, because they may
want to enter manufacturing directly. The latter activity is just another
route the market provides. For market purposes, it is irrelevant whether the
laboratories buy enterprises or vice versa.
In returning to the problem of inadequate demand for R&D products
during the transition, it appears that the applied field will face more diffi-
culties than the basic area, though both will need some forms of support.
It may prove to be unavoidable to continue a similar magnitude of (only)
financial support from the state budget to basic science as was the case in
the recent past. This must be accompanied by simultaneous, substantial
changes with respect to establishing principles of competition for funding,
Research and Development Management 233
competing sources, peer review, expert assessment for determining national
priorities, and so on.
Applied research presents a more formidable problem. Assistance will
be required in the interim, but if it is too generous it can deter and defer
the development of competition, innovation, and the benefits thereof. Tran-
sitional subsidies may make sense, but a new tax might accomplish the same
results. The operation of the tax should be studied more closely to determine
whether rules that govern the tax distort, in any way, the laboratories' or
enterprises' choice of organizational structure. Experience has shown that
it is preferable to avoid taxes that create an incentive to promote stand-
alone research laboratories or solely contract research. Any tax scheme is
required to be neutral, while providing adequate funds for investment and
development.
Finally, there is a fundamental dependence of scientific and technolog-
ical reform on legal and economic reform. In the legal sphere, the central
issue is the establishment of property rights of all forms (intellectual and
material). The more quickly an appropriate legal framework is in place, the
more rapidly the transitional problems will disappear.
In the economic sphere, it is clear that for rational technological assess-
ment at the enterprise and national levels one needs the right prices (those
that reflect the market-determined supply and demand). De-monopolization
is essential to allow competition to drive R&D investment. There are two
separate benefits to de-monopolization:
• Some competition will turn out to be better than no competition.
• In terms of increased size of total private resources invested in R&D, de-
monopolization and consequent competition will facilitate an improve-
ment in the functioning of the selection process (the moving toward more
desirable organizational forms).
Labor mobility is also very important in the economic sphere. S&T
workers must be free to choose their employer and vice versa. To restrict
labor mobility is to exclude a large fraction of the potential benefits of eco-
nomic reform.
Notes
[1] We are reminded of the shift of certain types of production to newly industri-
alized countries as in the cases of steel, chemicals, or automobiles. The specific
advantages of these nations drew these manufacturing industries to their soil,
and these industries have in a number of situations been further developed,
subsequently helping these nations to become substantial exporters of the re-
sulting products themselves. Simultaneously, a reorientation is required in
234 Christoph M. Schneider
those more mature nations from which the manufacturing initiatives originally
came.
[2] The percentage of heavy industry production in total manufacturing output
was 79% in 1944 (Goto, 1991, p. 6).
[3] The most thorough and renowned studies on this topic have been completed
by Edward Denison and his colleagues; see the References and Chapter 2.
[4] Numerous authors have come to the same conclusion regarding this fact. Ell-
man and Kontorovich (1992) state that technological progress in the USSR
slowed down significantly in the 1970s, retarding economic growth. The slow-
down in technological progress was due in part to the degradation of the re-
search and development sector (pp. 9-10). See also Poznanski (1987, p. 54).
[5] The views and propositions made throughout this section are based on personal
discussions with leading experts and policy makers from Russia and Western
nations who participated at an IIASA conference on "Research and Develop-
ment Management in the Transition to a Market Economy" in Moscow in July
1991.
[6] In the United States, only 35% of scientists are directly employed as R&D
personnel, while 45% are employed in related activities. They are involved
in marketing, communication, exchange programs, and so on. These related
activities make an essential contribution to research development and growth
without being immediately associated with R&D.
[7] This refers to the survey concerning managers' interpretations of R&D orga-
nization and structure within the framework of the economic reform program.
This study was presented by Leonid Kosals at the IIASA conference "R&D
Management in the Transition to a Market Economy" in Moscow, July 13-15,
1991.
[8] In 1945, the USA had to undergo a much larger conversion than that facing
the Soviet Union. At that time, approximately 40% of US GNP was devoted to
defense. In Japan the large military sector, which was built up during WWII,
disappeared overnight after the war.
[9] This is representative of the organization of R&D funding in most market
economies.
Chapter 8
Summary and Conclusions
8.1 Summary of Major Points
The purpose of this study is to conduct an up-to-date review and interna-
tional comparison of the structure, organization, management, and perfor-
mance of the Soviet research and development sector, subsequently deducing
the potential and form of its remnants in Russia's transition to a market
economy and bid to rejoin the global mainstream scientific and economic
communities. This is a substantial task by any means, but a rewarding one.
Rewarding in that the results reveal the ominous size and significant devo-
tion of Soviet planners to promote R&D, despite their inefficient use of it.
Russia, the largest successor republic of the former Union, is heir to most
of these voluminous resources accumulated over the decades, though also
to the administrative burdens. The potential for a progressive future looks
positive if accompanied by appropriate management reforms.
In Chapter 2, the importance of research and development for economic
growth is reviewed from the theoretical and empirical perspective. Findings
have shown that little doubt remains with respect to the fact that R&D
is one key source of economic growth. The discussion also reveals that, in
theory, under more or less free market economic conditions the incentives
to both competitive and monopoly industries to undertake R&D are less
than the potential social benefits. Consequently this causes a tendency to
underinvest in a purely market economy, and portrays a socially managed or
planned economy as more capable of achieving the optimal (meaning most
profitable and least wasteful to maximize social benefits) level of returns for
society using the optimal level of investment in R&D.
In addition, the theory of market structure has led some experts to
hypothesize that only large firms with large profit potential, high market
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shares in large secure markets, and the possibility of achieving economies
of scale in their R&D departments will engage in the risky operation and
financing of R&D and that too many firms doing research may generate un-
necessary repetition and a low productivity research process at the industry
level. But centrally planned economies have been dominated by immense,
vertically integrated firms. Thus, by such theoretical rationale, the planned
societies should have reached far superior levels of economic growth, devel-
opment, and living standards than those nations with more market-oriented
economies. These theoretical suggestions, however, have not been verified by
reality; the course of history, particularly recent decades, has actually proved
the contrary with respect to the Soviet Union.
Chapter 3 explicates the links between R&D and technological develop-
ment and growth in the Soviet context. After describing the participation
and status of the Soviet Union in the world economic and technological com-
munity, the chapter continues with an introduction to Soviet science and
technology as it was. The review indicates that Soviet-style socialism has
proved to be incompatible with rapid technological innovation. A.number
of characteristics are listed as evidence, including:
1. Firms had to make a considerable effort to overcome supply difficulties.
2. Process innovations dominated over product innovations.
3. Financial incentives for research, development, and implementation were
small, if not negative.
4. Enterprises' priorities were more inclined to emphasize the quantity
rather than the quality of output.
5. There has been a long time lag between invention and innovation; sub-
sequent diffusion was also slow.
A closer analysis of the structure and management of the R&D sector
reveals long-standing ideological foundations and a severe mismatch between
the established institutions of the Soviet science community and the need
for technological change and accompanying factors. The Soviets themselves
recognized the need for change, but the introduction of any alterations un-
der the old regime led to more complications, inefficiencies, and inequalities
rather than less.
Chapter 4 provides an account and international comparison of the in-
puts into the R&D sector under seven decades of Soviet leadership, and
clearly shows the magnitude of the R&D sector and its significance with
respect to the total global scientific resources. Statistics indicate that the
general educationalization of the Soviet Union took place within a fairly lim-
ited period of time, allowing the nation to subsequently draw on a strong
educational base. The commitment to considerable and consistent financing
Research and Development Management 237
for education continued. Yet, the arrangement and variety of schools, the
indirectly dictated areas for individual specialization, and the almost com-
plete absence of R&D activity conducted in institutes of higher education
have left many questions of whether the investment has served to continually
improve the level of education for R&D. With the globalization of research,
technology, industry, and business, the need arises to modify the require-
ments of the higher education system and its associated research function as
well as redefine the university/industry interface which has been intensified
in recent years in the Western nations. Russia's opportunity for sweeping
change is now.
Chapter 4 continues with a description of R&D personnel. By setting
yearly plan targets higher, the Soviet Union created a mega work force of sci-
entists and engineers numbering in excess of 1.5 million in the late 1980s, the
most in any single nation in the world. Unfortunately, there was largely an
organizational separation of science from production, and a sort of separation
of R&D from the different ruling scientific institutions. Thus, the stock of
available human resources was increasing though their actual utilization may
not have been increasing as quickly, or at all for that matter. Immobility,
specialization, special benefits, and lack of information about the activities
of others provided plenty of disincentives to contemplate a move elsewhere,
would it have been possible. Consequently, the overall management of the
R&D institutes and the large institutes' internal policy were thwarting cre-
ative developments (which are generally said to accompany growing employ-
ment of university graduates) and squandering scientific potential.
The final part of Chapter 4 deals with R&D financing. The figures ver-
ify a continual strong budgetary commitment to research and experimental
development activities. This emphasis was partly the result of a desire to
maintain a lasting tradition of promoting science as Marx had said it should
be done, and partly for the more practical reason that progress in science and
technology would yield solutions to economic and social problems. Essen-
tially, all financing was from the state. No one, however, from the science and
technology sector, or any other sector for that matter, was directly involved
in the budgetary process. Money automatically allocated from the GKNT
was considered "easy money" and frequently led to low-quality R&D and the
free-rider problem. As a consequence, funds were wasted on research studies
that had little or no commercial value and were often antiquated. Neverthe-
less, the financing process made it easy for the Soviet scientific community
to continue to grow and did secure numerous impressive results, particularly
in the technical sciences (although these priorities differed significantly from
those in the nonsocialist countries of the Western industrialized world).
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The material in Chapter 5 covers the extent and form in which Soviet
R&D management was linked to the world S&T community, and what the
consequences were. For many decades, the Soviet Union (naturally including
its R&D sector) was characterized by partially self-imposed and partially in-
flicted isolation from the industrialized Western world. So, it could neither
benefit from nor contribute to the developments and advances made in the
non-Communist West. Attempts were made within the CMEA to establish a
cooperative group of socialist nations to counter their exclusion from West-
ern activities. This, however, did not prove to be very fruitful. The opening
of the Soviet Union to the world in the late 1980s revealed the true level of
scientific achievements. Although there were some fields that did have some-
thing to offer, many others (particularly in the civilian sector) were seriously
lacking. Russia seems to be rejoining the world scientific, technological, and
economic communities just when internationalization and globalization are
coming into full swing. This and the factors associated with it could help
rejuvenate R&D in Russia, especially since there is such a strong domestic
S&E base which is favorable for attracting foreign R&D interests.
Chapter 6 leaves the specifics of R&D management and describes the
economic environment that has accompanied the development of the R&D
sector during the decades of Soviet Communist Party leadership. The cen-
tral planning system and bargaining economics determined everything in the
economy: from the priorities of and the resources for research and develop-
ment of innovations, to the needs for and objectives of scientific activities,
to the technologies used for production, to the prices and quantity of out-
put of all products, and to whom these would be distributed. However, the
enormous supply of labor in the full-employment economy and the access
to an undervalued and seemingly bottomless pit of raw material resources
negated the demand for more advanced, efficiency-enhancing, and input-
saving technologies.
Therefore, as stated in Chapter 6, "production amid plenty" in the USSR
required technologies to be functional in turning out masses of a particular
product regardless of the needed labor, raw material, or energy inputs. As a
consequence, the researchers, scientists, scholars, engineers, and technicians
(producers and developers of the techniques and ideas) were generally sub-
ject to the fulfillment of R&D plans based on the relatively simple technical
needs. In this way, the Soviet Union was inflicted by the vicious cycle of
technological decay: a continuous loop eroding technological progress, ex-
cept, of course, in sectors of special national interest such as defense and
space. In most fields of technical change the USSR fell well behind Western
industrialized nations. Eventually, the Soviet R&D sector also fell victim to
overemployment, inefficient resource use, and underutilization; the outputs
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were products tailored to the resource-rich nation. Nonetheless, the future
need not seem bleak in light of these events. With a moderate investment
in resource saving, a much greater advance in productivity growth can be
attained in the successor republics of the former USSR than can be achieved
with the same investment in a mature market economy.
The final chapter of the study discusses R&D management in the tran-
sition to the future: from the Soviet Union to Russia. The mismanagement
of research and development in the former Soviet Union or, rather, the pre-
ceding management based on distorted economic signals leaves much room
for improvement and future promise. The value of an accumulated stock
of knowledge and experience in R&D is crucial in the propagation of new
innovations. Russia now has this stock, although it also has its deficiencies.
Therefore, if the economic and political situation is modified to become some-
what more democratic and market oriented and to facilitate a reform of R&D
management, organization, and structure, future gains in economic growth
and development for Russia would seem to be assured. Some thoughts on
the management of R&D and technological advance in the transition to a
market economy are also given; these include such essential items as:
1. Directing a portion of the scientific effort toward specific areas that are
less sensitive to short-term price changes so that valuable resources and
potential will not be lost.
2. Closer ties with user needs.
3. Closer interaction with other policy areas.
4. Actual integration of R&D into industry.
5. Conversion of defense-oriented R&D to civilian-oriented R&D.
8.2 Concluding Remarks
The Soviet-style central planning model has demonstrated that it may be
possible, at least for a while, to reasonably plan production (supply) and
even to steer the desires of the public depending on the ideology underlying
the political system in order to plan consumption (demand). Yet, Soviet-
style socialism in all aspects of the economy, including the management of
research and development, particularly in comparison with the principles
ruling a market economy, has proved that it is incapable of planning inno-
vation to achieve the conditions corresponding to modern economic growth
and development.
Innovative activities, that is research and development, are creative, dy-
namic, and evolutionary processes that depend on an economic environment
that will provide:
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• The financial support when it is warranted and required to realize and
introduce an idea for commercialization that will increase overall social
welfare.
• The rewards that result in the continued interest of individuals and
various types of public and private groups (institutes or companies) to
engage in R&D and make technological change a cumulative process.
As Schumpeter emphasized, innovation is spontaneous (though ulti-
mately founded on previous achievements) and occurs at a nonlinear rate
over time. Thus, truly productive research and development, which sup-
ports the progress leading to the successfully and continually transforming
societies in which the standard of living reaches the level residents in Western
industrialized nations have become accustomed to, can only really flourish
where economic policy has laid the foundations of a market system; a system
in which the consumers' desires reverberate all the way to the researchers
and scientific experts who must respond, and for whose investigations, ex-
periments, and developments certain forms of free and secured financing is
always available but not automatic. Only potential success in a competitive
arena can procure the necessary resources to generate success. Of course, as
is evident in Western examples, this does not preclude the presence of some
strategic government intervention to aid the cause, not to interfere with but
rather to support the functions of an R&D market.
Although this may be thought of as wasteful at first, it is really a method
for improving efficiency. Less valuable resources are discarded on worthless
prospects, or at least not before their time has come. In addition, the actors
are endeavored to inevitably provide the optimum currently available in
an effort to stay ahead of any competitors. The resulting choice made by
consumers starts the process all over in a continuous, dynamic fashion.
In the former Soviet Union, the entire economic system was in a static
state - no dynamism, no change, no evolution. Like the dinosaur, it did not
alter its characteristics, behavior, habits, or relations with other components
of the changing system in order to accommodate the modifications in the
environment. And, like the once mighty and feared dinosaur, the technolog-
ical strength of the former Soviet Union is confronted with potential demise.
The implementation of appropriate R&D management in the transition to
a market economy is a necessity if the fate of the scientific and technology
communities is to be rescued. There must be competition, demand respon-
siveness, and international support and exchange, as well as cleverly directed
government policy.
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In the past, a number of economists have frequently called attention to
a tendency to underinvest in R&D in the private sector: that is, firms de-
vote too few resources to the development of new technology (for example,
Mansfield, 1980; and Rosenberg, 1980). There are several reasons for this.
R&D is a risky activity, and many firms appear to be rather risk averse.
But even more important are the short-term time horizons within which
business operates that make it difficult for firms to appropriate the benefits
that society receives from new technology. In addition, some industries or
even specific R&D activities are characterized by certain indivisibilities such
as economies of scale or industrial fragmentation which prevent some, of-
ten small organizations from undertaking them efficiently (Mansfield, 1980,
p. 139). As a result, several of the experts contend that a more extensive
system of government subsidy is needed to better articulate society's legiti-
mate long-term R&D needs and to strengthen the incentives of business in
technology development involving more distant payoffs (Rosenberg, 1980, p.
129). Considering all these difficulties in enabling productive and efficient
R&D for the general benefit of society under market economic conditions,
central planning may look like an attractive alternative at first glace.
In fact, Soviet-style central planning as it was formulated in the 1930s
and 1940s was based on numerous principles that could have solved the
potential problems in a market structure. The Soviet scheme for R&D man-
agement was expected to be accompanied by many benefits, including the
effects of large-scale production, the potential to eliminate duplicate work,
the extension of time horizons, and the selection of projects according to
social (not private) rates of return.
While this style of management originally satisfied at least the plan-
ners' requirements, the increasing inability to detect all the rapidly growing
needs of both society and producers led to inadequate quantity and quality
of output in both the R&D and manufacturing sectors despite the overly
abundant growth rate in inputs. Indeed, during the extensive-growth policy
environment of the 1950s and 1960s, the planners' demand for innovation
focused on technologies that increased the quantity of output, rather than
on cost- or resource-saving technologies that were the key to a modern-style
growth future (Linz, 1992, p. 68). Therefore, the same political and eco-
nomic conditions that promoted a valuable and enormous R&D sector (as
inefficient or unproductive as it has been accused of being) also created an
environment where this sector was essentially detached from the production
and consumer sectors. The real demand was lost in the R&D management
process.
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By the end of the Communist leadership in the Soviet Union, the R&D
sector had become riddled with issues that were reasons for concern when
anticipating the future. On the education side, the rate of total graduates
began to fall. The isolation aspect not only prevented domestic students
from going abroad (though there were additional reasons like the lack of hard
currency and others), but also kept the number of foreign students very low.
In the United States, for example, rising numbers of foreign students make
up for the decreasing number of domestic students. On the whole, rigidities
and lack of breadth in certain educational areas hindered the expansion of
fields when they were growing in importance on the world scientific stage.
Simply stated, Soviet scientists and engineers were engaging in R&D
activity in an overburdened bureaucratic environment. Bureaucratic barri-
ers to communication and low scientific mobility added to the isolation of
R&D workers from their domestic peers in addition to their relative inter-
national solitude. There was generally a rather low level of sophistication of
equipment and supplies, and especially a lack of access to computers that
could have made scientists' and engineers' work many times more efficient.
The age structure of leading Soviet researchers led to a dominance of the
old (in ideology and age) directors of institutes who were against change. A
bargaining style of politics developed that caused the acceptance of scientific
overemployment at the expense of underutilization.
But rather than continue to describe the problems of Soviet R&D, more
enthusiasm should be shown for the positive aspects: the achievements of
scientists and engineers under difficult working conditions in Soviet laborato-
ries. The Soviet system did have some virtues that deserve attention. These
begin with the enhanced level of prestige afforded the scientist on ideologi-
cal grounds; until the relatively recent past, their annual income was higher
than that of firm managers - quite contrary to the situation in, for exam-
ple, the USA. In general, the Soviets were devoted to consistent long-term
approaches to problem areas and the use of proven techniques.
Even the low level of sophistication of equipment and instruments had
its positive side. It fostered craftsmanship and creativity, and a low tech-
nician to researcher ratio. This, however, resulted in numerous scholars,
particularly younger ones, having functions very different from those they
had been trained for. Combined with a relatively high standard level of
idleness, this indicates that a considerable amount of the educated capacity
was not utilized in a productive manner. Yet, such a phenomenon was not
specific to the input side of the R&D sector, but also typified the output side.
A high proportion of research work was left unused (or incomplete) and firm
inventories were full of noninstalled domestic and foreign new machinery.
Communist leaders of the former Soviet Union recognized this problem and
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repeatedly voiced their concern at various party congresses since the early
1940s regarding the large quantity of scientific discoveries and important
inventions that lie around for years or even decades without being intro-
duced into practical applications (Berliner, 1987, p. 72). Who knows what
the potential impact would be if only a portion of the idle capacity were
harnessed?
The possibilities seem endless. Particularly today, when Russia is under-
going the transition to a market economy and the economic, institutional,
and ideological foundations upon which the scientists' and engineers' work-
ing environment was predicated for so long have finally been all but swept
away. The former official Western discrimination and the parallel reluctance
of the East to become too dependent on the West are no longer barriers to
Russia's opportunity for rejoining the global mainstream in research, tech-
nology, and economics. Science and technology establishments in Russia are
well endowed with qualified personnel and other factors (R&D expenditure
taking a proportionately larger share of national income for many decades
under Soviet leadership than was and is usual in the West), and are, con-
trary to others in Central and Eastern Europe, substantial as far as the
world scientific community is concerned. The concentration of scientists and
engineers in the R&D institutes could provide an ideal environment in which
the giant S&E work force can be introduced to the functions and character-
istics of a market economy with respect to science and technology. Russia
does not have to fall into the position of a product-cycle follower as many
of its neighbors might. During the transition and possibly for some time
afterward, imitation may be the dominant style of technological advance,
but innovation should soon become more significant.
Therefore, in a nutshell, Soviet-style R&D management resulted in an
unproductive and inefficient use of and a low if not negative social rate of
return in the long term on the enormous resources going into the promotion
of scientific and technological activity. Under new management methods,
such as those characteristic of a country as Russia attempting to complete
the transition to a market economy, much of the R&D resources created
under the former regime could be effectively used to generate crucially needed
growth in the economy. This growth could lead to an improvement of the
Russian economy and renewed prominence for the Russian S&T community,
but based on market principles and not the plan. As a consequence, Russia's
position in the world market would change. There is the potential for a global
impact that can affect many nations, both R&D leaders and followers, and
international economic relations will once again need to be adjusted.
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